Daniel Garcia Saavedra

The aim of this paper is two-fold. We argue against the received conception of epistemic malevolence and give a broader characterisation that, we argue, captures its real scope. We tackle the current notion of epistemic malevolence (EM) on three fronts. We claim that this notion fails to capture cases of EM that are (i) not knowledge directed (but that affect the agent's epistemic character), (ii) not robustly volitional (that do not involve an active opposition to the epistemic good by the malevolent agent) and that (iii) are not merely transactional (as opposed to structural). As a result, we claim that the received notion of EM fails to recognise (arguably) clear instances of EM because it is too narrow. Ultimately, we argue that such narrowness gives the false impression that, unlike its moral counterpart, EM is uncommon. After arguing for this, we offer a wider characterisation of EM and show the role this can play in generating solutions to the problem the phenomena poses.

In this paper, I argue that two plausible claims for olfactory experience, (i) that this modality is spatially indeterminate regarding the spatial location of what it presents and (ii) that whatever it presents, it is experienced as external to the perceiver’s body, are in conflict with one another. I argue that a satisfactory answer to this puzzle requires us to accept as part of olfactory phenomenology aspects of experience that do not obviously belong to olfactory experience. I claim that this ultimately leads to a modification of the idea that olfactory experience is spatially indeterminate.

Two celestial bodies stand between you and the sun at the same time. The smaller object (Near) is closer to you and is exactly under the shadow of the larger, more distant object (Far). What do you see? I argue that you see Far. However, I claim that you do not see any of Far’s proper parts. This is the simplest alternative because, unlike its competitors, it respects the idea that we simply see backlit objects without imposing upon it the logically independent idea that object perception entails part perception.