Daniel Grecco

Derrida resorted to the Fifth Cartesian Meditation by Edmund Husserl both to signal his differences vis-à-vis other philosophers and to elaborate an axiom regarding the respect that we should pay to the other's alterity. However, a further look at this very text may make Derrida's interpretation questionable. This paper aims to solve this tension by providing a broader take on Derrida's appropriation of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. The axiom that calls for respecting the other's alterity only makes sense in a context in which their appearing before us can lead to transcendental violence. Thus, I will first pay attention to Derrida's remarks regarding the axiom he draws from the Fifth Cartesian Meditation to make a contrast with Husserl's intentions. I will then turn to “Violence and Metaphysics” to lay the framework that makes Derrida's axiom necessary, namely the violence proper to phenomenality that threatens to disrespect the other's alterity.

Jacques Derrida coined the term “transcendental violence” to account for a kind of violence that begins as soon as the other appears to us. This “original” violence is paired with a betrayal of the other’s singularity since language and phenomenality impose meaning upon them. Despite Derrida’s efforts to question the idea that violence stems from an originally peaceful state, his account does not provide any explanation of violence as a lived experience, nor does it elaborate on how it is lived by the ego. In this essay, I will try to reappropriate the concept of transcendental violence and link it with that of shame, which I will define here as an objectifying glance that has consequences on the ego’s behavior. I will argue that the link between violence and shame can be appreciated by paying attention to the way the ego assumes the objectifying glance.