Daniel Jacob

Der Staat, wie wir ihn zu kennen glauben, ist geschichtlich und gegenwartig die Ausnahme und nicht die Regel. Doch auch in Raumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit wird regiert, haufig unter Beteiligung privater Akteure und internationaler Organisationen. Der Band untersucht, ob und wie unter diesen Bedingungen legitimes Regieren moglich ist und wem die Verantwortung zukommt, Menschenrechte und demokratische Teilhabe zu gewahrleisten. Der erste Teil des Bandes fragt begrifflich nach den normativen Implikationen von Staatlichkeit. Hieran anschlieaend untersucht der zweite Teil menschenrechts- und gerechtigkeitstheoretische Fragen, die sich aus begrenzter Staatlichkeit und dem Wirken nicht-staatlicher Governance-Akteure ergeben. Die Beitrage des dritten Teils erkunden, welche Implikation begrenzte Staatlichkeit fur das Ideal kollektiver Selbstbestimmung hat. Der vierte Teil des Bandes fragt schliealich, wie das Volkerrecht auf Governance in Raumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit reagieren sollte.

Is it a requirement of justice to democratize private companies? This question has received renewed attention in the wake of the financial crisis, as part of a larger debate about the role of companies in society. In this article, we discuss three principled arguments for workplace democracy and show that these arguments fail to establish that all workplaces ought to be democratized. We do, however, argue that republican-minded workers must have a fair opportunity to work in a democratic company. Under current conditions, this means that a liberal order must actively promote workplace democracy.

What is the moral value of formal democratic decision-making? Egalitarian accounts of democracy provide a powerful answer to this question. They present formal democratic procedures as a way for a society of equals to arrive at collective decisions in a transparent and mutually acceptable manner. More specifically, such procedures ensure and publicly affirm that all members of a political community, in their capacity as autonomous actors, are treated as equals who are able and have a right to participate in collective decision-making. Recently, a number of authors have raised what I describe as the ‘no impact’ objection. This objection focuses on the egalitarian emphasis on autonomy to cast doubt on the moral value of formal democratic procedures. It holds that individual participation in formal democratic decision-making has no impact on the eventual result, and therefore cannot be understood as an exercise in autonomy. Consequently, the ‘no impact’ objection claims that the moral value of formal democracy cannot be explained with reference to an egalitarian ideal of ‘rule by the people’. In this article, I refute this objection by complementing an egalitarian account of democracy with an account of basic autonomy