University Of Italian Switzerland
  •  55
    Aquinas on the Existence of the Future: A Response to Gili
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (3). forthcoming.
    I defend my paper "Aquinas, Geach, and Existence" against objections from Luca Gili, who argued that, according to Aquinas, future contingents do not enjoy genuine existence but exist in God's mind only.
  •  11
    Persistence in Time
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    Persistence in Time No person ever steps into the same river twice—or so goes the Heraclitean maxim. Obscure as it is, the maxim is often taken to express two ideas. The first is that everything always changes, and nothing remains perfectly similar to how it was just one instant before. The second is that nothing … Continue reading Persistence in Time →
  •  42
    Mereological Endurantism Defined
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    I develop a definition of mereological endurantism which overcomes objections that have been proposed in the literature and thereby avoids the charge of obscurity put forward by Sider against the view.
  •  108
    The Multi-location Trilemma
    Erkenntnis 1-17. forthcoming.
    The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location --- in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called Functionality, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in …Read more
  •  162
    Aquinas, Geach, and existence
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3): 175-195. 2019.
    Aquinas’ theory of being has received a growing amount of attention from contemporary scholars, both from a historic and a philosophical point of view. An important source of this attention is Geach’s seminal Form and Existence. In it, Geach argues that Aquinas subscribes to a tensed notion of existence and a theory of time according to which past and future entities do not exist in act. Subsequent commentators, such as Kenny in his Aquinas on Being, have agreed with Geach on both points. In thi…Read more
  •  87
    I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. The argument consists in a set of five jointly inconsistent assumptions. As such, the argument can be used to argue in favour of other conclusions, such as that exemplification is no relation or that plausible principles concerning ontological dependence or grounding do not hold.
  •  32
    Was Bonaventure a Four-dimensionalist?
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2): 393-404. 2020.
    Bonaventure is sometimes taken to be an ante litteram champion of the four-dimensional theory of persistence. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect: Bonaventure was no four-dimensionalist.
  • Esistenza e Persistenza
    Mimesis. 2018.
    Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temp…Read more
  •  1167
    The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence
    Journal of Philosophy 114 (2): 57-75. 2017.
    This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, insofar as a se…Read more
  •  230
    In Defence of Transcendentism
    Acta Analytica 31 (2): 225-234. 2016.
    How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and do not have temporal parts. According to the transcendentist version of endurantism, objects exist at times by participating in events that occur at those times. This version of transcendentism offers specific metaphysical and semantical advantages over other versions of endurantism. In this paper, we defend transcendentist endurantism against a series of criticisms that have been recently offered by …Read more
  •  373
    The Limit Decision Problem and Four-Dimensionalism
    Vivarium 55 (1-3): 199-216. 2017.
    I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times.
  •  2061
    Relativity and Three Four‐dimensionalisms
    Philosophy Compass 11 (2): 102-120. 2016.
    Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is ‘spacetime unitism’, according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things as points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A second is the B-theory of time, according to which the past, present, and…Read more
  •  86
    Multilocation, Fusions, and Confusions
    Philosophia 43 (1): 25-33. 2015.
    The paper provides a new and detailed critique of Barker and Dowe’s argument against multi-location. This critique is not only novel but also less committal than previous ones in the literature in that it does not require hefty metaphysical assumptions. The paper also provides an analysis of some metaphysical relations between mereological and locational principles
  •  679
    From times to worlds and back again: a transcendentist theory of persistence
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 210-220. 2013.
    Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism …Read more
  •  64
    Being in Time: a theory of persistence and temporal location
    Dissertation, University of Geneva. 2014.
    In Being in Time I articulate and defend a theory of diachronic identity based on a new account of the relation between objects and time. Traditionally, the relation between objects and time has been considered to be a direct one, analogous to the one they have with space, and accordingly called location. In my dissertation, I argue that this locative approach is metaphysically problematic insofar as it commits us to questionable consequences about the nature of objects or about the metaphysics …Read more