Daniel Rueda Garrido

Based on the fivefold synthesis of Fichte’s Wissenschafstlehre-1804-II, I examine the implicit logical necessity of both world-plan ages and worldviews in two works of the post-Jena period, in which Fichte seeks to explain the history of humanity from an a priori plan (Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters) and the history of consciousness in its ascent to a higher worldview (Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben) respectively. The purpose of this text is therefore threefold: (1) to verify the relationship between the fivefold synthesis and the worldviews; (2) to verify the relationship between the fivefold synthesis and the epochs of the world plan; and (3) to verify the relationship between 1 and 2. Of course, there are previous studies that examine both works separately, but none that establish a precise correlation between worldviews and world ages. This article fills that gap.

This book redefines emotions as embodied actions, rather than mere internal states. Through an ontological approach, Daniel Rueda Garrido explores how fundamental emotions like joy, fear, love, and anger are woven into the fabric of our communities, influencing who we are and how we interact with one another. Moving beyond traditional psychology and naturalism, this approach reveals that these emotions are not just internal experiences, but essential expressions of our collective, self-imposed ways of living within a community. Rueda's exploration offers a deeper understanding of self-consciousness and challenges traditional ways of thinking about emotional existence. It reveals the profound connection between feeling, action, and belonging.

In this article, I aim to briefly examine the ontological structure of religious life from a phenomenological perspective. By this, I mean how what the subject thinks and does reveals certain principles and patterns of religious life. The first step is to identify the guiding principle. We ask ourselves what the ultimate motivation of the religious human being is. After this, the main thing is to determine how they think of themselves, what image they have of themselves as human beings with regard to the divine. This points to a greater configuration of their consciousness. Next, we look at their habits and the ritualisation of their lives. And finally, the relationship they have with their community. Furthermore, we inquire about the implications of being part of that community. The findings are that religious subjects can only be happy as part of their community if, paradoxically, their desire is to abandon their ego (self-interest and desires) and devote themselves to the glorification of their god. However, although we can use the term “religious” to describe the form of life where subjects maximize the glory of the divine, other historically and sociologically constituted religions are moved by a different ontological principle.

The aim of this article is to examine and discuss the hypothesis put forth by Ernesto Laclau in his On Populist Reason (2005) that the identity of a group or community is constructed rhetorically through the act of naming, whereby it universalises a particular demand. Conversely, it will be argued that this process serves to reaffirm a pre-existing identity. The aforementioned identity is constituted by the way in which individuals conceptualise what it means to be human. This encompasses the image of being human that informs individuals’ expectations and experiences, as well as their behaviours.

Based on the fivefold synthesis of Fichte’s Wissenshafstlehere-1804-II, I examine the implicit logical necessity of both world-plan ages and worldviews in two works of the post-Jena period, in which Fichte seeks to explain the history of humanity from an a priori plan (Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters) and the history of consciousness in its ascent to a higher worldview (Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben) respectively. The purpose of this text is therefore threefold: 1. To verify the relationship between the fivefold synthesis and the worldviews. 2. To verify the relationship between the fivefold synthesis and the epochs of the world plan. And 3. To verify the relationship between 1 and 2. Of course, there are previous studies that examine both works separately, but none (to my knowledge) that establish a precise correlation between worldviews and world ages; this article fills that gap.

El Ideal krausista expresa un equilibrio interno proporcionado por la dialéctica entre la idea y la realidad. La idea es el principio absoluto, lo más real, en tanto que racional. El ideal es la adaptación de la idea a la realidad según su esencia: la razón. La realidad, como la vida, es para el krausismo no un producto acabado sino en continuo proceso, evolucionando y progresando infinitamente. Este progresar infinito de la vida en tanto que realidad racional, y en última instancia idea real, lo asemeja a la concepción aristotélica del pensamiento, el cual «siempre progresa hacia sí mismo», también la idea efectivamente corporeizada en la vida progresa hacia sí misma, profundizando y dando de sí gradualmente a la esencia humana. Cada cambio experimentado por el ideal, desde estos presupuestos, no es algo cualitativamente distinto del estado anterior, sino un consumar exigencias de la propia humanidad. Es así el ideal como una visagra que facilita la relación dinámica entre ambos planos y permite el paso del deber al ser y la adaptación conspicua del ser al deber. Los distintos aspectos de esta dialéctica lo estudian las disciplinas mayores, a saber, Filosofía, Historia y Filosofía de la Historia. Cada una de estas disciplinas versa sobre una particular relación entre sendos elmentos anunciados. La relación entre la idea y el ideal es la Filosofía. La función de esta es fundamental en el sistema krausista de las ciencias. En tanto que ciencia primera o ciencia de las verdades eternas es la encargada de alcanzar la ley general que une a todas las ciencias y a la realidad toda, organizándolas orgánicamente para su realización y desarrollo.

