Daniel Labrador Montero

Este artículo ofrece un nuevo enfoque a la hora de estudiar la influencia de Malthus en Darwin. Muchos filósofos e historiadores consideran que el insight malthusiano del naturalista implicó la simple aplicación del principio de población al mundo natural. Sin embargo, en este artículo se sostiene que, al asumir dicho principio, Darwin incorpora también otros elementos del pensamiento malthusiano, en particular elementos de corte antropológico y psicológico que remiten a la tradición de la escuela escocesa. Estos componentes, fundamentales para sostener la tesis de Malthus, son reelaborados por Darwin en clave biológica como parte de una operación conceptual más profunda. En este proceso, la noción de “lucha por la existencia” se convierte en una metáfora compleja y polisémica que articula aspectos esenciales de su teoría evolutiva. El artículo propone, así, una lectura innovadora del trasvase intelectual entre economía política y biología.

En las últimas décadas, numerosos autores han reivindicado la importancia de la metáfora a nivel cognitivo y científico. En esta línea, este artículo realiza un análisis histórico y filosófico de la metáfora de la división del trabajo en las teorías de Henri Milne-Edwards y Herbert Spencer. Si bien es cierto que las relaciones metafóricas entre la biología y las ciencias sociales han suscitado interés filosófico e historiográfico, por lo general, la reflexión se ha enfocado en la transferencia metafórica de conceptos biológicos al pensamiento social y económico-político. En cambio, este artículo apoya la hipótesis de que la influencia fue recíproca; explora cómo un concepto intrínseco a la economía política (la división del trabajo) se convirtió, a lo largo del siglo XIX, en una metáfora prolífica para las ciencias biológicas. A diferencia de investigaciones anteriores que evaluaron principalmente cómo la economía clásica y liberal influyó en la teoría darwiniana, este artículo observa cómo el concepto político-económico de la división del trabajo jugó un papel significativo en las ciencias de la vida del siglo XIX.

Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of metaphors in Darwin’s theory, emphasizing their role not only as rhetorical devices but also as conceptual tools essential to the development of his thought. This article supports this view and highlights the complex and multifaceted functions of metaphors in Darwin’s work. However, the primary aim of this study is not to reiterate this importance but to demonstrate that Darwin employed his metaphors consciously and reflectively, critically assessing their utility and limitations. Additionally, the article explores how Darwin defended these figures against the criticisms and misunderstandings of his time, presenting arguments that showcase his deep understanding of the conceptual and epistemological dimensions of metaphorical language in scientific knowledge construction.

This paper analyzes Adam Smith's ideas about physiology and how these ideas influenced and are present in his economic-political theory through the use of the organic metaphor. To do so, firstly, I will attempt to show that such a resource was not exceptional. However, great precursors and exponents of economic-political thought, such as Hobbes, Petty, or Quesnay, frequently used such metaphor. Secondly, I will show that Adam Smith's use of the organic metaphor reveals relevant aspects of his thought concerning both animal economy and political economy, as well as important metaphysical commitments. Finally, I conclude that the role of such a trope was not merely rhetorical and heuristic but an important means of reflection and inquiry.

This article aims to delve into the concept of taxonomic incommensurability as advocated by Thomas Kuhn from the 1980s onward. According to Kuhn, in this more local and moderate interpretation, the incommensurability between theories results from the semantic alteration of certain central terms, which he refers to as 'taxonomic categories'. He argues that these categories are holistically inter-defined, such that altering the meaning of any one term necessitates a redefinition of the others. To draw examples of such localized holism and the semantic restructuring that ensues following a scientific revolution, Kuhn frequently references the physics of Aristotle and Newton. However, although he identifies these instances as significant, his treatment of them lacks depth. Consequently, this article seeks to thoroughly examine whether an in-depth analysis of these theories substantiates the thesis of taxonomic incommensurability.

Este artículo tiene como objetivo ofrecer una revisión y reinterpretación al problema teórico en la teoría de Darwin en el que se pone en relación el principio de divergencia y la competencia entre los seres vivos. Respecto a este asunto ha habido dos interpretaciones fundamentales. La primera de ellas es la de aquellos que defienden que la divergencia se ve favorecida porque implica una reducción de la competencia a la que se enfrentan los seres vivos que se desplazan de nicho ecológico. Por otro lado, algunos abogan — aunque es una posición menos extendida— por una interpretación en la que la reducción de la competencia no es la ventaja, sino que lo es la especialización y, por tanto, el incremento en la competitividad, es decir, el tener mejores herramientas o capacidades para competir. En este artículo se defiende esta última tesis, fundamentalmente sostenida por William Tammone, pero desde otra perspectiva y sustentada en otros argumentos que se nutren de la propuesta de Trevor Pearce acerca de la noción de economía natural de Darwin.

Are species real categories or just conventions? Are species natural kinds? Are teleological statements a distinctive feature of biology? Can life sciences escape from teleology? These are common issues in philosophy of biology. This paper aims to show that in order to answer to each of these questions it is inevitable to take a position respecting the others. Therefore, there is a historical relation between the concept of species and teleological issues. In order to analyse such relation, I will take a historical perspective.After making such historical reconstruction focused on the Aristotle, Linnaeus, Buffon and Lamarck thoughts, I will analyse the Darwinian peculiar view respect teleology and his ideas about species. Although Darwin set out the collapse of teleological essentialisms in biology, there are important vestiges of teleology in his theory.

The aim of this chapter is to show some of the assumptions that lie behind transhumanism. The concept of enhancement is analyzed. While, from transhumanism, human welfare depends on the enhancement of human capabilities, here it shall be argued that to begin with, a social debate over what is considered welfare is needed before we can establish what we wish to improve (enhance). This reflection must emphasize the necessity to reflect, ex ante, on what kind of technological development we want, viewing technology as a means to attain the agreed-upon type of welfare, rather than a goal in itself. On the basis of a socially open debate with an anticipatory perspective, society as a whole can establish which risks it is willing to take.

Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse Steve Fuller’s use of the term «post-truth» – especially, the political connotations about epistemic democracy that he highlights. Instead, we offer a pragmatist defence of the truth and an alternative meaning of epistemic democracy.

Are species real categories or just conventions? Are species natural kinds? Are teleological statements a distinctive feature of biology? Can life sciences escape from teleology? These are common issues in philosophy of biology. This paper aims to show that in order to answer to each of these questions it is inevitable to take a position respecting the others. Therefore, there is a historical relation between the concept of species and teleological issues. In order to analyse such relation, I will take a historical perspective.After making such historical reconstruction focused on the Aristotle, Linnaeus, Buffon and Lamarck thoughts, I will analyse the Darwinian peculiar view respect teleology and his ideas about species. Although Darwin set out the collapse of teleological essentialisms in biology, there are important vestiges of teleology in his theory.