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3Quatorze observations topographiques sur les contenus et les normesFacta Philosophica 4 (2): 177-199. 2002.
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13Making „Reasons " Explicit. How Normative is Brandom's Inferentialism?Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 13 (1): 127-145. 2008.This paper asks whether Brandom has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me t…Read more
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Reasons and SupervenienceIn Bartosz Brożek, Antonino Rotolo & Jerzy Stelmach (eds.), Supervenience and Normativity, Springer. 2017.
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6Mind, Davidson and RealityPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2). 2005.The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irreal-ism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general characterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of in-tentional realism which is not, is a restricted one whic…Read more
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11Que Sera SeraDialectica 54 (4): 247-264. 2000.Having suggested that a salient feature of philosophical naturalism is to deny that there are non‐natural norms, I make a distinction between a moderate naturalism, which admits the existence of natural norms, and a radical naturalism which denies it. On the assumption that intentional facts are irreducibly normative, their existence would thus seem to raise a problem for moderate epistemological naturalism. I argue that no non‐trivial naturalistic explanation of conceptual intentionality is to …Read more
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10Between Phenomenalism and ObjectivismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
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39La langue d'une population: le lien entre la sémantique et la pragmatiqueDialectica 40 (4): 251-272. 1986.RésuméCet article vise à préciser la nature et le contenu des conventions qui lient les membres d'une communauté linguistique et par ce biais à caractériser les relations entre le sens intentionnel et le sens conventionnel d'une énonciation. Je formule, à l'aide d'une version modifiée de la définition de la notion de convention proposée par Lewis , une hypothèse concernant les conditions dans lesquelles on peut dire qu'une langue comprenant des expressions déictiques, des phrases ambiguës et des…Read more
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73Reasons, contents and experiencesDisputatio 1 (17). 2004.I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experien…Read more
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83Pragmatics, pittsburgh stylePragmatics and Cognition 13 (1): 141-160. 2005.I give a rough outline of Brandom¿s scorekeeping account of conceptual content. The account is meant to be phenomenalist, normativist, expressively complete and non-circular; the question is how and to what extent it succeeds in meeting these goals
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11Nonconceptual Contents vs Nonconceptual StatesGrazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 23-43. 2005.The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be underst…Read more
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33Nouvelles catégories pour l'analyse du sens du locuteurDialectica 40 (2): 87-106. 1986.RésuméLe sens intentionnel ?une énonciation comprend selon Grice un acte illocutoire principal et des actes illocutoires secondaires, qui peuvent être soit des implicatures conventionnelles soit des implkatures non‐conventionnelles. Je montre que cette analyse, sous ľnterprétation visée par Grice, est défectueuse en ceci que i) elle exclut que ľacte illocutoire principal puisse être non littéral, ii) elle ne rend pas compte de ce que les implicatures conventionnelles sont annulables et iii) elle…Read more
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70Mind, Davidson and realityPrincipia 9 (1-2): 125-157. 2005.The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irrealism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general haracterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of intentional realism which is not, is a restricted one which i…Read more
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24Le programme de Davidson et les langues naturellesDialogue 24 (2): 195-212. 1985.Une théorie davidsonienne de la signification pour une langue L prend la forme d'une theorie tarskienne de la véeritée-dans-L. Une telle théeorie sera absolument radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne, c'est-à-dire conforme à la convention T de Tarski, en n'utilisant que des donnéees empiriques dont la description ne fait intervenir aucun concept linguistique, tandis qu'elle sera relativement radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne en n'utilisant que de…Read more
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18Luc Bégin et alii, Pragmatisme et pensée contemporaine. Cahiers de philosophie, no. 2, Département de philosophie, Université Sherbrooke, 1984, ix et 178 p. Luc Bégin et alii, Pragmatisme et pensée contemporaine. Cahiers de philosophie, no. 2, Département de philosophie, Université Sherbrooke, 1984, ix et 178 p (review)Philosophiques 12 (1): 232-236. 1985.
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19Rationality and IntentionalityGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 125-141. 1992.The view that in radical interpretation, the interpreter should aim at optimizing the rationality of agents is defended. A distinction and a parallel is drawn between linguistic interpretation and psychological interpretation. Both can be taken to be governed, in part, and in somewhat different ways, by a principle of rationality. Such approaches have been criticised on the ground that they make it impossible for a speaker or an agent to have wildly irrational or false beliefs. It is argued that…Read more
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13On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of IndeterminacyIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 229--248. 1999.
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42Making "Reasons" Explicit: How Normative is Brandom's InferentialismAbstracta 5 (2): 79-99. 2009.This paper asks whether Brandom (1994) has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This lea…Read more
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22Between Phenomenalism and ObjectivismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
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23L'analyse théologique du contenu intentionnelRevue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4): 660-690. 1998.
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51Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind George Lakoff Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 614 p. 29, 95 $The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason Mark Johnson Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 233 p. 27, 50 $ (review)Dialogue 29 (3): 477-. 1990.
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43La logique: une introduction Michel J. Blais Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1985. 234 pDialogue 25 (2): 385-. 1986.
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61Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because ConstraintDialogue 50 (2): 315-331. 2011.ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative
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