David Bakhurst

In the last twenty years there has been a dramatic revival of interest in the idea that there can be genuine moral knowledge. The noncognitivist assumptions that dominated so much twentieth-century ethical theory no longer seem the obvious truths they once did to so many thinkers. It is now common to hear the claim that moral values are genuine constituents of the furniture of the world - or at least of its upholstery- and that moral deliberation and judgment legitimately aspire to truth. Morality, it is frequently argued, is a realm of discovery rather than invention, and moral reasoning, and the play of moral imagination, must be constrained by how the moral facts stand.Such “realist” or “cognitivist” views in ethics take many forms. This essay considers whether a pragmatist account of moral knowledge might fruitfully be developed. My project will recommend itself only to those who believe that pragmatist insights serve to support relatively robust conceptions of truth and justification.

The Heart of the Matter explores the legacies of Ilyenkov and Vygotsky, two Russian thinkers who marshalled their passion for truth, enlightenment and independent thought to understand the human mind, not just for the sake of knowledge alone, but to help create the conditions in which human flourishing can become a reality for all. The book renders their theories intelligible against the dramatic social and historical background in which they lived and worked, bringing their ideas into dialogue with themes and thinkers in Western philosophy to reveal how they illuminate philosophical issues of enduring significance.

This paper explores Ilyenkov’s conception of imagination as it is expressed in his writings on aesthetics and in his 1968 book Ob idolakh i idealakh (Of Idols and Ideals). Ilyenkov deemed imagination and creativity to be central to the character of distinctively human forms of mental activity. After examining the many different contexts in which Ilyenkov sees imagination at work—from the most basic operations of perception to the expression of artistic and scientific genius—I bring his ideas into dialogue with the account of imagination developed in Vygotsky’s writings. I argue that, though there are significant differences, their respective approaches are complementary. Both see imagination not simply as a vehicle of fantasy, but as intimately involved in disclosing reality. Moreover, both thinkers are reluctant to cast imagination as a discrete mental function on a par with reason, memory, will, etc. Imagination, rather, is critical to the way in which mental functions express themselves. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of whether children can be taught to be creative and imaginative.

This paper introduces a suite of articles devoted to Philip Kitcher’s The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education (Oxford University Press, 2021). The suite opens with a paper by Kitcher, which presents the central themes of his important book. This is followed by an assessment of the work as whole by John White, and four commentaries discussing in detail various aspects of Kitcher’s position by Ben Kotzee (on science education), Alexis Gibbs (on arts education), Sheron Fraser-Burgess (on deliberative democracy and inclusivity), and Nigel Tubbs (on Kitcher’s ‘Deweyan Society’). In the final contribution, Kitcher replies to his critics. The introduction sketches the character of Kitcher’s project and comments on his pragmatist method.

This paper argues that Gareth Matthews’ writing on developmental psychology is both a central part of his philosophical legacy and a contribution of enduring interest. Although he engages with figures, such as Piaget and Kohlberg, who are no longer as influential as they once were, his critique of the ‘deficit conception of childhood’ retains its relevance today. While the deficit model holds that any capacity, aptitude, virtue, or skill that a child possesses is a deficient version of the same capacity, aptitude, virtue, or skill, as possessed by adults, Matthews contends that there are some things adults do badly which children do well, and that children's curiosity, wonder, and imaginative insight is something we should respect—indeed envy—and try to learn from. The paper concludes by raising a number of questions and criticisms of Matthews’ approach that his contemporary followers might fruitfully seek to address.

The question of the affinity between Wittgenstein's philosophy and pragmatism is one that has been often discussed, usually by philosophers sympathetic to a broadly affirmative answer. Pragmatism came into being in 1867 in a reading group in Cambridge Massachusetts, the members of which included Peirce and James. Putnam observes that though the later Wittgenstein may not have been a pragmatist “in the strict sense”, he “shares a central, perhaps the central emphasis with pragmatism: the emphasis on the primacy of practice”. Though Wittgenstein might have resisted the idea that he gave “primacy” to any concept, there is clearly a sense in which Putnam is right. Wittgenstein also admits a class of propositions he calls “grammatical propositions” or “norms of description”. James's most significant influence over Wittgenstein lies in the philosophy of psychology. James's method in psychology is empiricist and introspectionist, and he is a master of the description of mental life.

John McDowell begins his essay ‘Knowledge by Hearsay’ (1993) by describing two ways language matters to epistemology. The first is that, by understanding and accepting someone else's utterance, a person can acquire knowledge. This is what philosophers call ‘knowledge by testimony’. The second is that children acquire knowledge in the course of learning their first language—in acquiring language, a child inherits a conception of the world. In The Formation of Reason (2011), and my writings on Russian socio‐historical philosophy and psychology, I address issues bearing on the second of these topics, questions about the child's development through initiation into language and other forms of social being. In this chapter, I focus on the first: the epistemology of testimony. After expounding a view of testimony inspired by McDowell, and supplemented by ideas from Sebastian Rödl, I consider how such an account illuminates two issues in philosophy of education: the extent of an individual's epistemic dependence upon others, and the nature of teaching.