Daian Bica

This essay investigates Newton's thoughts on laws of nature. First, we argue that Newton’s experimental-philosophical methodology of hypotheses and queries exhibits a modal-exploratory nature. Second, this modal-exploratory character has immediate consequences for his metaphysics of laws of nature. In the introduction, we explain the main characteristics of modal-exploratory modelling as a modelling technique involving targetless models (i.e. non-existing entities; cf. Massimi 2019, 2022). In the second section, we show that Newton’s modelling of the cause of universal gravitation via his earlier (presented in his optical correspondences from 1675) and later aether models (presented in the Opticks of 1704 and 1717) are paradigmatic cases of modal-exploratory modelling. In the third and final section, we show further that also the context of Newton's metaphysics of laws/active principles from “Query 31” of the second edition of the Opticks (1717) can be seen as a case of modal-exploratory modelling. Recent commentators (e.g., Biener & Schliesser 2017, Henry 2020, Hazelwood 2023, Walsh 2017) remarked that Newton’s definition of active principles as laws, causes, natures, or dispositions gives rise to various conceptual tensions. However, we aim to show that the tension inherent in his conception of laws is merely apparent since he is wrestling with multiple possibilities of making a theory of laws work. According to our modal-exploratory reading, Newton attempts to find out a plausible contender for what laws of nature may be. Relative to our reading, his definition of active principles in terms of laws and dispositions should not be taken at face value, but seen as a “never-at-rest” exploratory activity. So, we will reach the conclusion that Newton's modelling procedure is an exploratory one, being situated at the intersection of philosophical- experimental methodology and his metaphysics of laws.

In this review article, I situate Michela Massimi’s 2022 Perspectival Realism book in the broader state of the art of the contemporary philosophy of science by examining critically its contribution to the perspectival realism debate. Setting up a new agenda of philosophical problems for the perspectival realist, Massimi’s book is the most comprehensive assessment of perspectival realism since the publication of Giere’s 2006 Giere, Ronald. Ed. 2006. Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.[Crossref], [Google Scholar] Scientific Perspectivism (the starting point of the debate). The author carries out a scrupulous analysis of the historical, epistemological, and metaphysical foundations of perspectival realism—while she engages critically with the existing literature, she does so by giving a generous homage to the previous contributions to the state of the art (the works of Giere, Morrison, van Fraassen and others). However, I raise a batterie of questions about Massimi’s (perspectival) commitments, to bring into question the reach and the ambitions of her global project, specifically the rising tension between her modest epistemological beliefs in a plurality of culturally and historically situated perspectives and her ambitious metaphysical commitments towards a primitivist view about laws of nature.