•  18
    Seperating the intrinsic complexity and the derivational complexity of the word problem for finitely presented groups
    with Klaus Madlener and Friedrich Otto
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 39 (1): 143-157. 1993.
    A pseudo-natural algorithm for the word problem of a finitely presented group is an algorithm which not only tells us whether or not a word w equals 1 in the group but also gives a derivation of 1 from w when w equals 1. In [13], [14] Madlener and Otto show that, if we measure complexity of a primitive recursive algorithm by its level in the Grzegorczyk hierarchy, there are groups in which a pseudo-natural algorithm is arbitrarily more complicated than an algorithm which simply solves the word p…Read more
  •  7
    You Cannot Judge an Argument by its Closure
    Informal Logic 43 (4): 669-684. 2022.
    he best arguments are distinguished by more than logical validity, successful rhetorical persuasion, or satisfactory dialectical closure. Argument appraisal has to look beyond the premises, inferences, and conclusions; it must consider more than just the objections and replies, and resolutions that satisfy the arguers might not satisfy outside critics. Arguers and their contexts can be important factors for assessing arguments. This conclusion is reached by considering several scenarios in which…Read more
  •  6
    You Cannot Judge an Argument by its Closure
    Informal Logic 43 (4): 669-684. 2022.
    he best arguments are distinguished by more than logical validity, successful rhetorical persuasion, or satisfactory dialectical closure. Argument appraisal has to look beyond the premises, inferences, and conclusions; it must consider more than just the objections and replies, and resolutions that satisfy the arguers might not satisfy outside critics. Arguers and their contexts can be important factors for assessing arguments. This conclusion is reached by considering several scenarios in which…Read more
  •  16
    Justice publique et justice privée
    Archives de Philosophie du Droit 41 149-162. 1997.
    Notion de justice. Définitions justice publique, justice privée. Place et diversité de la justice privée. Dualisme ou unité de la justice publique et de la justice privée? I. Dissemblances. A. - Rapports d'antagonisme. B. - Raisons historiques. C. - Origines différentes de la fonction juridictionnelle exercée. II. - Convergences. A. - Influence du privé sur la justice publique. B. - Influence du public sur la justice privée. C. - Perspectives communes. Juridicité. Finalité poursuivie
  •  2
    Feminist Theology, Men and the Goddess: Reminiscences and Opinions
    Feminist Theology 11 (1): 27-34. 2002.
    This article contains an account of Asphodel's early work on goddesses and related topics, and its influence on men as well as women. I show how my own spiritual awareness and my understanding of the Goddess has developed through discussions with her. I also indicate why I have a strong interest in and liking for feminist theology despite not being a theologian.
  •  14
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. We are not as reasons-responsive as w…Read more
  •  6
    D'une Science Résistante, l'Autre
    Journal of Ancient Philosophy 173-177. forthcoming.
  •  5
    A filosofia do mito em Plotino e Proclo: um estudo comparativo
    with Joachim Lacrosse
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 5 77-82. 2010.
    This contribution resumes the main conclusions of a common work of philosophical comparatism between the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, which is based on the examination of their respective reception of the traditional metaphysical use of anciant myths. This article consists in the examination of two important “definitions” of myth collected in the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to assert that, for Plotinus as fo…Read more
  •  3
    A filosofia do mito em Plotino e Proclo: um estudo comparativo
    with Joachim Lacrosse
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 5 77-82. 2010.
    This contribution resumes the main conclusions of a common work of philosophical comparatism between the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, which is based on the examination of their respective reception of the traditional metaphysical use of anciant myths. This article consists in the examination of two important “definitions” of myth collected in the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to assert that, for Plotinus as fo…Read more
  •  4
    Academic arguments
    with George Thomas Goodnight
    Calling an argument “merely academic” impugns its seriousness, belittles its substance, dis-misses its importance, and deflates hope of resolution, while ruling out negotiation and compromise. How-ever, “purely academic” argumentation, as an idealized limit case, is a valuable analytical tool for argumen-tation theorists because while the telos of academic argumentation may be cognitive, it is cognitive in the service of a community, which, in turn, is a community in the service of the cognitive…Read more
  •  18
    Traduction des textes sur la doctrine stoïcienne du mélange total
    with Nicolette Brout, Michèle Broze, Bernard Collette, Lambros Couloubaritsis, Sylvain Delcomminette, Sabrina Inowlocki, Joachim Lacrosse, Mihaïl Nasta, and Annick Stevens
    Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 24 (2): 61-92. 2006.
  •  43
    Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The concept of a devil's advocate—a cooperative arguer who assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the argument—serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation's goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be adversarial and the different ways that argumentation can be said to be "essentially" adversarial.
  •  4
    The Word as Will and Idea
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 32 126-140. 1988.
  •  1
    If, What-If, and So-What
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 17 20-28. 1998.
    With the possible exception of completely formal exercises in logic, philosophy is thoroughly metaphorical and largely conditional. Moreover, the purposes served by metaphors and conditionals in it are similar. Metaphors ask us to imagine the world in a new way, while conditionals may ask to imagine a new world. Yet some conditionals and metaphors are incompatible. There are limits to how metaphors can occur in conditionals, and how conditionals can themselves be metaphors. Specifically, only ce…Read more
  •  4
    Assertion and Conditionals
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4): 1051-1052. 1987.
  •  17
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. We are not as reasons-responsive as w…Read more
  •  6
    Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3): 444-445. 2003.
    Book Information Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology Jeanette Kennett New York Oxford University Press 2001 viii + 229 Hardback US$45 By Jeanette Kennett. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. viii + 229. Hardback:US$45
  •  38
    If circumstances were always simple and all arguers were always exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would probably always be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so in practice the default seems to be adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to…Read more
  •  52
    What Virtue Argumentation Theory Misses: The Case of Compathetic Argumentation
    with George Miller
    Topoi 35 (2): 451-460. 2016.
    While deductive validity provides the limiting upper bound for evaluating the strength and quality of inferences, by itself it is an inadequate tool for evaluating arguments, arguing, and argumentation. Similar remarks can be made about rhetorical success and dialectical closure. Then what would count as ideal argumentation? In this paper we introduce the concept of cognitive compathy to point in the direction of one way to answer that question. It is a feature of our argumentation rather than m…Read more
  •  124
    Introduction: Virtues and Arguments
    Topoi 35 (2): 339-343. 2016.
    It has been a decade since the phrase virtue argumentation was introduced, and while it would be an exaggeration to say that it burst onto the scene, it would be just as much of an understatement to say that it has gone unnoticed. Trying to strike the virtuous mean between the extremes of hyperbole and litotes, then, we can fairly characterize it as a way of thinking about arguments and argumentation that has steadily attracted more and more attention from argumentation theorists. We hope it is …Read more
  •  22
    How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, and yet objectivity is itself a bias? In this paper, we argue that objectivity is indeed a kind of bias but is still an argumentative virtue. In common with many biases – and many virtues – its effects are neither uniformly negative nor uniformly positive. Consequences alone are not enough to determine which character traits are argumentative virtues. Context matters. The opening section addresse…Read more