•  6
    Meaning and Affect in the Placebo Effect
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Alessandro Grecucci
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (3): 313-329. 2021.
    This article presents and defends an integrated view of the placebo effect, termed “affective-meaning-making” model, which draws from theoretical reflection, clinical outcomes, and neurophysiological findings. We consider the theoretical limitations of those proposals associated with the “meaning view” on the placebo effect which leave the general aspects of meaning unspecified, fail to analyze fully the role of emotions and affect, and establish no clear connection between the theoretical, phys…Read more
  •  15
    This book offers a philosophically-based, yet clinically-oriented perspective on current medical reasoning aiming at 1) identifying important forms of uncertainty permeating current clinical reasoning and practice 2) promoting the application of an abductive methodology in the health context in order to deal with those clinical uncertainties 3) bridging the gap between biomedical knowledge, clinical practice, and research and values in both clinical and philosophical literature. With a clear phi…Read more
  •  6
    The power of meta-analysis: a challenge for evidence-based medicine
    with Paola Berchialla, Giovanni Valente, and Ari Voutilainen
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1): 1-18. 2020.
    This paper discusses the outstanding problem of replicability of empirical data in the context of recent work on meta-analysis, especially within the field of evidence-based medicine. Specifically, it deals with the methodological issue of how to determine the degrees of heterogeneity between different collected studies. After critically reviewing the standard measures used to quantify meta-analytical heterogeneity, we argue that they should be revised in such a way to take into account the stat…Read more
  •  2
    From Knowability to Conjecturability
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Contemporary Pragmatism 17 (2-3): 205-227. 2020.
    Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce’s pragmaticism, called here ‘action-first’ epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer…Read more
  •  95
    The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and di…Read more
  •  8
    Correction to: On the Logical Philosophy of Assertive Graphs
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4): 399-399. 2020.
    This erratum is to correct in the paper of Daniele Chiffi and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, On the Logical Philosophy of Assertive Graphs.
  •  11
    On the Logical Philosophy of Assertive Graphs
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4): 375-397. 2020.
    The logic of assertive graphs is a modification of Peirce’s logic of existential graphs, which is intuitionistic and which takes assertions as its explicit object of study. In this paper we extend AGs into a classical graphical logic of assertions whose internal logic is classical. The characteristic feature is that both AGs and ClAG retain deep-inference rules of transformation. Unlike classical EGs, both AGs and ClAG can do so without explicitly introducing polarities of areas in their languag…Read more
  •  10
    Pragmatic logics for hypotheses and evidence
    Logic Journal of the IGPL. forthcoming.
    The present paper is devoted to present two pragmatic logics and their corresponding intended interpretations according to which an illocutionary act of hypothesis-making is justified by a scintilla of evidence. The paper first introduces a general pragmatic frame for assertions, expanded to hypotheses, ${\mathsf{AH}}$ and a hypothetical pragmatic logic for evidence ${\mathsf{HLP}}$. Both ${\mathsf{AH}}$ and ${\mathsf{HLP}}$ are extensions of the Logic for Pragmatics, $\mathcal{L}^P$. We compare…Read more
  •  12
    Reasoning in medicine requires the critical use of a clinical methodology whose validity must be evaluated as well as its limits. In the last decade, an increasing amount of evidence has shown severe limitations and flaws in the conduct of prognostic studies. The main reason behind this fact is that prognostic judgments are at high risk of error. In this paper we investigate the pragmatic and illocutionary aspects of different forms of linguistic acts and judgments involved in clinical practice.…Read more
  •  1
    A normative analysis of nursing knowledge
    with Renzo Zanotti
    Nursing Inquiry 23 (1): 4-11. 2016.
  •  52
    We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance
    with Massimiliano Carrara, Ciro De Florio, and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Synthese 198 (4): 3565-3580. 2019.
    The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, w…Read more
  •  6
  •  27
    Risk and Values in Science: A Peircean View
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Axiomathes 29 (4): 329-346. 2019.
    Scientific evidence and scientific values under risk and uncertainty are strictly connected from the point of view of Peirce’s pragmaticism. In addition, economy and statistics play a key role in both choosing and testing hypotheses. Hence we may show also the connection between the methodology of the economy of research and statistical frequentism, both originating from pragmaticism. The connection is drawn by the regulative principles of synechism, tychism and uberty. These principles are valu…Read more
  •  332
    On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics
    with Gianluigi Bellin and Massimiliano Carrara
    Journal of Logic and Computation 50 (28). 2018.
