Dario Galvão

This article examines how Hume engages with the notions of animality and imagination in his account of the origin of human society. I argue that, although Hume treats the formation of society as a development specific to the human species, he grounds it in principles shared with other animals such as need and self-preservation. Central to this account is the imagination, which enables human beings to adapt means to ends in response to necessity and to invent society – thus surpassing other species and asserting their dominance over nature. For Hume, in contrast to traditional philosophical accounts, it is not Reason that elevates humanity, but rather imagination: an animal faculty we share with other species and which he conceives as the cornerstone of knowledge.

The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the ‘desire of company’, we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions.

O objetivo deste trabalho é refletir acerca da perspectiva anticartesiana que se manifesta nas obras de Pascal e Hume, especificamente no que se refere à concepção filosófica dos primeiros princípios do conhecimento. Partindo da enunciação da mathesis universalis em Descartes, buscamos identificar como Pascal e Hume apresentam uma posição alternativa, assim como refletir acerca das semelhanças e divergências entre esses dois autores. As principais fontes de Pascal a serem consideradas são o opúsculo Do Espírito Geométrico e o fragmento 72 dos Pensamentos. No caso de Hume, focaremos na Parte I do Livro I do Tratado acerca da natureza humana e na Investigação sobre o entendimento humano.