Daniel McInerny

The human person is a truth seeker, and one of the most compelling ways human beings pursue truth is through the arts. In Beauty and Imitation: A Philosophical Reflection on the Arts, Daniel McInerny argues for an understanding of art as a form of inquiry into truth that proceeds by way of sensible beauty. Drawing upon the thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, McInerny argues for the unfashionable yet philosophically compelling view that art is essentially "mimetic," imitative of human action. But what does it mean for art to imitate human action? It means that art imitates the way human beings by nature quest for fulfillment, or happiness. In questing for fulfillment, human life takes the form of a story, and so the arts--all the arts, from painting to music, from fiction to film--are storytelling arts whose beauty reveals the truth about human happiness. The first part of the book features a renewed defense of the ancient Aristotelian claim that art is mimetic and that its imitation of the human story takes the form of a moral argument. The second part shows how audiences are transformed by the moral arguments the mimetic arts make, and the third concludes with a guided tour of the mimetic arts, where specific arts are considered in light of the Aristotelian and Thomistic principles advanced earlier.

What would a theory of practical reason that defended positions taken to be definitive or consonant with the natural law tradition, and that also aimed to be a serious contender within contemporary analytic ethics, look like? The theory put forward in Mark Murphy’s compelling and ambitious book seeks to provide the answer. The character of the theory Murphy defends is summarized by him as naturalist, objectivist, welfarist, antiparticularist, and anticonsequentialist. How this summary cashes out in detail will be recognizable in many ways by those familiar with the work of John Finnis, though Murphy does depart from Finnis in significant respects.

As Aquinas makes explicit, the argument of the Summa contra gentiles is ordered according to the twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. The first three books thus concern the wisdom which revelation announces but which nonetheless is available to natural human reason, while the fourth is devoted to that revealed wisdom incommensurate with human rationality. Interpreters of the SCG have been divided, however, on the question of how these two modes of truth are related in regard to the structure and method of the work. Thomas Hibbs's provocative and engaging new study of the SCG proposes that the unity between them is found primordially in God Himself ; it is found, more precisely, in God as Author of the narrative of Christian revelation which orders the wisdom of the philosophers to Wisdom strictly considered.

It may seem odd that our legal culture’s uneasiness with regard to the insanity defense has risen in direct proportion to advancements in the scientific understanding of insanity itself. Yet the most intriguing benefit of Daniel N. Robinson’s short history of the insanity defense is his explanation of why this is not an oddity at all. For as Robinson convincingly argues, Western legal systems at least since the seventeenth century have been influenced by theoretical accounts of insanity which have undermined the very understanding of human agency according to which those legal systems were built. The result has been a mounting incoherency in what it means for a plea of insanity to come before a court of law.

Robert McKee, in his widely-esteemed screenwriting manual, Story , speaks of storytelling in general, and the screenplay in particular, as 'the creative demonstration of truth.' But what could it mean to think of the screenplay as a 'demonstration,' that is, as an argument? In this article I explore this question, taking my cue from McKee's own description of screenplay narrative as 'dramatized dialectical debate.' McKee's reference to dialectic suggests a connection to the dialectical inquiries in Aristotle's major treatises, especially the dialectical inquiry into the nature of human happiness found in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics . I argue for an analogy between this dialectical inquiry in Aristotle's ethics, and the dialectical trajectory of popular screenplays. Such an analogy helps us understand how films do work as kinds of argument, arguments that aim at the truth of what it means for human beings to achieve their good

Those who associate the name of Joseph Owens only with his magisterial work in Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics will, with this issue of his collected ethical writings, be forced to reassess their appreciation of his scholarly breadth. The twenty-seven chapters which make up this book, though humbly put forward by their author as side-paths along his main intellectual road, are no dilettante’s work: they constitute a significant and challenging contribution to many of the central debates in Aristotelian/thomistic ethics.