Daniel Linford

Here we survey arguments for and against the Existential Inertia Thesis (EIT). We begin by sketching a variety of motivations for EIT. These include theoretical virtues, divine temporality, an Aristotelian proof argument, a probabilistic argument, and an argument from the Principle of Material Causality (PMC). Next, we fend off the principal criticisms of EIT in the literature. These include alleged counterexamples, microstructural dependence, four arguments from Hsiao and Sanders, proportionate causality, form-matter interdependence, contingent natures, vicious circularity, the De Ente argument for classical theism, and worries from four-dimensionalism.

Here we argue that stage two of the Aristotelian proof fails. More specifically, we argue against the inferences to the following divine attributes: timelessness, perfection, uniqueness, goodness, omnipotence, intelligence, omniscience, freedom, and immateriality. We also argue that the failure of the Aristotelian proof’s second stage entails the failure of the second stages of the other classical theistic proofs we consider in our book. Moreover, the chapter is relevant not only to the Aristotelian proof but also to the gap problem for persistence arguments more generally, as we also articulate a naturalist-friendly account of the nature of a necessarily existent, timeless foundation of reality. The account is based on recent work in the philosophy of physics on wavefunction monism.

We begin by noting the historical and contemporary significance of arguments from change for classical theism. We then critically examine a contemporary formulation of Aquinas’s First Way. We argue, first, that the validity of Aquinas’s First Way, at least so formulated, is preserved only in light of certain interpretations of the conclusion and premises. But such interpretations are found either to be unmotivated or to lend little to no support to classical theism. We also uncover at least six non-sequiturs afflicting the First Way. We conclude by addressing objections to our critical appraisal.

Much ink has been spilled on different accounts of persistence such as endurantism and perdurantism, but comparably little ink has been spilled on why things persist at all. The purpose of this chapter is to redress this lack of research. More specifically, we develop and categorize explanations of persistence on which temporal things (or some subset thereof) persist without external sustenance or conservation unless and until they are positively destroyed. Such accounts include tendency-disposition accounts, transtemporal accounts, law-based accounts, necessity accounts, and no-change accounts.

The Neo-Platonic proof reasons from the reality of composite objects to the existence of an absolutely simple or non-composite being. Here we argue that this proof fails. After articulating the argument and several preliminaries, we first argue that premise three of the argument—the causal principle that every composite object requires a sustaining efficient cause to combine its parts—is both unjustified and dialectically ill-situated. We then argue that the Neo-Platonic proof fails to deliver the mindedness of the absolutely simple being and actually militates against its mindedness. Finally, we uncover tensions between Christian doctrines and the Neo-Platonic proof.

We begin by surveying and comparing different articulations of the existential inertia thesis. We then raise and analyze a series of questions aiming to taxonomize inertial theses. This includes questions about scope, relativity theory, modal register, dependence and destruction, and metaphysical accounts of inertial persistence. We then articulate our existential inertia thesis using our answers to these taxonomic questions. Finally, in hopes of providing a foundation and jumping-off point for further research on existential inertia, we list each taxonomic question in the concluding section.

Edward Feser argues in his Aristotelian proof that the only adequate explanation of change is ultimately in terms of an unchangeable, purely actual being. The proof is divided into two stages. Stage one seeks to demonstrate the existence of a purely actual, unactualized actualizer, while stage two identifies this unactualized actualizer with God. Our purpose in this chapter is to critically assess the argument’s first stage. We first argue that several defeaters afflict premise (7) of Feser’s argument. Next, we propose a new necessary condition for per se chains, arguing that our proposal provides an undercutting defeater for the argument. Finally, we argue that Feser’s inference from presently unactualized actualizer to purely actual actualizer is a non-sequitur on multiple fronts.