Dagfinn Føllesdal

Husserl’s notion of the intentional object may be compared and contrasted with Bolzano’s and Frege’s views on the reference of linguistic expressions, especially since Bolzano was a main influence on the development of Husserl’s views. Føllesdal responds to David Bell’s criticisms of Føllesdal’s earlier readings of Husserl on reference, directedness, and the notion of a determinable object x. He argues that Husserl’s treatment of indexicals and reference is in some ways more insightful than the treatments of either Bolzano or Frege. To preempt the charge that Husserl’s philosophy forwards a naïve, overly mentalistic model of the mind and its expressive capacities, Føllesdal mentions that Husserl developed a thought experiment nearly identical to the well-known Twin Earth scenario later framed by Hilary Putnam to criticize internalist, mentalistic theories of meaning. Føllesdal argues that Husserl was ahead of his time in trying to account for the semantics of indexical and demonstrative terms, partly under the influence of Brentano. This study shows that the opposition between so-called continental and so-called analytic philosophy is not historically as well-grounded as many have supposed.

The rationality assumptions that are made when one interprets texts or explains actions have been regarded as necessary (Davidson, Dray), empirical (Hempel), superfluous (Popper), or false (Donagan). After a survey of different notions of rationality and the role that each of them plays in interpretation and in the explanation of action, the author's view is presented in four theses: (1) some degree of rationality is necessary, (2) reasons for actions should always be included in their explanation, even where purely causal factors would suffice to explain them, (3) explanations should not seek to maximize rationality, and (4) man is striving to be rational.