Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

“Tell me," Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?" His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?” What would it have looked like if we looked at all sciences from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? Wittgenstein is undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His complex body of work has been analysed by numerous scholars, from mathematicians and physicists, to philosophers, linguists, and beyond. This volume brings together some of his central perspectives as applied to the modern sciences and studies the influence they may have on the thought processes underlying science and on the world view it engenders. The contributions stem from leading scholars in philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics, psychology and human sciences; all of them have written in an accessible style that demands little specialist knowledge, whilst clearly portraying and discussing the deep issues at hand.

Societies around the world are struggling to think clearly about trans realities and understand trans identities. _Real Gender_ is the first book to present a cis defence of what it means to be transgender. Moyal-Sharrock and Sandis delve into the various factors which make many trans people’s experience of their gender (or lack thereof) as natural and unquestionable as that of cis people. While recognising the undeniably social aspects of gender, they find that gender cannot be completely divorced from our biological underpinnings. Contrary to popular opinion, gender self-identification does not require the denial of either biology or sex. What is needed is a more liberal understanding of our gender concepts, which would prevent us from confusing diversity with pathology. Steeped in published and personal trans testimonials, _Real Gender_ does not seek to provoke or attack, but to unequivocally defend trans realities. A powerful exploration of a divisive topic, this book will be of interest to a wide audience of readers.

An overview is offered of Wittgenstein's groundbreaking discussion of knowledge and certainty, especially in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. The main interpretative readings of On Certainty are discussed, especially a non-propositional/non-epistemic interpretation and a variety of propositional and/or epistemic interpretations. Surveys are offered of the readings of On Certainty presented by such figures as Annalisa Coliva, John Greco, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, P. F. Strawson, MichaelWilliams, and CrispinWright. This Element demonstrates how On Certainty has been especially groundbreaking for epistemology with regard to its treatment of the problem of radical scepticism.

It may be said that the single track of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is the discernment and elucidation of grammar—its nature and its limits. This paper will trace Wittgenstein’s evolving notion of grammar from the Tractatus to On Certainty. It will distinguish between a ‘thin grammar’ and an increasingly more fact-linked, ‘reality-soaked’, ‘thick grammar’. The ‘hinge’ certainties of On Certainty and the ‘patterns of life’ of Last Writings attest to the fact that one of the leitmotifs in the work of the third Wittgenstein is the grammaticalization of experience. This reflects Wittgenstein’s realisation that grammar can manifest itself as a way of acting. In moves that exceed anything in Philosophical Investigations, the third Wittgenstein makes grammar enactive. We shall see that Wittgenstein’s hesitant but unrelenting link of grammar to the stream of life in no way infringes on the ‘autonomy of grammar’.

Wittgenstein takes Moore to task for confusing knowledge with the non‐epistemic brand of conviction that logically underlies it, and he drives a categorial wedge between them: 'knowledge and certainty belong to different categories'. However basic knowledge is understood, it must be capable of standing in logical relations to whatever judgements rest on it. For example, it must be capable of being consistent or inconsistent with them. But this means that even basic knowledge must involve propositional content. In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake. If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented. In thus logically closing the door to doubt and mistake as regards our basic certainties, Wittgenstein closes the door to universal skepticism, and thereby also to the contextualism Michael Williams attributes to Wittgenstein.

In this paper,¹ I briefly take stock of Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy and some other disciplines. Surveying some of the ways in which he emphasizes the primacy of action, together with the superfluity - in basic cases - of propositions and cognition, in his account of mind, language and action, I suggest that, far from being a maverick philosopher, Wittgenstein’s pioneering ’enactivism’ puts him in the mainstream of philosophy today. I mention the importance of his thought for the philosophy of mind and epistemology, as also for psychology and the cognitive sciences, and conclude that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is still spearheading the fight against physicalism and reductionism.

