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The mapping between the public and the private lexiconIn Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press. pp. 184--200. 1998.
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Modularity and RelevanceIn Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press Usa. 2005.This chapter addresses the flexibility problem for massive modularity. It argues that massively modular architectures exhibit flexibility largely as a result of context-sensitive competition between modules for the allocation of cognitive resources. Thus, it is the cognitive system as a whole that exhibits flexibility, rather than any particular subsystem within it.
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On Grice's Theory of ConversationIn Paul Werth (ed.), Conversation and Discourse: Structure and Interpretation, St. Martins Press. pp. 155-178. 1981.
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Intuitive and reflective inferencesIn Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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4Relevance TheoryIn Laurence R. Horn & Gregory Ward (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics, Blackwell. pp. 607--632. 2004.General overview of relevance theory.
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82Intuitive and reflective inferencesIn Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 149--170. 2009.Much evidence has accumulated in favor of such a dual view of reasoning. There is however some vagueness in the way the two systems are characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are presented with a bundle of contrasting features - slow/fast, automatic/controlled, explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central - that, depending on the specific dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two systems. As Evans states in a recent review, “i…Read more
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55For acquired behaviour to count as cultural, two conditions must be met: it must propagate in a social group, and it must remain stable across generations in the process of propagation. It is commonly assumed that imitation is the mechanism that explains both the spread of animal culture and its stability. We review the literature on transmission chain studies in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and other animals, and we use a formal model to argue that imitation, which may well play a major role i…Read more
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63Evolution, communication and the proper function of languageIn Gloria Origgi & Dan Sperber (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press), . pp. 140--169. 2000.Language is both a biological and a cultural phenomenon. Our aim here is to discuss, in an evolutionary perspective, the articulation of these two aspects of language. For this, we draw on the general conceptual framework developed by Ruth Millikan (1984) while at the same time dissociating ourselves from her view of language.
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74Evolution, communication and the proper function of languageIn Gloria Origgi & Dan Sperber (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press), . pp. 140--169. 2000.Language is both a biological and a cultural phenomenon. Our aim here is to discuss, in an evolutionary perspective, the articulation of these two aspects of language. For this, we draw on the general conceptual framework developed by Ruth Millikan (1984) while at the same time dissociating ourselves from her view of language.
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38What causes failure to apply the Pigeonhole Principle in simple reasoning problems?Thinking and Reasoning 23 (2): 184-189. 2017.The Pigeonhole Principle states that if n items are sorted into m categories and if n > m, then at least one category must contain more than one item. For instance, if 22 pigeons are put into 17 pigeonholes, at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one pigeon. This principle seems intuitive, yet when told about a city with 220,000 inhabitants none of whom has more than 170,000 hairs on their head, many people think that it is merely likely that two inhabitants have the exact same number of…Read more
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46Argumentation: its adaptiveness and efficacyBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2): 94-111. 2011.Having defended the usefulness of our definition of reasoning, we stress that reasoning is not only for convincing but also for evaluating arguments, and that as such it has an epistemic function. We defend the evidence supporting the theory against several challenges: People are good informal arguers, they reason better in groups, and they have a confirmation bias. Finally, we consider possible extensions, first in terms of process-level theories of reasoning, and second in the effects of reaso…Read more
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41Weird people, yes, but also weird experimentsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 84-85. 2010.Henrich et al.’s article fleshes out in a very useful and timely manner comments often heard but rarely published about the extraordinary cultural imbalance in the recruitment of participants in psychology experiments and the doubt this casts on generalization of findings from these “weird” samples to humans in general. The authors mention that one of the concerns they have met in defending their views has been of a methodological nature: “the observed variation across populations may be due to …Read more
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54Partner choice, fairness, and the extension of moralityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1): 102-122. 2013.Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.
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604Partner choice, fairness, and the extension of moralityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1): 102-122. 2013.Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.
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41. Reason on TrialIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 15-33. 2017.
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5ReferencesIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 357-382. 2017.
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717. Reasoning about Moral and Political TopicsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 299-314. 2017.
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49. Reasoning: Intuition and ReflectionIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 148-174. 2017.
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2. Psychologists’ TravailsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 34-48. 2017.
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412. Quality Control: How We Evaluate ArgumentsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 222-236. 2017.
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NotesIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 337-356. 2017.
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84Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive PerspectiveMind and Language 27 (5): 495-518. 2012.From an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behaviour may be to secure a good reputation as a co-operator. The best way to do so may be to obey genuine moral motivations. Still, one's moral reputation maybe something too important to be entrusted just to one's moral sense. A robust concern for one's reputation is likely to have evolved too. Here we explore some of the complex relationships between morality and reputation both from an evolutionary and a cognitive point of view.
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66. MetarepresentationsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 90-106. 2017.
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17IndexIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 387-400. 2017.
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816. Is Human Reason Universal?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 277-298. 2017.
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57. How We Use ReasonsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 109-127. 2017.
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348Epistemic VigilanceMind and Language 25 (4): 359-393. 2010.Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguist…Read more
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5AcknowledgmentsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 383-384. 2017.