Daniel Labrador Montero

Este artículo tiene como objetivo ofrecer una revisión y reinterpretación al problema teórico en la teoría de Darwin en el que se pone en relación el principio de divergencia y la competencia entre los seres vivos. Respecto a este asunto ha habido dos interpretaciones fundamentales. La primera de ellas es la de aquellos que defienden que la divergencia se ve favorecida porque implica una reducción de la competencia a la que se enfrentan los seres vivos que se desplazan de nicho ecológico. Por otro lado, algunos abogan — aunque es una posición menos extendida— por una interpretación en la que la reducción de la competencia no es la ventaja, sino que lo es la especialización y, por tanto, el incremento en la competitividad, es decir, el tener mejores herramientas o capacidades para competir. En este artículo se defiende esta última tesis, fundamentalmente sostenida por William Tammone, pero desde otra perspectiva y sustentada en otros argumentos que se nutren de la propuesta de Trevor Pearce acerca de la noción de economía natural de Darwin.

Are species real categories or just conventions? Are species natural kinds? Are teleological statements a distinctive feature of biology? Can life sciences escape from teleology? These are common issues in philosophy of biology. This paper aims to show that in order to answer to each of these questions it is inevitable to take a position respecting the others. Therefore, there is a historical relation between the concept of species and teleological issues. In order to analyse such relation, I will take a historical perspective.After making such historical reconstruction focused on the Aristotle, Linnaeus, Buffon and Lamarck thoughts, I will analyse the Darwinian peculiar view respect teleology and his ideas about species. Although Darwin set out the collapse of teleological essentialisms in biology, there are important vestiges of teleology in his theory.

This article aims to delve into the concept of taxonomic incommensurability as advocated by Thomas Kuhn from the 1980s onward. According to Kuhn, in this more local and moderate interpretation, the incommensurability between theories results from the semantic alteration of certain central terms, which he refers to as 'taxonomic categories'. He argues that these categories are holistically inter-defined, such that altering the meaning of any one term necessitates a redefinition of the others. To draw examples of such localized holism and the semantic restructuring that ensues following a scientific revolution, Kuhn frequently references the physics of Aristotle and Newton. However, although he identifies these instances as significant, his treatment of them lacks depth. Consequently, this article seeks to thoroughly examine whether an in-depth analysis of these theories substantiates the thesis of taxonomic incommensurability.