In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker addresses what he takes to be misconceptions of Wittgenstein's philosophy with respect to (1) the periodisation of his thought and to what should properly be counted as part of his work; (2) his conception of grammar since the Big Typescript (1929–33); and (3) his conception of philosophy as grammatical investigation. I argue that Hacker's restrictive conception of what ought to be considered part of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his conservative view of Wittgensteinian grammar are unjustified and prevent him from appreciating the revolutionary importance of On Certainty for epistemology. Finally, while agreeing that Wittgenstein views philosophy as grammatical elucidation, I suggest some reasons for the resistance that this view has generated. In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker deals with three of the “many misunderstandings, misrepresentations and misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy” (2012, 1); the first of which concerns “the periodisation of Wittgenstein's thought”; the second, the supposition that what Wittgenstein called “grammar” in PI differed fundamentally from, and was more limited than, his conception of it when he was writing the Big Typescript; and the third, the claim that what Wittgenstein took to be grammatical statements are, in fact, dogmatisms, theories or doctrines inconsistent with his meta‐philosophical remarks in PI. I address each of these concerns seriatim.

Meaning, believing, thinking, understanding, reasoning, calculating, learning, remembering, intending, expecting, loving, longing: these experiences are, according to Wittgenstein, embodied actions. In Certainty in Action, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock argues that there is hardly anything traditionally thought to be a mental process or state, that, in fact, Ludwig Wittgenstein has not shown to be primarily embodied or enacted. The book traces the radical, diverse and recurrent importance of action and 'ways of acting' as the original and cohesive thread weaving through all of Wittgenstein's philosophy, especially language and memory. Moyal-Sharrock highlights throughout Wittgenstein's clarification of 'the inner' and his belief in the certainty of action. With Wittgenstein's philosophy increasingly influencing multiple branches of psychology, particularly those concerned with child development, language acquisition and memory, Certainty in Action is essential reading for students and researchers interested in the philosophy underpinning these areas, as well as Wittgenstein specialists.

Hinge Epistemology is rapidly becoming one of the most exciting areas of epistemology and Wittgenstein studies. In connecting these two fields it brings a revived energy to both, opening them up to fresh developments. The essays in this volume extend the subject in terms of both depth and breadth. They present new voices and challenges within hinge epistemology. They explore new applications and directions of hinge epistemology, particularly as it relates to the philosophy of mind, society, ethics, and the history of ideas.

Like Aristotle, Wittgenstein’s leitmotif was action. Wittgenstein saw action (or behaviour) as the root, manifestation and transmitter of meaning. He repeatedly demonstrated the regress manifest in seeing the proposition, or any kind of representation, as a necessary precursor to thought and action, or at least he pointed out the superfluity of such shadowy inner precursors when instinct and practices can easily be seen to be at the base of all our thought: ‘In philosophy one is in constant danger of producing a myth of symbolism, or a myth of mental processes. Instead of simply saying what anyone knows and must admit’ (Z, §211). Where Aristotle warns us that Plato had been misled by the uniform appearance of a word in different contexts into believing that it had a uniform meaning across uses, Wittgenstein urges us to see the differences in meaning that are often hidden by the uniform appearance of language, insisting that meaning is dependent on use or context. Just as Aristotle in the Categories gave Plato’s forms a linguistic status, so, Wittgenstein took a linguistic turn from his predecessors, giving metaphysics a grammatical reading: both showed that concepts are not entities existing in isolated splendour in some metaphysical realm but simply abstractions from sentences in use.

D. H. Lawrence famously wrote that “art-speech is the only truth.” If we are to give credibility to these words, we must know what Lawrence means by “truth.” Here is the passage in which this expression occurs:Art-speech is the only truth. An artist is usually a damned liar, but his art, if it be art, will tell you the truth of his day. And that is all that matters. Away with eternal truth. Truth lives from day to day, and the marvellous Plato of yesterday is chiefly bosh today.... Two blankly opposing morals, the artist’s and the tale’s. Never trust the artist. Trust the tale.1One thing is made clear by the passage: “truth” here is not used in the sense of absolute truth, something that can never be falsified....

O desenvolvimento do presente texto parte do pressuposto inicial segundo o qual grande parte do Da Certeza é dedicada a expor a distinção entre ‘certeza’ e ‘conhecimento’. Nossas certezas básicas – ou ‘fulcrais’ ou, ainda, ‘dobradiças’ [hinges] – formam a nossa imagem de mundo e sustentam o nosso conhecimento, não sendo elas mesmas, porém, de natureza epistêmica. As deliberações de Wittgenstein levamno a compreender que as nossas certezas básicas compartilham as seguintes características conceituais; elas são todas: não epistêmicas, indubitáveis, não empíricas, gramaticais, não proposicionais, inefáveis, exibidas na ação [enacted] e fundacionais. Estas características necessárias das certezas fulcrais são investigadas com algum detalhe ao longo do texto que se segue.