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253Functionalism and tacit knowledge of grammarPhilosophical Perspectives 37 (1): 18-48. 2023.In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing with G about expressions' semantic, phonetic, and …Read more
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406What Is It To Have A Language?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (4): 837-866. 2023.This article defends the view that having a language just is knowing how to engage in communication with it. It also argues that, despite claims to the contrary, this view is compatible and complementary with the Chomskyan conception of language on which humans have languages in virtue of being in brain states realizing tacit knowledge of grammars for those languages.
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313Is meaning cognized?Mind and Language 38 (5): 1276-1295. 2023.In this article, I defend an account of linguistic comprehension on which meaning is not cognized, or on which we do not tacitly know our language's semantics. On this view, sentence comprehension is explained instead by our capacity to translate sentences into the language of thought. I explain how this view can explain our capacity to correctly interpret novel utterances, and then I defend it against several standing objections.
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Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyDepartment of Linguistics and PhilosophyDigital Learning Fellow
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Linguistics |