•  29
    Reply to Doody
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (5): 677-681. 2017.
    In an earlier paper, we appealed to various empirical studies to make the case that the unconscious mind is capable of robust self-deception. Paul Doody has challenged our interpretations of that empirical evidence. In this reply we defend our interpretations, arguing that the unconscious is engaged in strategic and flexible goal pursuit.
  •  59
    How (Not) to Theorize About Multiple Realization
    Metaphilosophy 49 (5): 674-690. 2018.
    Though multiple realization has been an important concept in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology for more than fifty years, it has not been until quite recently that anyone proposed an actual theory of what multiple realization is. This paper argues that the most dominant current theories of multiple realization are unacceptable. It does so by mainly arguing for a particular methodology for theorizing about multiple realization. Rather than being mostly constrained by intuitions,…Read more
  •  140
    Functional analysis and mechanistic explanation
    Synthese 191 (12): 2695-2714. 2014.
    Piccinini and Craver (Synthese 183:283–311, 2011) argue for the surprising view that psychological explanation, properly understood, is a species of mechanistic explanation. This contrasts with the ‘received view’ (due, primarily, to Cummins and Fodor) which maintains a sharp distinction between psychological explanation and mechanistic explanation. The former is typically construed as functional analysis, the analysis of some psychological capacity into an organized series of subcapacities with…Read more