By exploring the world of pre-modern and early modern scholastic Aristotelianism, this chapter outlines one of the likely metaphysical backgrounds against which Bacon developed his views on material appetites. By material appetites, he meant a set of original tendencies in nature, inherent in every part of matter. When we take into consideration the context of late scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, Bacon’s position emerges out of an exceedingly variegated landscape of philosophical solutio…
Read moreBy exploring the world of pre-modern and early modern scholastic Aristotelianism, this chapter outlines one of the likely metaphysical backgrounds against which Bacon developed his views on material appetites. By material appetites, he meant a set of original tendencies in nature, inherent in every part of matter. When we take into consideration the context of late scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, Bacon’s position emerges out of an exceedingly variegated landscape of philosophical solutions, a true sylva sylvarum of conceptual differences, deliberate borrowings and tacit accretions. As someone who during his philosophical apprenticeship must have waded into the dense forest of Aristotelian arguments in translations and commentaries, Bacon was acquainted with the distinctive Aristotelian unease about material appetite. As is well known, in Aristotle’s metaphysics matter is presented in terms of inert substratum. Furthermore, while Aristotle argued that appetite might denote life at both an inanimate (ἔφεσις) and animate (ὄρεξις) level, no form of intentional and ‘orektic’ teleology could be assigned to inanimate nature given the unintentional character of natural purposiveness. Through elaborating an original notion of material appetite, Bacon overcame classic scholastic objections and redefined traditional ontological divisions between matter, unsentient drive and conscious desire.