Daniel King

In this paper I examine Grünbaum's criticisms of the 'Primordial Existence Question', which he articulates as 'Why is there something contingent at all, rather than nothing contingent?'. I argue that from Grünbaum's point of view one of the most telling criticisms of the PEQ would be that its proponents, in arguing that the existence of a state of nothingness would be simpler and thus more plausible than the existence of the universe, have applied Ockham's Razor, an epistemological principle, as though it were an ontological one. I go on to claim that whether one accepts this criticism as valid depends on a number of considerations, such as whether epistemological aspects are always absolutely separable from ontological. © 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Murray MacBeath, in his essay ``Time's Square'', describes a fictitious scenariowhere various physical observations made by the participants would, he claims, invitethe interpretation that time for them is two-dimensional. In the present paper, however, Iargue that such observations come close to underdetermining the hypothesis of time's twodimensionality;for a rival hypothesis - that, under certain circumstances, the observationscan be explained in terms of the familiar time dilation effects predicted by special relativity- almost fits the evidence as well. That is, under certain (albeit artificial) circumstances theworld can already behave almost as though it were temporally two-dimensional.

"Methodological Solipsism and the Multiverse" defends the many-universes interpretation of quantum physics, but draws attention to a major philosophical obstacle to the interpretation's acceptance: the question of why, if there are many universes, all on a par with one another, at a particular time the 'I' is manifest in only one. This is known as the 'preferred basis' problem. The so-called methodological solipsism approach, introduced by Driesch and employed by philosophers, such as Putnam and Fodor, is used to answer the question

In the field of computability and algorithmicity, there have recently been two essays that are of great interest: Peter Slezak's "Descartes's Diagonal Deduction," and David Deutsch's "Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer." In brief, the former shows that Descartes' Cogito argument is structurally similar to Godel's proof that there are statements true but cannot be proven within a formal system such as Principia Mathematica, while Deutsch provides strong arguments for believing that the universe can be represented as a Turing machine. King contends that the conjoining of Slezak's analysis with Deutsch's provides a perspective from which it is possible to argue that a scientific theology can be taken a little more seriously at present than in the past. , , , , In the field of computability and algorithmicity, there have recently been two essays that are of great interest: Peter Slezak's "Descartes's Diagonal Deduction," and David Deutsch's "Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer." In brief, the former shows that Descartes' Cogito argument is structurally similar to Godel's proof that there are statements true but cannot be proven within a formal system such as Principia Mathematica, while Deutsch provides strong arguments for believing that the universe can be represented as a Turing machine. King contends that the conjoining of Slezak's analysis with Deutsch's provides a perspective from which it is possible to argue that a scientific theology can be taken a little more seriously at present than in the past