    We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking a…Read more
  •  18
    Varieties of Probability in Clinical Diagnosis
    with Pierdaniele Giaretta
    Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 6 (1): 5-27. 2018.
  •  12
    Introduction: Foundations of Clinical Reasoning—An Epistemological Stance
    with Mattia Andreoletti, Paola Berchialla, and Giovanni Boniolo
    Topoi 38 (2): 389-394. 2019.
  •  12
    On Pragmatic Denial
    with Ciro de Florio and Massimiliano Carrara
  •  11
    Logical Investigations on Assertion and Denial
    with Massimiliano Carrara and Ciro De Florio
    Journal of Applied Logic 25. 2017.
  •  97
    On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics
    with Massimiliano Carrara and Ciro De Florio
    Journal of Applied Logic 25. 2017.
    The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence
  •  19
    Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995, Erkenntnis, 43, 81–109) by outlining a pragmatic l…Read more
  •  330
    Assertion and hypothesis: a logical framework for their opposition relations
    with Massimiliano Carrara and Ciro De Florio
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (2): 131-144. 2017.
    Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypothe…Read more
  •  19
    Pragmatic and dialogic interpretations of bi-intuitionism. Part 1
    with Gianluigi Bellin, Massimiliano Carrara, and Alessandro Menti
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (4): 449-480. 2014.
    We consider a “polarized” version of bi-intuitionistic logic [5, 2, 6, 4] as a logic of assertions and hypotheses and show that it supports a “rich proof theory” and an interesting categorical interpretation, unlike the standard approach of C. Rauszer’s Heyting-Brouwer logic [28, 29], whose categorical models are all partial orders by Crolard’s theorem [8]. We show that P.A. Melliès notion of chirality [21, 22] appears as the right mathematical representation of the mirror symmetry between the i…Read more
  •  40
    The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions –ncalled logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on so-called revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame on the underl…Read more
  •  16
    Pragmatic and dialogic interpretations of bi-intuitionism. Part I
    with Gianluigi Bellin, Massimiliano Carrara, and Alessandro Menti
    Logic and Logical Philosophy. 2014.
  •  50
    Abductive inference within a pragmatic framework
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Synthese 1-17. forthcoming.
    This paper presents an enrichment of the Gabbay–Woods schema of Peirce’s 1903 logical form of abduction with illocutionary acts, drawing from logic for pragmatics and its resources to model justified assertions. It analyses the enriched schema and puts it into the perspective of Peirce’s logic and philosophy.
  •  11
    Assertive graphs
    with F. Bellucci and A.-V. Pietarinen
    Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1): 72-91. 2018.
    Peirce and Frege both distinguished between the propositional content of an assertion and the assertion of a propositional content, but with different notational means. We present a modification of Peirce’s graphical method of logic that can be used to reason about assertions in a manner similar to Peirce’s original method. We propose a new system of Assertive Graphs, which unlike the tradition that follows Frege involves no ad hoc sign of assertion. We show that axioms of intuitionistic logic c…Read more
  •  19
    Assertions and Conditionals: A Historical and Pragmatic Stance
    with Chiffi Daniele and Di Giorgio Alfredo
    Studia Humana 6 (1): 25-38. 2017.
    The assertion candidate expresses a potential logical-linguistic object that can be asserted. It differs from both the act and the product of assertion; it needs not to be actually asserted and differs from the assertion made. We investigate the medieval origins of this notion, which are almost neglected in contemporary logic. Our historical analysis suggests an interpretation of the assertion candidate within the system of logic for pragmatics.
  •  27
    Clinical Equipoise and Moral Leeway: An Epistemological Stance
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Topoi 38 (2): 447-456. 2019.
    Clinical equipoise has been proposed as an ethical principle relating uncertainty and moral leeway in clinical research. Although CE has traditionally been indicated as a necessary condition for a morally justified introduction of a new RCT, questions related to the interpretation of this principle remain woefully open. Recent proposals to rehabilitate CE have divided the bioethical community on its ethical merits. This paper presents a new argument that brings out the epistemological difficulti…Read more
  •  19
    Fundamental Uncertainty and Values
    with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
    Philosophia 45 (3): 1027-1037. 2017.
    This paper explores the intertwining of uncertainty and values. We consider an important but underexplored field of fundamental uncertainty and values in decision-making. Some proposed methodologies to deal with fundamental uncertainty have included potential surprise theory, scenario planning and hypothetical retrospection. We focus on the principle of uncertainty transduction in hypothetical retrospection as an illustrative case of how values interact with fundamental uncertainty. We show that…Read more