David B. Martens

This paper is a critical study of an argument put forward by Kwasi Wiredu in his engagement with C. I. Lewis on choosing the right modal logic for logical necessity. Wiredu argues that Lewis “could have been more adventurous modally with perfect logicality” and could justifiably have accepted S4 rather than being “to the last cautious of any system stronger than S2” (Wiredu 1979). I address terse, incomplete, and provocatively incongruous notes on Wiredu’s paper by (Makinson 1980) and (Humberstone 2011), as well as a paper by (Cresswell 1965) that Humberstone cites, and I draw on recent work by (Lewitzka 2015; 2016). I conclude that Wiredu’s argument cannot be accepted as sound but a variant argument can be accepted as sound.

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to provide insights into the logic of automated decisions with the goal of promoting fairer, more transparent, and more trustworthy automated decision-making. Despite mounting regulatory pressure, changing consumer expectations, and a growing stream of XAI-related research, few consumer-facing applications of XAI exist. In anticipation of future XAI-enabled products and services, we use ethical foresight analysis to investigate the possible consequences of monetizing explanations. By developing a conceptual artifact we call an explanation platform, we analyze what could happen when digital advertising is fused with XAI. We explore the platform’s business and design logic, examine its potential social and ethical impact, and describe several plausible explanation manipulation scenarios and strategies. We find that while XAI monetization could incentivize industry adoption of XAI technology and expand algorithmic recourse across society, it could also lead to corrupted forms of explanations optimized for profit-driven objectives. Overall, our foresight analysis makes the case for the economic and technological feasibility of monetized XAI, but raises concerns about its desirability in liberal democratic societies.

This sophisticated, difficult, and puzzling book consolidates and continues the exploration of our finitude pursued in Adrian Moore’s earlier book The Infinite and in a number of previous and intervening articles by him. One of Moore’s purposes in Points of View is to defend an affirmative answer to the question “Are absolute representations possible?” Moore takes this question to be an expression of an essential connection between current concerns about language and mind, and what he regards as deeper perennial concerns about our finitude. Another of his purposes is to recommend acquisition of a certain taste for nonsense as an apt response to those connected concerns, as “a philosophical tactic of very general utility.”

Robert Shope states at the outset of The Nature of Meaningfulness that his goal is "to present a unified view of meaningfulness". As the book unfolds, the unity in his view turns out to be subtle and complex, and to take in many distinct topics. His discussion is dense with arguments and counterexamples, and engages with many other contemporary analytic philosophers' writings on each topic. Readers are justified, I think, in treating the book as a collection of quite independent essays on various metaphysical topics that can profitably be engaged selectively on the basis of a reader's interests and on the reader's methodological terms.

In this dissertation I investigate the nature of first-person thoughts, i.e., thoughts typically expressed in English with sentences containing 'I'. ;Led by McTaggart and Castaneda, many philosophers have advanced various arguments and putative counter-examples designed to show that no theory of first-person thoughts can be correct which holds that the reference of a first-person thought to its subject is mediated by descriptive content of that thought. I thoroughly review classical and contemporary theories of first-person thoughts, from Russell through the present, carefully noting the data, arguments, and putative counter-examples that an adequate theory must accommodate. ;Taking a position contrary to that of McTaggart, Castaneda, et al., I describe a class of descriptional theories of first-person thoughts able to meet all of the principal anti-descriptionalist arguments and putative counter-examples, and to explain many of the peculiar properties of first-person thoughts. Those theories impute to a first-person thought a complex descriptive content derived from its subject's introspection of his or her own nonfirst-person mental states; certain causal relationships with its subject's actions; and a structure that includes an aspect under which the content is thought, obscuring part of that content from the introspective awareness of its subject

This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first- person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person. I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle theory according to which first- person belief essentially involves the believer's introspective acquaintance with herself

This paper proposes a response to the duplication objection to the descriptive theory of singular mental reference. This objection involves hypothetical cases in each of which there are a pair of qualitatively indistinguishable objects and a thought that apparently refers to only one of the pair, despite the descriptive indistinguishability of the two objects. I identify a concept of reference-likeness or closeness to reference, which is related to the concept of genuine singular reference as the concept of truthlikeness or closeness to truth is related to the concept of truth. My response to the duplication objection is to say that the hypothetical cases it involves establish only that a thought can come close enough to singular reference to a thing despite not genuinely referring to that thing, a consequence that is compatible with the descriptive theory of singular mental reference.