Daniel L. Crescenzo

David Schlosberg argues that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach can include ecosystems as subjects of justice if we view integrity, rather than dignity, as the conceptual ground for being a subject of justice. I further specify Schlosberg’s concept of ecosystem integrity, arguing that it should be understood as loose integrity. An ecosystem has loose integrity if it retains its capacity to return, after disruption, to functioning as substantially the same kind of system it was before disruption. Finally, I argue that the opportunity for ecosystems to maintain loose integrity can become the object of an overlapping consensus.

According to Martha Nussbaum, treating animals justly is a matter of guaranteeing each individual those capabilities up to a minimum threshold that are essential for flourishing as a member of a particular species. Nussbaum’s basic theoretical framework is acceptable; however, a capability which Nussbaum thinks is not essential for the flourishing, the oppor­tunity to kill as a part of exercising predatory instinct, may in fact be essential for predator flourishing. Nussbaum ought to be concerned with the possibility that this capability is essential, since if it is, it is likely that in doing less harm than good we will also be treating some predators unjustly by denying them the opportunity to flourish.