Danielle Levitan

This paper responds to recent arguments for the outsourcing of parental obligations and shows why such proposals are morally problematic. After outlining why it is impermissible for the parent–child attachment to be outsourced, and prior to Section 4, I explain the meaning of the duty of love. In Section 4, I note the primary motivating intuitions that lead parents to shift their moral obligations. I then discuss the intuition that the decision to shift an obligation of this sort cannot be criticized on moral grounds if children are, in fact, better and more content with their lives. In Section 5, I claim that the duty of love is conditioned by vulnerability and attention, both of which give rise to moral obligations of attachment. In Section 6, I argue that such duties cannot be shifted onto more capable adults because doing so would undermine the parent–child relationship and render it significantly less valuable. In Section 7, I discuss the permissibility of outsourcing certain duties relating to the child's welfare in order to maximize the child's well-being and argue that the responsibility to maximize the child's well-being is only outsourceable in terms of extrinsic goods. In Section 8, I remark on a related duty to promise to foster an intimate, affectionate attachment with one's child.

This paper responds to recent arguments for the outsourcing of parental obligations and shows why such proposals are morally problematic. After outlining why it is impermissible for the parent–child attachment to be outsourced, and prior to Section 4, I explain the meaning of the duty of love. In Section 4, I note the primary motivating intuitions that lead parents to shift their moral obligations. I then discuss the intuition that the decision to shift an obligation of this sort cannot be criticized on moral grounds if children are, in fact, better and more content with their lives. In Section 5, I claim that the duty of love is conditioned by vulnerability and attention, both of which give rise to moral obligations of attachment. In Section 6, I argue that such duties cannot be shifted onto more capable adults because doing so would undermine the parent–child relationship and render it significantly less valuable. In Section 7, I discuss the permissibility of outsourcing certain duties relating to the child's welfare in order to maximize the child's well‐being and argue that the responsibility to maximize the child's well‐being is only outsourceable in terms of extrinsic goods. In Section 8, I remark on a related duty to promise to foster an intimate, affectionate attachment with one's child.

ABSTRACT Most countries legally recognize the right and duty to raise the child one has carried and given birth to, (i) reflecting a traditional legal presumption (despite widespread abuse and neglect) that parents should be granted wide‐ranging legal rights with respect to their minor children. What interests me here is the moral aspect of the right to childrearing: does childrearing have a value that is objective, and if so, why? In this paper, I explore a theory of intrinsic value that is consistent with an objective stance on childrearing. The theory enables us to make sense of the belief that something can be objectively good as an end‐in‐itself even if a person derives no pleasure from it, thus grounding the distinction between the good of childrearing and the pleasure one might gain from it. This paper is divided into three parts. Section 1 explores the concept of intrinsic goodness. I explain what I mean by ‘childrearing’ as distinguished from procreation, and argue that childrearing is both an objective and intrinsic good. Section 2 clarifies how this works, maintaining that the intimate relationship between parent and child makes the parent's life richer and more worthwhile. (ii) I argue further that childrearing is a component of well‐being rather than an instrumental cause of it. Section 3 sketches three types of theories outlined by Derek Parfit (iii) regarding what is good for a person: hedonistic theories, desire‐fulfilment theories, and objective‐list theories (iv).

This Palgrave Pivot considers what kind of care—adequate, good or best— can be expected of primary caregivers. It is suggested that parents are morally obliged to promote their child’s wellbeing, and that the care they owe to their children counts as a moral duty. But it is also argued that there is no moral obligation to supply the best possible care. A duty to provide best care would limit parents’ own rights to an unreasonable extent. It is recognized that it is tempting to take extreme measures to promote all the interests of a child, to embrace their needs as reflected in the right to best care - such actions arise from concern and love for the child. But the case is made that certain expectations are unreasonable, such as parents staying together, and presumably being unhappy, so that a child will be more comfortable. The book’s final chapter considers the question of state enforcement. Parents, the State, and the Care Rights of Children is essential reading for all scholars and advanced students of jurisprudence, the philosophy of law and social philosophy.

In this paper, I argue against any state intrusion and interference that amounts to scrutiny of parents based on their decision to separate. The state, to my mind, ought not to be involved in childrearing decisions in cases of divorce unless there is a sufficient reason, and, as I will argue, divorce per se does not present a level of risk to children that justifies state intervention. The claims I am about to make apply not only to parental capability tests but also to the entire process of legal divorce, which allows the courts to decide who they believe is a better parent—a decision that, in my view, the state is not capable of (and should not be) making. I do not claim that states ought not to interfere at all but rather that, unless parents fail to do what they are morally required to do, state interference should not be permitted. To make this case, I present two claims: claim A, that only a risk reaching a certain level (which I will call level H) justifies state intervention; claim B, that the act of divorce does not meet level H; and therefore C, there is no justification for state intervention in divorce.