Darius Parvizi-Wayne

The flow state has historically been a source of mystery and, at times, mysticism. Whereas some accounts of flow allude to the flowing individual’s conscious absorption and focus, others imply that the individual is, in fact, not conscious. If we take this latter model seriously, our intuition that those in flow ought to be creditable for their acts becomes deeply threatened. However, there is good reason to believe that this mindless account of flow is wrong. Recent work in theoretical cognitive science suggests that flow is an exhibition of bodily minded skill in which consciousness plays a central part. Although this account might salvage more creditability for the minded flowing individual than their mindless counterpart, under a recent axiological framework, it remains ambiguous just how creditable such minded individuals emerge, insofar as the taxonomy fails to cover the role played by subdoxastic intentions and desires in skilful activity. We thus propose a refinement of the framework, which accounts for how these flowing individuals are just as intentional, agentive, skilful, and thus creditable as any non-flowing counterpart who achieves the same material outcome.

The use of large language models (LLMs) for companionship is rapidly increasing. As “friends”, LLMs act as scaffolds to the development and enactment of our ongoing comportment, not only with them but also in the broader environment in which we are embedded. From the perspective of scaffolding as it is understood in the philosophy of cognitive science literature, we will argue that LLMs qua “friends” are proving to be damaging to the overall interests of the users who engage with them. We will show that this generally manifests in terms of a growth in the addictive dependency those agents have on LLM-“friends”, as well as the social and moral deskilling they risk suffering, alongside the social demotivation they are likely to experience. Furthermore, we will contend that LLM-“friends” are not only harmful but hostile, whereby the overall interests of the agent utilising the LLM are undermined whilst those of another agent, who was actively involved in the establishment and refinement of the technology, are furthered. This “other agent” is the corporate body that is actively exploiting and profiting from the social difficulties many are currently facing, which are evinced most markedly by reports of rampant global loneliness.

The frame problem, or problem of relevance, concerns the capacity of cognitive agents to zero in on relevant information during action and perception, whilst intelligently ignoring everything else. Although this is an ability that such agents realise even in the most seemingly novel of situations, it is generally accepted that no comprehensive explanatory account of it has been provided by cognitive-scientific researchers. However, a new account deriving from the popular active inference framework purports to solve the problem of relevance, an achievement which, if realised, would give strong evidence for the framework’s claim to be an all-embracing theory of cognition. Unfortunately, this account, alongside previous active inference attempts to respond to the problem of relevance, is explanatorily inadequate. This means that, as is the case for all other frameworks in cognitive science, active inference has heretofore failed to resolve the problem of relevance.

This paper explores the relationship between intuition and flow from a neurodynamics perspective. Flow and intuition represent two cognitive phenomena rooted in nonconscious information processing; however, there are clear differences in both their phenomenal characteristics and, more broadly, their contribution to action and cognition. We propose, extrapolating from dual processing theory, that intuition serves as a rapid, nonconscious decision-making process, while flow facilitates this process in action, achieving optimal cognitive control and performance without [conscious] deliberation. By exploring these points of convergence between flow and intuition, we also attempt to reconcile the apparent paradox of the presence of enhanced intuition in flow, which is also a state of heightened cognitive control. To do so, we utilize a revised dual-processing framework, which allows us to productively align and differentiate flow and intuition (including intuition in flow). Furthermore, we draw on recent work examining flow from an active inference perspective. Our account not only heightens understanding of human cognition and consciousness, but also raises new questions for future research, aiming to deepen our comprehension of how flow and intuition can be harnessed to elevate human performance and wellbeing.

Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self—which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference—and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual’s conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher–order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.

It is easy to think of attention as a purely sensorimotor, exogenous mechanism divorced from the influence of an agent’s preferences and needs. However, according to the active inference framework, such a strict reduction cannot be straightforwardly invoked, since _all_ cognitive and behavioural processes can at least be described as maximising the evidence for a generative model entailed by the ongoing existence of that agent; that is, the minimisation of variational free energy. As such, active inference models could cast an (embodied) cognitive mechanism like attention, described in this paper as a relevance filter, as constrained (or enslaved) by these prior preferences for which an agent must seek evidence, whether or not such priors are having direct, real-time neurocognitive effects on the sensorimotor loops that couple the attending agent and her surrounding environment. This duality with respect to the role of priors corresponds to a wider, ongoing debate in the active inference community regarding the framework’s explanatory power. More specifically, the debate centres on whether the notion of a generative model and the priors embedded ubiqitously therein act as a purely useful instrumental tool for scientists aiming to model the behaviours of self-organising entities, or, rather, the brain (and body) is genuinely constituted by a predictive hierarchy within which higher-order dynamics constrain and contextualise activity unfolding at lower levels. With a focus on the second (ontologically realist) construal of active inference presented here, this paper argues that in cognitive systems endowed with attentional schema, higher-order preferences do, indeed, impose a demonstrable and powerful modulating effect on the way attention unfolds. Furthermore, these preferences in question transcend the contingent, task-relevant goals that have already been shown to bias attention. Rather, attention is powerfully tuned by the most-deep rooted priors the agent possesses, such that, when sensory evidence against these priors is observed and free energy spikes, the agent attentionally prioritises the homeostatic restoration of these preferred states over their shorter-term desires. This suggests that, at its core, attention is a goal-driven process, which calls into question the putative dichotomy that exists between endogenous (goal-directed) attention and exogenous (stimulus-driven) attention. What emerges in its place is a symbiotic relationship between attention and preferences, whereby the fulfilment of the latter rests on successful application of the former, and the former derives its function from the organismic need to find evidence for the latter.