Darren Corpe

Liberal K-12 education faces a predicament. It seeks to promote children’s personal autonomy. Yet this aim faces the problem that autonomy is usually conceived as an adult capacity, not something children can meaningfully exercise. K-12 education therefore often focuses on preparing children for autonomous adulthood, but these strategies for cultivating adult autonomy paradoxically risk undermining children’s present-day identities and values. This dissertation seeks a way out of these pitfalls by rethinking autonomy from the ground up. It distinguishes two complementary forms: autonomy-as-independence and autonomy-as-individuality. Autonomy-as-independence captures the day-to-day capacity for responsibility and liability, but it is not the most fitting lens for K-12 education. Autonomy-as-individuality, by contrast, is understood as a form of self-governance shaped by a narrative identity and oriented toward harmony across one’s commitments. This conception provides a more suitable foundation for developing a liberal framework for education: one that respects pluralism while also promoting autonomy for children as present learners and pending adults. This dissertation develops a framework for an autonomy-as-individuality enhancing education that draws on Diana Meyers’ relational account of autonomy, Joseph Raz’s teleological model of authority, and John Rawls’ conception of moral personhood. Together, these resources yield a liberal, autonomy-promoting theory of education that is both pluralist and neutral when promoting students’ future capacities, while still affirming the justice-relevance of children’s lives as learners.

The best way to divide control over children’s education between private and state authorities is unclear. This task has ethical implications that this thesis explores—in the context of a pluralist liberal democracy. In cases where authority over children’s education is granted to private groups, like ethnic or religious minorities, rights are often part of the default vocabulary adopted by politically liberal commentaries. These rights are often viewed as a shield that offers the group immunity from state interference. Some illiberal minority groups argue that they need to be shielded from state interference because the persistence of their cultural or religious identity depends on it. For example, the Amish community in Wisconsin argued in Wisconsin v. Yoder that the future of their community would be jeopardized if they were forced to send their children to school beyond the age of fourteen. While a rights-based approach does explain many of the variables connected with cases like these, the explanation is incomplete. I will offer two clarifications to the rights-based view. First, in the event that a minority group is shielded from state interference, it is not clear that it would be morally legitimate for the group to take over the authority of the state. I will, then, offer a plausible theory that could justify the self-governing authority of minority groups in these situations. My second clarification is that the concept of individual autonomy, often the central liberal value protected by rights, is too broad to support a zero-tolerance approach toward illiberal groups. This indicates that illiberal minority groups might still have a claim to self-governing authority even though they arguably interfere with the autonomy of their children. Some interference with minor elements of individual autonomy should arguably be tolerated in cases where the ruination or assimilation of the group’s unique culture or religion is at stake.