• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Daniel James Brigham

Cambridge University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    4
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    2
  •  News and Updates
    2

 More details
  • Cambridge University
    Faculty of Philosophy
    Graduate student
PhilPapers Editorships
Identity Theory of Truth
  • All publications (4)
  •  147
    Analysing attitudes: How cognitive realists meet Felappi’s challenge to propositionalism
    Analysis 77 (3): 498-501. 2017.
    In a recent article, Giulia Felappi has leveled a challenge for those who believe that propositional attitudes involve relations between subjects and propositions: they must say more about what it is for a given proposition to figure as the content of one’s attitude. This note argues that Felappi’s challenge has already been met by proponents of act-theoretic conceptions of propositions.
    Propositions as Acts
  •  92
    Propositional Content, by Peter Hanks. Oxford University Press, 2015, x + 227 pp. ISBN 978‐0‐19‐968489‐2 hb £30.00
    European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4): 184-189. 2016.
    Propositions as Acts
  •  98
    Assertion: on the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech By Sanford G. Goldberg (review)
    Analysis 76 (3): 389-391. 2016.
  •  130
    The Metaphysics of Thought: A Response to Fish and Macdonald
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1): 106-112. 2014.
    John McDowell’s position on the metaphysics of thought combines an identity conception of truth, the view that if one thinks truly that p, then what one thinks is the fact that p, with a Tractarian conception of the world as the totality of facts. In response to the charge that it is incoherent, William Fish and Cynthia Macdonald have recently defended a novel way of developing McDowell’s position. I argue that their interesting proposal doesn't work, owing to the fact that it can accommodate ne…Read more
    John McDowell’s position on the metaphysics of thought combines an identity conception of truth, the view that if one thinks truly that p, then what one thinks is the fact that p, with a Tractarian conception of the world as the totality of facts. In response to the charge that it is incoherent, William Fish and Cynthia Macdonald have recently defended a novel way of developing McDowell’s position. I argue that their interesting proposal doesn't work, owing to the fact that it can accommodate neither false thought nor, it seems, certain cases of true thought.
    Identity Theory of Truth
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback