Daniel Richard Herbert

Christopher Hookway has been influential in promoting engagement with pragmatist and naturalist perspectives from classical and contemporary American philosophy. This book reflects on Hookway’s work on the American philosophical tradition and its significance for contemporary discussions of the understanding of mind, meaning, knowledge, and value. Hookway’s original and extensive studies of Charles S. Peirce have made him among the most admired and frequently referenced of Peirce’s interpreters. His work on classical American pragmatism has explored the philosophies of William James, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce, and examined the influence of pragmatist ideas outside of the United States. Additionally, Hookway has participated in a number of celebrated exchanges with some of the most high-profile figures of twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy, including Karl-Otto Apel, Philip Pettit, Hilary Putnam, and W.V.O. Quine, through which his treatments of a large range of topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language have been developed and promoted. The chapters in this book—which include contributions from several of Hookway’s former students and colleagues—include studies of Hookway’s engagement with the works of Peirce, James, and Dewey, his contributions to virtue epistemology, and his discussions of hope and pragmatist metaphysics. Pragmatic Reason will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on American philosophy, the history of analytic philosophy, and epistemology.

The present paper makes three contentions with regard to the respective Kantian and Bradleyian accounts of the intrinsically problematic status of our epistemic predicament. First, it is in consequence of their common adherence to a view of the human intellect as both inherently qualified by its cognitive dependence upon the conditional phenomena of sensible experience and rationally committed to the pursuit of knowledge of the unconditional, that Kant and Bradley regard rational cognition as accountable to a standard which it cannot match. Second, Kant and Bradley are committed to differing idealist positions which carry significant implications for their respective outlooks on the ontological commitments we incur in pursuit of the highest standards of reason. Third, and, finally, whereas Kant's transcendental idealism permits him to hold that theoretical reason does not entail ontological commitment to any object which lies beyond the scope of our cognitive powers, Bradley finds himself in the more awkward position of having to concede that our capacity for knowledge necessarily commits us to the existence of an Absolute which is ultimately beyond the grasp of the human intellect. Hence it shall be argued that it is Bradley, and not Kant, whose idealism results in unintelligible ontological commitments

With his recent contribution to Dewey studies, Deweyan Experimentalism and the Problem of Method in Political Philosophy, Joshua Forstenzer delivers a timely and highly readable examination of Dewey's democratic ideal and its contemporary relevance. Outstanding in its scholarship and compelling in its argument, Forstenzer's fascinating study presents an extensive interpretation of Dewey's experimentalist approach to democratic politics, while highlighting its significant interdisciplinary value and practical interest. Focussing particularly upon its experimentalist character and renunciation of a priori idealisations, Forstenzer examines, over ten well-argued chapters, how Dewey's approach to political philosophy...