Damian Ilodigwe

Like many of his contemporaries such as Bradley and Collingwood, Whitehead wrote at a time when positivism was the dominant philosophical influence in British philosophy, following the disintegration of the Hegelian synthesis. Central to Whitehead’s philosophical project is the task of rehabilitation of metaphysics against the backdrop of its deconstruction by logical positivism. While Whitehead is broadly sympathetic to the ideal of metaphysics, he believes that the grandiose conception of metaphysics as science of being qua being associated with traditional metaphysics is out of tune with scientific rationality and as such is problematic. At the core of Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics, therefore, is an attempt to broker rapprochement between metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality by converting metaphysics into speculative metaphysics, with the ambition of focusing on our universe of experience rather than all universes of discourse, as is typical of traditional metaphysics. While there is no doubt that Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is an answer to positivism, it is at the same time an attempt to tone down the claims of metaphysics such as to bring it in accord with scientific rationality. Yet it remains to be seen whether Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is successful in so far as the reconciliation of metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality through speculative philosophy focuses only on particular experiences rather than universal experiences, so that the concern of metaphysics to address the fundamental nature of the real in all its expressions remain pressing beyond the ideal of speculative philosophy.

The constitutive activity of the self and the ground of the unity of the self are two important aspects of understanding the self. This paper attempts to delineatethese considerations, tracing their use, function and implications in Bradley’s thesis on the self. The article argues that for Bradley, the focalization is on the understanding of the self and the relation of thought to reality. Furthermore, the article attempts to locate Bradley’s account of the self as appearance as a middle course between Kant’s transcendental idealism to Hegel’s speculative idealism to demonstrate the overlaps, ruptures, and evolution of the philosophical journey of the concept of the self, its nature, and its expressions.

A prominent feature of the contemporary society in the last couple of decades is the phenomenon of globalization. While globalization has brought immense benefits to Africa on the one hand, Africa’s entrance into and participation in the global scene has also precipitated a crisis of confusion and identity for Africa–a situation which is analogous to the effect of her encounter with colonialism, so that unless the dialectic of identity and difference that inevitably arises from this situation is constructively managed, it will be difficult for Africa to make the best of the opportunities inherent in globalization. Given that no one can make the best of any opportunity for interaction with others unless one is clear about one’s identity and priorities, a major challenge Africa has to address in the context of globalization is the need to assume personal responsibility in defining her priorities and interests such as to allow these to inform her engagement with the various participants in the global world. More often than not, the Achilles heel of Africa is lack of clear focus in respect of her priorities as well as failure to allow her interests to drive her engagement with other participants in the global system. To reverse the situation of dependency which this mode of operation fosters, we argue that, Africa needs to relocate the locus of control internally and put in place a strong regime of internal democracy based on rule of law to tackle the menace of corruption and mismanagement that has undermined development initiatives since independence.

Parmenides is one of the greatest thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. His thought has been a major point of reference for many metaphysical discussions that define the history of philosophy. Indeed there is virtually no moment in the history of metaphysics that his thought has not been influential. It is usual to contrast his philosophy of the unchanging reality of the One with Heraclitus' philosophy of change and becoming. While his counter-intuitive denial of change is questionable the philosophical burden is rethink his monism by infusing change into it without prejudice to the general idea that reality is a whole in which unity and diversity are reconciled.

Like many of his contemporaries such as Bradley and Collingwood, Whitehead wrote at a time when positivism was the dominant philosophical influence in British philosophy, following the disintegration of the Hegelian synthesis. Central to Whitehead’s philosophical project is the task of rehabilitation of metaphysics against the backdrop of its deconstruction by logical positivism. While Whitehead is broadly sympathetic to the ideal of metaphysics, he believes that the grandiose conception of metaphysics as science of being qua being associated with traditional metaphysics is out of tune with scientific rationality and as such is problematic. At the core of Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics, therefore, is an attempt to broker rapprochement between metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality by converting metaphysics into speculative metaphysics, with the ambition of focusing on our universe of experience rather than all universes of discourse, as is typical of traditional metaphysics. While there is no doubt that Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is an answer to positivism, it is at the same time an attempt to tone down the claims of metaphysics such as to bring it in accord with scientific rationality. Yet it remains to be seen whether Whitehead’s rehabilitation of metaphysics is successful in so far as the reconciliation of metaphysical rationality and scientific rationality through speculative philosophy focuses only on particular experiences rather than universal experiences, so that the concern of metaphysics to address the fundamental nature of the real in all its expressions remain pressing beyond the ideal of speculative philosophy.