•  220
    Modality and supervenience
    Acta Analytica 15 141-155. 2000.
    According to the thesis of modal supervenience it is impossible that two objects be alike in their actual properties but differ in their modal properties. Some have argued that the concept of supervenience is inapplicable to the modal-actual case. Some have argued that the thesis of modal supervenience is trivially true. These arguments are refuted; a thesis of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is meaningful and nontrivial. The significance of the thesis is nevertheless limited by the…Read more
  •  171
    The modality principle and work-relativity of modality
    Acta Analytica 20 (4): 41-52. 2005.
    Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more in the spirit of contextualism to understan…Read more
  •  140
    Popper on Laws and Counterfactuals
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1): 109-119. 2005.
    According to the received view, the regularity “All F’s are G” is a real law of nature only if it supports a counterfactual conditional “If x were an F (but actually it is not), it would be a G”. Popper suggested a different approach -- universal generalisations differ from accidental generalisations in the structure of their terms. Terms in accidental generalisations are closed, extensional and terms in laws of nature are open, strictly universal, intensional. But Popper failed to develop this …Read more
  •  124
    Lehrer and the consequence argument
    Philosophical Studies 161 (1): 77-86. 2012.
    The consequence argument of van Inwagen is widely regarded as the best argument for incompatibilism. Lewis’s response is praised by van Inwagen as the best compatibilist’s strategy but Lewis himself acknowledges that his strategy resembles that of Lehrer. A comparison will show that one can speak about Lehrer-Lewis strategy, although I think that Lewis’s variation is dialectically slightly stronger. The paper provides a response to some standard objections of incompatibilists to the Lehrer-Lewis…Read more
  •  88
    Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is a…Read more
  •  74
    How to accommodate the possibility of lucky true beliefs in necessary (or armchair) truths within contemporary modal epistemology? According to safety accounts luck consists in the modal proximity of a false belief, but a belief in a true mathematical proposition could not easily be false because a proposition believed could never be false. According to Miščević modal stability of a true belief under small changes in the world is not enough, stability under small changes in the cognizer should a…Read more
  •  70
    Incompatibilism and the logic of transfer
    Acta Analytica 19 (33): 45-54. 2004.
    Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample t…Read more
  •  58
    Semifactuals and epiphenomenalism
    Acta Analytica 16 (26): 23-43. 2001.
    Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism Mental properties are said to be epiphenomenal because they do not pass the counterfactual test of causal relevance. Jacob (1996) adopts the defence of causal efficacy of mental properties developed by LePore and Loewer (1987). They claim that those who argue for the epiphenomenalism of the mental place too strong a requirement on causal relevance, which excludes causally efficacious properties. Given a proper analysis of causal relevance, the causal efficacy of…Read more
  •  44
    Dreams in a Vat
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (2): 89-105. 2016.
    Putnam’s semantic argument against the BIV hypothesis and Sosa’s argument against dream skepticism based on the imagination model of dreaming share some important structural features. In both cases the skeptical option is supposed to be excluded because preconditions of its intelligibility are not fulfilled (affirmation and belief in the dream scenario, thought and reference in the BIV scenario). Putnam’s reasoning is usually interpreted differently, as a classic case of deception, but this feat…Read more
  •  40
    Post-analytic metaphilosophy tnd the case of compatibilism
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1): 257-272. 2002.
    Terry Horgan defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy. I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibil…Read more
  •  38
    Knowledge and Conditionals of (Dis)connection
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3): 267-294. 2015.
    The gist of modal epistemology is expressed in the idea that you fail to know if you do believe truly but it is seriously possible for you to believe falsely. According to subjunctivism, this idea is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One formulation invokes a safety condition—“If S had believed P, then P would have been the case,” while the other invokes a sensitivity condition—“If P had been false, S would not have believed that P.” According to simple subjunctivism, such conditiona…Read more
  •  33
    What is informal logic, is it ``logic" at all? Main contemporary approaches are briefly presented and critically commented. If the notion of consequence is at the heart of logic, does it make sense to speak about ``informal" consequence? A valid inference is truth preserving, if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. According to Prawitz two further conditions must also be satisfied in the case of classical logical consequence: (i) it is because of the logical form of the sentences involve…Read more
  •  28
    Since Aristotle there are two main approaches in the explanation of begging the question (petitio): a dialectical mistake (an improper move in an argumentative dialogue) and an epistemic mistake. According to the latter begging the question is committed when the premises of an argument cannot be known independently of knowing the conclusion of the argument. Dialectical approaches use the notion of a commitment (acceptance, standpoint) and rules of dialogue as their basis. I propose a hybrid mode…Read more
  •  27
    Curiosity about Curiosity
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3): 327-340. 2016.
    Ilhan Inan’s (2012) approach to curiosity is based on the following central theses: (i) for every question asked out of curiosity there is a corresponding term (definite description) that is inostensible for the asker (its reference is unknown) and that has the function of uniquely identifying an object; (ii) the satisfaction of curiosity is always in the form of com- ing to know an object as falling under a concept. This model primarily covers curiosity as our search for empirical objectual kno…Read more
  •  26
    Embedded Conditionals as the Essence of Causality?
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2): 197-211. 2002.
    Counterfactual analysis of causation between particular events, combined with standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals, cannot express the idea that the cause is sufficient for the effect. Several authors have suggested that a more complex pattern of nested counterfactual conditionals is a better candidate for expressing the idea of causal connection. The most systematic account is developed by Kadri Vihvelin. She argues that a complex pattern of causal dependence, expressed by embedde…Read more
  •  23
    Tracking without Concessions?
    Prolegomena 12 (2): 337-352. 2013.
    In the first, shorter part of the paper I point out some problems and potential misunderstandings connected with B. Berčić’s treatment of Nozick’s sensitivity condition for knowledge. In the second part of the paper I offer the condition of modal stability or limited sensitivity as a revision of Nozickian conditions for non-accidental connection between our belief and the truth of our belief. “When it is seriously possible for you to falsely believe that p,” that is a good reason for denying tha…Read more
  •  13
    Kako razložiti modalnost?
    Filozofski Vestnik 13 (1). 1992.
    EXPLAINING MODALITY There are two sources of our modal intuitions which have to be explained - physical (natural) modality and metaphysical modality. The problem of explanation is presented as a dispute between modal realism and modal anti-realism. Traditional explanations of modalities are classified according to the strength of their anti-realism. They are unsuccessful because they are not able to show how to extract modal properties out of something which is ultimately non-modal. Even the th…Read more
  •  12
    It is commonly accepted that those embedded conditionals of the type "if A, then if B, then C" we do understand, we understand as equivalent to sentences without embedded conditionals. This reduction is in classical logic achieved with the use of laws of exportation and importation. V. McGee even presents counterexamples to modus ponens which are based on the classical treatment of embedded conditionals and proposes to trade the validity of modus ponens for the validity of laws of importation an…Read more
  •  7
    On a Consequence in a Broad Sense
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3): 433-453. 2018.
    Cogency is the central normative concept of informal logic. But it is a loose evaluative concept and I argue that a generic notion covering all of the qualities of a well-reasoned argument is the most plausible conception. It is best captured by the standard RSA criterion: in a good argument acceptable and relevant premises provide sufficient grounds for the conclusion. Logical qualities in a broad sense are affected by the epistemic qualities of the premises and “consequence” in a broad sense e…Read more
  •  6
    “The Brain in Vat” at the Intersection (review)
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 205-217. 2018.
    Goldberg 2016 is a collection of papers dedicated to Putnam’s (1981) brain in a vat (‘BIV’) scenario. The collection divides into three parts, though the issues are inter-connected. Putnam uses conceptual tools from philosophy of language in order to establish theses in epistemology and metaphysics. Putnam’s BIV is considered a contemporary version of Descartes’s skeptical argument of the Evil Genius, but I argue that deception (the possibility of having massively false belief) is not essential,…Read more
  • Non Sequitur – Some Reflections on Informal Logic
    Balkan Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 91-102. 2009.
    Some general, programmatic points about informal logic are addressed. The informal approach to argument analysis faces serious foundational problems which have been recognized by its practitioners – but informal logic has yet to come together as a clearly defined discipline. Another problem is the dilemma of the dialectician : informal logic is either trivial or powerless on its own. According to Johnson and Blair the central notion in theory of argument is cogency which replaces soundness. An a…Read more