Tras la identificación realizada por el profesor Enrique Ureña de los textos alemanes traducidos en el Ideal de la humanidad para la vida de San del Río el estudio del krausismo español se ha subsumido dentro de una investigación concerniente al pensamiento alemán que sirvió de origen en concreto a la masonería de esta manera se ha pretendido agotar en su fuente cualquier particularidad de tal pensamiento en España. Sin embargo, desde esta insoslayable integración europea, hago notar que en el Ideal de San de Río los textos traducidos toman un sentido unitario de mayor capacidad explicativa de lo que se ha querido ver hasta ahora. Este sentido está explícito en la estructura que muestra tal obra, estructura que no pertenece directamente a ningún libro de Krause y que responde a la filosofía de la acción comprendida en la dialéctica del ideal para la España del siglo XIX.

In recent years, various descriptions of subjectivity related to the era of neoliberal capitalism have been offered. These descriptions assume uncritically that there is both a subjectivity of this time and a qualified subject to which it corresponds. The contrast of these descriptions with the claims of postmodernist authors regarding the death of the subject posits a contradiction. In this article, a solution to this problem is provided by the support of the dialectic of Sartre’s realistic materialism. The application of the dialectic sheds light on the neoliberal individual, who, integrated as a negated subject in the totality of the neoliberal order, shows itself as a reified individual without subjectivity, or rather, with a negated subjectivity. From that it follows, opposed to a rather widely accepted definition, that subjectivity is not a positive characterisation but rather the negativity of the reified form of life within neoliberal capitalism.

If human action cannot be understood separately from subjectivity, as the phenomenological tradition has shown, with this article I seek to explore the relationship between subjectivity and community, in what can be taken as an intersubjective consciousness constituted by the phenomenological totality of a particular way of being human -an anthropical image-. Thus, if such consciousness is intersubjective, it is precisely because it implies the same way of being and acting in others. This way of being and acting is the expression of a certain power, not only that of persisting in the actualisation of this anthropical image, but also that of incarnating it in progressive degrees of perfection. This power, therefore, although it is to a greater degree in those subjects who incarnate it more perfectly, whom we can call elites, it is also to an essential degree in the other co-subjects. Acting in a certain way implies a meaning and an interest, both of which are particularly vested in the community’s elites.

In this paper, I claim that both being and meaning constitute human actions. We can only apprehend their meaning through our phenomenological experiences of them as being. The methodology to explore and support such a proposal is both a phenom-enological approach indebted to Sartre and a version of Panofsky's iconology grounded in the understanding of the symbolical dimension of human being. The argument put forth is that since every phenomenon within a series responds to a principle that can be considered its essence, it logically follows that the phenomenological images of perceived actions, that is, the actions as they appear to our consciousness (praxical image), are also principled by an essence, and since actions are enrooted within a particular culture, therefore, the principle must be cultural as well; and given that the principle rules the series of phenomenological images from inside as well as from outside, then, it can be held that the principle is a cultural image of human being (anthropical image) which constitutes the essential meaning of the series of actions that accounts for a form of life, and thus, it can be concluded that the phenomenological images are already invested with cultural (symbolical) meaning, which endows the agent with identity. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series (Sartre, 1956: 46).

Krausists followed a dialectical method in all their activities. It is an action plan in which theory and practice are established on a continuum. Since it summarizes all human activity, this dialectic implies a philosophy of action. The originality of this article lies precisely in offering an account of the philosophy of action implicit in the work of Krause, which has never before been made explicit. Therefore, the goal of this article is, on the one hand, to isolate this dialectic in the texts of the Spanish Krausists, and, on the other hand, to demonstrate the traditional affirmation about the practical meaning of Krause’s philosophy, as shown in its Spanish version. This practical orientation of his thought was channelled through several disciplines and, especially, through the modern pedagogy known as active education. Throughout the article, I also show how to relate Krause’s philosophy to contemporary philosophical debates.

