-
36A range of reasonsAsian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 1-16. 2024.Daniel Whiting’s excellent new book, The Range of Reasons (2022), makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the philosophical literature on reasons and normativity. A good deal has been written on normative reasons, and it is no easy thing to make novel and promising arguments. Yet, this is what Whiting manages to do. We are sympathetic to some of his ideas and critical of others. It makes sense for us to focus on the first half of his book, where Whiting presents two accounts of normative r…Read more
-
56A New Pluralist TheoryAnalysis 84 (1): 210-218. 2023.Garrett Cullity’s Concern, Respect, and Cooperation is a highly sophisticated work of philosophy that carefully explores and boosts the reader’s confidence in a.
-
9History of ethics: essential readings with commentary (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2019.Is there an objective moral standard that applies to all our actions? To what extent should I sacrifice my own interests for the sake of others? How might philosophers of the past help us think about contemporary ethical problems? As the most recent addition to the Blackwell Readings in Philosophy series, History of Ethics: Essential Readings with Commentary brings together rich and varied excerpts of canonical work and contemporary scholarship to span the history of Western moral philosophy in …Read more
-
1433Do confucians really care? A defense of the distinctiveness of care ethics: A reply to Chenyang liHypatia 17 (1): 77-106. 2002.Chenyang Li argues, in an article originally published in Hypatia, that the ethics of care and Confucian ethics constitute similar approaches to ethics. The present paper takes issue with this claim. It is more accurate to view Confucian ethics as a kind of virtue ethics, rather than as a kind of care ethics. In the process of criticizing Li's claim, the distinctiveness of care ethics is defended, against attempts to assimilate it to virtue ethics.
-
23From Outside of EthicsGibbons, John. The Norm of Belief.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 320. $85.00Ethics 126 (4): 1139-1148. 2016.
-
125The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.This Handbook maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides the definitive guide to it. An illustrious team of philosophers explore the concept of a reason to do or believe something, in order to determine what these reasons are and how they work. And they investigate the nature of 'normative' claims about what we ought to do or believe.
-
445Reasoning with ReasonsIn Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, Oxford University Press. pp. 241-59. 2018.
-
30History of Ethics (edited book)Wiley. 2019.Is there an objective moral standard that applies to all our actions? To what extent should I sacrifice my own interests for the sake of others? How might philosophers of the past help us think about contemporary ethical problems? As the most recent addition to the Blackwell Readings in Philosophy series, History of Ethics: Essential Readings with Commentary brings together rich and varied excerpts of canonical work and contemporary scholarship to span the history of Western moral philosophy in …Read more
-
3214Reasons as EvidenceOxford Studies in Metaethics 4 215-42. 2009.In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present several arguments in favor of our analysis of reason…Read more
-
146Review of Sean McKeever, Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism As a Regulative Ideal (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2007.
-
71Alan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics (review)Philosophical Review 119 (2): 259-263. 2010.
-
1398Weighing ReasonsJournal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1): 70-86. 2013.This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis concerning normative reasons, proposed and defended in earlier papers. According to this thesis, a fact is a normative reason for an agent to Φ just in case this fact is evidence that this agent ought to Φ. John Broome and John Brunero have presented a number of challenging criticisms of this thesis which focus, for the most part, on problems that it appears to confront when it comes to the topic of …Read more
-
671Michael SmithIn Graham Robert Oppy, Nick Trakakis, Lynda Burns, Steven Gardner & Fiona Leigh (eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand, Monash University Publishing. 2011.
-
2244Three Conceptions of Practical AuthorityJurisprudence 2 (1): 143-160. 2011.Joseph Raz’s much discussed service conception of practical authority has recently come under attack from Stephen Darwall, who proposes that we instead adopt a second- personal conception of practical authority.1 We believe that the best place to start understanding practical authority is with a pared back conception of it, as simply a species of normative authority more generally, where this species is picked out merely by the fact that the normative authority in question is authority in relati…Read more
-
111Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative EthicsOxford University Press. 2015.Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics. Normative ethics is a sophisticated, open-ended philosophical enterprise that attempts to articulate and defend highly general ethical principles. Such principles aspire to specify our reasons, and tell us what it is right to do. However, it is not plausible to suppose that virtuous people in general follow such philosophical principles. These pri…Read more
-
359"From Outside of Ethics" review, John Gibbons, *The Norm of Belief* (OUP, 2013) (review)Ethics. forthcoming.
-
1150Reasons, Facts‐About‐Evidence, and Indirect EvidenceAnalytic Philosophy 54 (2): 237-243. 2013.
-
1109Two Levels of Moral ThinkingOxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1 75-96. 2011.The purpose of this paper is to introduce a two level account of moral thinking that, unlike other accounts, does justice to three very plausible propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad: (1) People can be morally virtuous without the aid of philosophy. (2) Morally virtuous people non-accidentally act for good reasons, and work out what it is that they ought to do on the basis of considering such reasons. (3) Philosophers engaged in the project of normative ethics are not wasting the…Read more
-
1380Moral knowledge, epistemic externalism, and intuitionismRatio 21 (3): 329-343. 2008.This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evid…Read more
-
85Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and LittlejohnPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3): 728-744. 2016.
-
265Précis of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative EthicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3): 706-708. 2016.
-
193Review of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism (OUP, 2007) (review)Mind 119 (473): 210-215. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
-
1430Weighing ExplanationsIn Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
-
782Moral metaphysicsIn Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2013.This chapter sketches four forms of realism ascribed to four great historical figures that provide an important set of determinate versions of moral realism. Plato provides a picture according to which moral facts exist in a non-concrete realm of abstract universal properties. Aristotle provides a picture according to which moral facts exist as concrete facts in the world. Hume provides a picture according to which moral facts have their basis in universal human sentiments. Kant provides a pictu…Read more
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
1 more
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Aesthetics |
Reasons and Oughts |
Normativity |
PhilPapers Editorships
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |