Daria Drozdova

In this chapter I am going to (a) examine the logical connections between various descriptions of the Scientific Revolution proposed by Alexandre Koyré and (b) propose an attentive and detailed reading of texts written by Koyré in different periods of his life in order to identify various aspects of his interpretation of the revolution in thought that occurred in early modern Europe. His most famous description of the Scientific Revolution (the dual characterization) indicates two aspects of the process that led to the emergence of classical physics: “destruction of the Cosmos” and “geometrization of space”. However, Koyré frequently used other expressions for characterization of the period, such as “mathematization of nature” or transition “from the world of more or less to the universe of precision” and “from the closed world to the open universe”. One could expect that Koyré would try to reduce his initial dual characterization to one single formula. I argue here that, on the contrary, the duality of description had a special meaning which permits us to keep in focus the complexity of the intellectual change that occurred during the seventeenth century, when a new science was rising from a new conception of reality and a new world-view was emerging from the new science.

Данная работа представляет собой первую часть исследования, посвященного становлению и трансформации канонического изложения истории философии Нового времени в русскоязычной философской литературе. Начиная с последних десятилетий XIX века в европейских и американских учебниках по истории философии окончательно фиксируется канон новоевропейской философии, который представлен нарративом о противостоянии двух главных эпистемологических традиций Нового времени: рационализма (в лице Декарта, Спинозы и Лейбница) и эмпиризма (в лице Локка, Беркли и Юма). Однако такое изложение истории новоевропейской философии возникает в противоборстве разных традиций (кантианской, гегельянской, позитивистской и пр.), каждая из которых предлагала свои схемы классификации и упорядочивания философских систем Нового времени. Отражение этой борьбы можно найти в появляющейся в XIX веке русскоязычной учебной литературе по истории философии. Поэтому задача данного исследования — рассмотреть и проанализировать образы философии Раннего Нового времени в русскоязычной учебной литературе первой половины XIX века, чтобы выявить основные тенденции в формировании канона новоевропейской философии как с точки зрения его главных представителей, так и с точки зрения нарратива, который описывает динамику развития философской мысли XV–XVII веков. В центре рассмотрения данной статьи находится многотомная «История философии» (18–) архимандрита Гавриила (Воскресенского), которая оказывается проводником француз- ского влияния на российскую традицию историографии философии. В работе показано, что архимандрит Гавриил заимствует основную канву своего повествования из учебника по истории философии Селестина Иппо, который, в свою очередь, опирается на схематизацию историко-философского процесса, предложенную Виктором Кузеном.

This book is the thirty-third volume in the "Philosophy of Russia of the first half of the 20th century" series. It traces the life and intellectual trajectories of three European thinkers with Russian roots: A. Koyré, A. Kojève, and I. Berlin. It explores their methodological strategies, explains the cultural and existential premises of their thinking styles that enabled them to succeed and gain recognition as European philosophers, traces their intellectual links with Russia, and reflects on the importance of Russian intellectual culture for these thinkers and for twentieth-century European philosophy as a whole. The book is addressed to a wide range of readers interested in philosophy, social and political thought, and the intellectual history of the Russian exiles of the first half of the 20th century.

Over the last 400 years, attitudes toward Francis Bacon's philosophy have changed considerably: the 17-century interest and the 18-century enthusiasm have been replaced by the 20-century criticism and reevaluation. However, both the praise and the rejection of the Lord Chancellor’s philosophical ideas often originate from the isolation and absolutization of particular features of his philosophy that can sometimes be in opposition to each other. These partial readings are justified by the fact that the reference to Bacon’s methodological and epistemological legacy has a symbolic meaning and is part of what is called “image of science” in Y. Elkana’s terminology. The way in which references to Bacon are used at different times and in different contexts is, in fact, a functional myth or theoretical fiction (I. Kasavin) in which the “historical Bacon” is fading away and what emerges is important and meaningful to those who declare themselves his followers or who lash out at him with criticism.

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of his passing, this special book features studies on Alexandre Koyré, one of the most influential historians of science of the 20th century, who re-evaluated prevalent thinking on the history and philosophy of science. In particular, it explores Koyré’s intellectual matrix and heritage within interdisciplinary fields of historical, epistemological and philosophical scientific thought. Koyré is rightly noted as both a versatile historian on the birth and development of modern science and for his interest in philosophical questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. In the 1940s and 1950s his activities in the United States established a crucial bridge between the European historical tradition of science studies and the American academic environments, and an entire generation of historians of science grew up under his direct influence. The book brings together contributions from leading experts in the field, and offers much-needed insights into the subject from historical, nature of science, and philosophical perspectives. It provides an absorbing and revealing read for historians, philosophers and scientists alike.

Thought experiments can be used in various ways. A part of them seems to have a special epistemic value: they can give us a new, unknown information about reality. One of the most famous thought experiments of that kind is the thought experiment of Galileo which demonstrates that two bodies of the same kind should fall with the same speed. However, an analysis of this argument shows that it is based on several ontological presuppositions. Therefore it's not the thought experiment itself that has a significance, but its correspondence to real experience.