This essay aims to explore imitation in social contexts. The argument that summarizes my claim is that the perception of other people’s behaviour conditions the agent in imitating that behaviour, as evidence from social psychology holds (Bargh and Chartrand in J Pers Soc Psychol 76(6):893–910, 1999; Bargh and Ferguson in Psychol Bull 126(6):925–945, 2000; Bargh and Ferguson in Trends Cogn Sci 8(1):33–39, 2004), but what the agent perceives and experiences becomes potential motives for her actions only through her identification with a particular way of being and acting. Therefore, although the agent’s actions are conditioned by perceptual stimuli, the latter are not the cause of the actions. The agent is the ultimate cause. That is, a convergence between perceptual stimuli and conscious will. I take this latter conclusion to suggest a compatibilist approach whereby action in a social situation would require the perceptual conditioning as much as the freedom and consciousness of the agent.

In this article, I discuss how Fichte treats the idea of the non-state society in several of his works over the course of his philosophical career. In particular, I examine why such an idea is necessary in his ethical system as well as for his theory of the state, and what kind of hope of realisation in the empirical world it admits. Furthermore, I show that the idea of a non-state society, as the final development of human progress, can only be understood as necessary in conjunction with the human drive to achieve moral perfection through actions beyond individuality. Only by uniting these two poles can the law of perfectibility operate.

With this article, I seek to examine Krause’s analysis of the self in Analitische Philosophie, and in particular in Vorlesungen über die Psychische Anthropologie. But I do so through the texts that the Spanish Krausists devoted either to translating or to discussing and disseminating Krause’s ideas in dialogue with the philosophies of the time. In my exposition and examination of the doctrine of the self, I focus on its embedding in a particular existence through embodiment, and argue that these are aspects with which Krausism can still illuminate the debate about human subjectivity.

Why do we act as we do? Why do we assume that the way of being and behaving in our community is right, good, and common sense? Why do we fail to understand those who are, act, and feel differently? These are some of the questions that this book raises and attempts to answer. This ontology is rooted in the phenomenological tradition but with the innovation of taking the "form of life" as the central ontological unit. We are our form of life, but, as a transcendental-immanent reality, this is not directly equivalent to culture or society; it is rather the "political" realisation in the world of an image of the human being shared by a given community. This overcomes the traditional dualities of individual and society, consciousness and body, facticity and freedom, actuality and possibility. The subject is a subject because it identifies with that image, which is equivalent to the intersubjective consciousness of how one should act and be in the world. This gives rise to multiple forms of life. The latter implies a certain power to be who one wants to be. In this way, the book is an invitation to self-examination, for if our form of life is voluntary (i.e., capitalism), it shatters the illusion that one cannot live in any other way, and places us before the anguished but inevitable task of justifying its adoption or resorting to its abandonment. The book offers a dynamic analysis of human existence as the actualisation of a form of life that is, at the same time, the exercise of a certain power over those who seek to live otherwise, especially when that form is institutionalised by a government as the essence of the national or transnational community.

Working from the phenomenological tradition, the author takes the “form of life” as the central ontological unit. We are our form of life, but as a transcendental-immanent notion. This is not directly equivalent to culture or society, but to the realisation in the world of an image of the human being shared by a given community. The question explored is the following: If the form of life is what gives us being, what role does language play? Topics explored include the concepts of propaganda and ideology. and how these terms always refer to what others say and do, never to our own actions and discourses. The central part of the book is devoted to an analysis of language itself, including propaganda, emotions, dispositions, and racism and racist discourses. The book also analyses Vladimir Putin’s speeches on the occasion of the Russian war in Ukraine, the elements of their propaganda, and the justifying elements that are part of their ethical discourse, whereby actions taken or to be taken are justified as good because they are necessary from their ontological principle.

In this article, my purpose is to explore conversion in its onto-phenomenological structure. To this end, in the first section, I develop a notion of form of life as an ontological unit. That is, the totality of the possible actions of a subject according to the principle that drives him/her. In this way, the subject is the result of the actions that constitute the adopted form of life. In the second section, I hold that all conversion is precisely the passage from one form of life to another triggered by a crisis, and that if this requirement is not met, neither is there a conversion. This makes it possible to reduce any type of conversion, whether religious, moral, or intellectual, to a single onto-phenomenological structure based on the form of life as an ontological unit. And it even allows for the analysis of other phenomena in terms of conversion, such as the passage from one social group to another.