Dattatreya Burte

Sāṅkhya, an ancient Indian philosophical discourse, has been interpreted in literature so far, predominantly in realistic terms which this essay criticises while it recommends phenomenological approach to its interpretation. The essay basing itself on classical Sanskrit sources demonstrates Sāṅkhya to be a proper phenomenological discourse. It explains the relation of bhūtas to tanmātras, demonstrates bhūtas as constitutions in and by consciousness and shows that ‘physical things’ are what we posit as spatiotemporal existents on the basis of bhūtas. This interpretation of the theory of objects is compared with the Husserl’s phenomenological theory of objects.

IntroductionThis is a comparative study. It is in two parts: ‘nature’ and ‘elementary nature’. ‘Nature ’ as in the Western tradition is identified here with ‘prakṛti’ in sāṅkhya.NatureSāṅkhya is argued to be a post-epoche discourse. ‘Pure consciousness’ is then identified with ‘buddhi’ and what Husserl calls its ‘ground’, with ‘pradhān’. The ‘nature’ of the psychophysical reality is argued to be ‘pure consciousness’ while the ‘nature’ of ‘pure consciousness’ is argued to be its ‘ground’. Phenomenological reduction is interpreted as ‘laya’ of the psychophysical reality into its ‘nature’.‘Elementary nature’‘Stuff’ and ‘form’ in phenomenology and the three ‘guṇa’ in sāṅkhya are interpreted as the ‘elementary natures’. Two criteria, one of ‘non-selfsufficiency’ and the other of ‘comprehensiveness’, for qualifying as ‘elementary nature’, are proposed. The former is shown to disqualify as ‘elementary nature’, what we get by ‘empirical intuition’. What Husserl describes as ‘pure essence’ satisfies, but it is argued to be but a kind, the ‘empirically instantiated’ kind of ‘pure essence’ and is identified with what sāṅkhya calls ‘dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa’ kind of ‘sāmānya viṣaya’. ‘Stuff’, is not ‘empirically instantiated’, but ‘empirically un-instantiated’ kind of ‘pure essence’ and is identified with what sāṅkhya calls ‘a-dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa’ kind of ‘sāmānya viṣaya’. It is characterised as non-selfsufficiency of ‘reciprocal’ kind, as against ‘form’, as one of ‘unilateral’ kind. The other criterion, that of ‘comprehensiveness’, is based upon ‘satkāryavāda’. It requires moods and the four Aristotelian causes of mental things to be traceable to the ‘elementary natures’ in the respective discipline. Sāṅkhya satisfies both these criteria but phenomenology is not found to fare as well; particularly, ‘sense-data’, which Husserl proposes as ‘stuff’, fails on the criterion of ‘non-selfsufficiency’.

IntroductionThis paper is introduced as the first in a series on a comparative study in phenomenology and Sāṅkhya. The issues intended to be investigated in this paper have been specified. IntentionalityBrentano’s attempt to characterize the Cartesian division of the world with the help of his concept of intentionality, his theory of intentionality and difficulties associated with it are discussed. Paradox and RemedyConsciousness, which alone is argued to be intentional, is argued to make the world a paradoxical pseudo-totality preventing its theorization. The remedy for resolution of the paradox is presented.Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality and ‘Paradigm of Consciousness’The division of the world possible under the ‘Cartesian paradigm’ is shown to be of no help in resolving the paradox. Husserl’s theory of intentionality is shown to have distinguished itself from theories prior to it, in dividing the pseudo-totality that the world is, into genuine totalities under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’.Phenomenological and ‘Natural’ ReductionThe possibility of the being of phenomenology as a science as well as, that of the ‘natural sciences’ comprising the physical sciences as well as psychology, is traced to their being sciences of genuine totalities made possible by the division under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’ by Husserl’s theory of intentionality.SāṅkhyaSāṅkhya is argued to be a phenomenological discourse. In fact, it is argued to be a post-epoche discourse. Also, all cittavṛtti are argued to have their viṣaya, the concept which has been identified with ‘intentional object’ as the correlate of consciousness. Cittavṛtti, therefore, are argued to be intentional, and thereby equivalent to intentional mental processes. Parallels in Sāṅkhya to Husserl’s concepts of ‘matter’ and ‘quality’ of mental processes have been sought in Sāṅkhya.

Phenomenology, as propounded by Edmond Husserl, is an important movements in the modern western philosophy, while sÅÙkhya and its application yoga are the ancient Indian philosophical disciplines or dar±ana. This is a comparative study of phenomenology with sÅÙkhya and yoga. As per my present understanding this project is now completed. I have organized the outcome of my study in the following four papers preceded by prolegomena: Prolegomena to the comparative study of Phenomenology and SaÙkhya 1, Consciousness in Phenomenology and SÅÙkhya 2. ‘Nature’ (ontology) in Phenomenology and SÅÙkhya 3. Structures (cosmology) in Phenomenology and SÅÙkhya 4. ‘Terminal Transcendental Teleological Cause’ in Phenomenology and SÅÙkhya The parallelism between the philosophical disciplines, so far removed historically, geographically and culturally from each other, which this study brought out, was not only fascinating but also extensive. Certain differences also have been critically brought out. Viewing phenomenology through the grid of sÅÙkhya, I found, elucidates phenomenology. In being viewed from the perspective of a philosophical school, as modern as that of phenomenology, the ancient Indian disciplines also stand to benefit. The comparative study can hope to introduce sÅÙkhya to those acquainted with phenomenology and vice versa. This presentation is an attempt to share the flavor of my findings.