Dalila Serebrinsky

Both descriptivism and the causal theory of reference fail to account for the meaning of theoretical terms in a way consistent with scientific realism. Faced with this problem, hybrid theories of reference have been developed. They combine features of both descriptivism and the causal theory and seek to capture the advantages of each. In this work, we critically analyze two strategies to articulate hybrid theories of reference in the face of the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms. They are exemplified by the proposals of Psillos and Kitcher. We argue that neither of these strategies is successful in articulating the descriptive and causal elements in a genuine hybrid theory of reference that satisfies the standards of scientific realism.

Este artículo conecta la epistemología del desacuerdo y la metafísica de la ciencia al proponer que los desacuerdos en ontología científica pueden entenderse como instancias de desacuerdo profundo que exhiben diversos grados de profundidad. Primero establecemos las características centrales de los desacuerdos profundos y argumentamos que las explicaciones estándar fallan en acomodar su naturaleza gradual. Tomando el debate entre las stances empirista y metafísica en ontología científica como un caso paradigmático, mostramos cómo este desacuerdo satisface los criterios para ser considerado un desacuerdo profundo. Luego, basándonos en trabajos recientes en epistemología del desacuerdo, desarrollamos un marco teórico que muestra cómo la profundidad de los desacuerdos se correlaciona con la generalidad de los principios en conflicto. A través de un estudio de caso detallado de debates sobre modalidad en ontología científica, demostramos tres niveles de profundidad: desacuerdos entre perspectivas (más profundos), desacuerdos dentro de perspectivas sobre dominios específicos (intermedios), y desacuerdos dentro de sub-posiciones (menos profundos). Este análisis revela que los desacuerdos profundos en metafísica de la ciencia no son monolíticos sino que exhiben una estructura rica que explica tanto su persistencia como el progreso diferencial posible a través de diferentes debates. Nuestro marco proporciona tanto una perspectiva teórica sobre la naturaleza del desacuerdo filosófico como una orientación práctica para entender los límites y perspectivas de la metafísica de la ciencia.

ABSTRACT Deep disagreements have often been described as controversies that do not admit rational resolution because they lack the necessary conditions for formulating arguments. It is therefore worth asking whether there is any benefit to attempting arguments in these contexts. In this work, I argue that, although the conditions for argumentation are not met in deep disagreements, attempts at argumentation can still play a role. I take as a case study the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists and its description as a difference between epistemic stances, that is, between values and commitments that determine epistemic policies. Using the notion of epistemic stance, it is shown why this debate can be considered a case of deep disagreement. By analyzing the No Miracle Argument, one of the most frequent arguments in this debate, I conclude that attempts at formulating arguments, while they cannot resolve the disagreement, can play a valuable role in these contexts: that of revealing insights in the opponent that allow them all to better refine their own stance.

The debate between scientific realists and anti-realists is now a classic debate in the Philosophy of Science. Van Fraassen (2002) has suggested that the positions that take part in the debate involve not only different doxastic attitudes regarding some propositions, but different epistemic stances, that is, different sets of commitments, values and epistemic strategies. The formulation of this debate in terms of epistemic stances and the voluntarist epistemology it motivates make it plausible to think of it as a deep disagreement. This kind of disagreements cannot be settled by reason alone because they lack the conditions that are necessary for arguments to work. I argue, however, that the attempts to use arguments can have an epistemic value in these contexts, as they can help reveal intuitions. I adopt the view on intuitions put forward by Chudnoff (2014), according to which they are mental states capable of motivating epistemic action. I claim that, while the attempt to utter an argument cannot convince an opponent of changing her mind, it can make her perform some epistemic actions and, thus, bring out some of her intuitions. To show how arguments can work in this way, I take as a study case one of the main realist arguments: the No Miracles Argument.

El empirismo de conceptos propuesto por Jesse Prinz pretende ser una teoría de conceptos que cumpla con todos los desiderata que, según el mismo autor, una teoría de conceptos debe cumplir y, a la vez, lo haga de la manera más económica posible. Con respecto al contenido intencional, propone una semántica informacional no atomista. Los conceptos, para Prinz, son meros detectores de rasgos perceptibles, es decir, entidades estructuradas, cuyas partes significativas obtienen su contenido de manera informacional. Es el objetivo de este trabajo mostrar que el empirismo de conceptos es incapaz de satisfacer el desideratum que se refiere a la explicación del contenido intencional. Argumentamos que los conceptos entendidos como meros detectores no logran dar cuenta satisfactoriamente del contenido de los conceptos sin caer en el problema de la disyunción y que son incompatibles con el externalismo propio de las teorías informacionales.

Deep disagreements have been described as controversies that are not just about some propositions, but also about the right method to evaluate those propositions and, thus, cannot be rationally resolved. Recently, this idealized notion has been questioned, and there is growing consensus on the existence of different levels of depth among disagreements. I analyse the account of the degree of deep disagreement offered by Lagewaard and argue that it does not provide a satisfactory explanation, as it takes an epistemic principle approach, but fails to give a coherent picture of how epistemic principles actually work. I argue that the relevant property in a classification of epistemic principles is the generality of the domain they are applied to. Although epistemic principles have a central role in the epistemic actions agents perform, they underdetermine these actions and can be applied differently by different agents or in different situations. I offer an account that takes this feature of epistemic principles to show how we can draw many incompatible domain-specific principles from the same general principle. This explains the existence of conflicts in epistemic principles that can be applied more or less generally, which results in disagreements that are deeper than others.