Daniel Vecchio

This paper explores the relationship between classical theism, natural law, and moral realism, focusing on the critical role of divine exemplarism in securing moral constraints. Drawing on the work of Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau, the paper examines three central theses for a robust moral realism: (1) the existence of moral facts, (2) their stance-independence, and (3) the necessity of moral constraints. While Aristotelian essentialism addresses the first two theses by grounding moral truths in human nature, it falls short on the third—constraint. The paper argues that classical theism, through divine exemplarism, provides the necessary resources to secure moral constraints that other metaethical proposals lack. By asserting that all essences reflect divine goodness, theism constrains the moral landscape, ensuring moral facts are not arbitrary and preventing any world from permitting violations of essential moral platitudes—such as the idea that it could ever be good to torture, act cruelly, or slander for fun. The paper concludes that classical theism strengthens moral realism while offering a simpler, more robust explanation than alternative theories.

The following is a critical and historical account of Aristotelian Essentialism informed by recent work on Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. The semantics of the modal syllogistic are interpreted in a way that is motivated by Aristotle, and also make his validity claims in the Prior Analytics consistent to a higher degree than previously developed interpretative models. In Chapter One, ancient and contemporary objections to the Aristotelian modal syllogistic are discussed. A resolution to apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is proposed and developed out of recent work by Patterson, Rini, and Malink. In particular, I argue that the semantics of negation is distinct in modal context from those of assertoric negative claims. Given my interpretive model of Aristotle’s semantics, in Chapter Two, I provide proofs for each of the mixed apodictic syllogisms, and propose a method of using Venn Diagrams to visualize the validity claims Aristotle makes in the Prior Analytics. Chapter Three explores how Aristotle’s syllogistic fits within Aristotle’s philosophy of science and demonstration, particularly within the context of the Posterior Analytics. Consideration is given to the Aristotelian understanding of the relationship among necessity, explanation, definition, and essence. Chapter Four applies Aristotelian modal logic in contemporary contexts. I contrast Aristotelian modality and essentialism with contemporary modalism based upon the semantics of possible worlds, e.g. Kripke and Putnam. I also develop an account of how Aristotelian modal logic can ground a sortal dependent theory of identity, as discussed by Wiggins.