Daniel Doyle Sánchez

ABSTRACT: This paper shows how the concept of Natural Right (ius naturale), also in its subjective dimension, is conceived by Hugo Grotius as dependent on a primary relationship with the notion of justice considered in a broad sense. The author contends that the Grotian critical reconstruction of the Aristotelian categories of justice, i.e. corrective-distributive in terms of expletive-attributive respectively, largely determines the way in which the notion of ius might be understood. Accordingly, the content of Natural Right in Grotius’ view is not confined to a scope merely articulated by subjective rights, as it is usually presented, but it is extended to a genuine moral field wherein natural law can and must be understood in the light of the demands of virtue, not vice versa. En este artículo se muestra cómo, según Hugo Grocio, el derecho natural (ius naturale), también en su dimensión subjetiva, depende de una relación primaria con la justicia entendida en un sentido moral amplio. La tesis que sugiero es que la reconstrucción crítica que hace Grocio de las categorías aristotélicas de la justicia (correctiva-distributiva en términos de expletiva-atributiva respectivamente) determina, en buena medida, la forma en que se concibe el ius. Es decir, el contenido del derecho natural en Grocio no se reduce a un ámbito articulado por meros derechos subjetivos, como con frecuencia se tiende a pensar, sino que se extiende a un ámbito genuinamente moral en el que se abre un espacio donde la ley natural puede y debe ser entendida a la luz de las exigencias de la virtud, y no viceversa.

“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence: […] the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” (KpV 5:161).1 While through the study of nature we become aware of our animal nature, our moral condition raises us above animality and makes us aware of our dignity as persons. This is the famous dictum which summarizes Kant’s philosophical stance. In writing these beautiful words, he was probably inspired by Seneca (Ep. 64.5–7; Constant. 8.2–4; Santozki 2006: 226–7; Seidler 1981: 674–6). Kant held ancient moral philosophy in great esteem (Religion 6:24). Kant was well acquainted with the Stoic tradition, particularly through his reading of Cicero and Seneca. He studied them both during his school years at the Collegium Frideri cianum and also later as a university professor. However, in his published writings he does not usually refer to specific texts nor does he mention authors by name. As a consequence, in his discussion of Stoic theories it is common to find both textual and systematic inaccuracies (Santozki 2006: 154–8; Seidler 1981: 1–13). Kant seems more interested in using Stoic ideas to develop and define his own position (Schneewind 1996: 292–3). Both Kant and the Stoics ultimately understood philosophical activity as a guide for living. However, contrary to the Stoic intellectualistic bent, Kant strongly denies that philosophical knowledge provides any help for leading a moral life. The role of philosophy is to provide justifications for the moral principles available at any particular time to ordinary people. The philosopher or the sage is in no better a position to lead a moral life (GMS 4:404). In this chapter our main objective is to offer a number of Stoic interpretative keys so that we can better understand Kant’s moral philosophy. That Kant was strongly influenced (positively or negatively) by the Stoics is beyond doubt. Unfortunately, only on a few occasions is it possible to trace direct textual links. However, one can identify a number of structural parallelisms between Stoic and Kantian positions. We provide an account of some of the most relevant of these because central concepts of Kantian ethics– such as the good will, virtue, the relationship between duty and happiness, and the role of emotions– gain a more precise definition when considered from a Stoic perspective. Textual references to Stoicism serve this purpose but will not be discussed in detail here.

This article explores, from an epistemic perspective, the scope of some key notions of the Stoic theory of action at the moment of a rational agent’s deliberation. It is argued that deliberation consists primarily in a critical examination of impulsive presentations (φαντασίαι ὁρμητικαί) and that indifferent objects (ἀδιάφορα), as carriers of a kind of selective value (ἀξία ἐκλεκτική), rather than a reason to act constitute a reason to believe (Klein, 2015). Finally, it is concluded that virtue, contrary to what has sometimes been interpreted, is not part of the deliberative process as one among other considerations about the indifferent because the moral value of virtue is incommensurable with the natural value of the indifferent. However, virtue enters decisively into deliberation insofar as the practical end of the rational agent is to reason perfectly (εὐλογιστεῖν) in full consonance with the demands of destiny.

En este libro se reconstruye el modelo de fundamentación ética naturalista que el estoicismo desa¬r¬rolló a partir de la noción clave de la oikeiosis. Lo sorprendente de este modelo con¬sis¬te en el hecho de que, a pesar de orientarse a partir de la noción de autoconservación, los estoicos no desarrollaron una ética de la supervivencia ni asumieron ninguna otra variante habitual del egoísmo moral, sino que elaboraron, por el contrario, una ética de marcado contenido social, que adquiere in¬clu¬so un carácter decididamente universalista y cosmopolita. A través de un estudio detallado de los textos estoicos más relevantes y en diálogo con las voces contemporáneas que lideran el estudio de esta escuela helenística, el autor analiza las diferentes fases del proceso de modulación de los impulsos naturales que se da en el ser humano con el surgimiento de la razón, y explica en qué sentido el logro de la virtud equivale para un estoico a una “vida en conformidad con naturaleza”. This book makes a critical examination of the Stoic theory of oikeiosis offering a systematic reconstruction of the natural basis of morality within this philosophical school. What is striking about this theory is the fact that, despite being guided by the notion of self-preservation, the Stoics did not develop an ethics of survival or assume any other variant of the usual ethical egoism but rather developed a model of ethics replete with social content, which takes on a decidedly universal and cosmopolitan character. Through a detailed study of classical sources and in dialogue with leading contemporary scholars in the field of Stoic studies, the author accounts for the different stages of the process of modulation of natural impulses that occurs in human beings with the emergence of reason, and also explains in what sense the attainment of virtue is for a Stoic equivalent to a “life in accordance with nature”.