Daniel Klugman

In the Pensées, Pascal famously criticizes Descartes as “useless and uncertain” (S445/L887). Further, he claims that even if the Cartesian philosophy were certain it would not be “worth an hour of labor” (S118/L84) and sets out to “write against those who delve too deeply in the sciences. Descartes” (S462/L553). Some have concluded from such remarks that Pascal dismissed Descartes’s philosophy primarily on the grounds that it was useless, and that its uselessness lies in the fact that it does not aid our salvation. In this paper, I argue that such a reading does not accurately capture the full scope of Pascal’s engagement with Descartes’s epistemology. First, I argue that Pascal does take Descartes’s epistemology seriously on its own terms and shows that it fails to secure the certain knowledge it seeks. Second, I show that Pascal develops an alternative epistemology to Descartes’s, one that he sees as remedying its inability to acquire certain knowledge by locating the source of such knowledge not in reason but in the heart. Third, I show that Pascal thought adopting his epistemology led to the cultivation of a truly Christian life and thus brought one closer to salvation. Accordingly, Pascal would have regarded his own epistemology, unlike Descartes’s, as certain and useful: certain because it can acquire certain knowledge, and useful because it leads one closer to salvation. Finally, I suggest that Pascal was not as dismissive of philosophizing as is often assumed. He criticizes forms of philosophizing such as Descartes’s that place reason at their center, yet remains open to a kind of philosophizing grounded instead in the heart and its feelings, for this kind of philosophizing does aid our salvation.