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2Consciousness, Attention, and Working Memory: an Empirical Evaluation of Prinz's Theory of ConsciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10): 7-29. 2014.A popular issue in mind is to explain why conscious mental states are conscious. Prinz (2012) defends three claims in an effort to make such an explanation: (i)mental states become conscious when and only when we attend to them; (ii)attention is a process by which mental states become available to working memory; so (iii) mental states are conscious when and only when they become available to working memory. Here I attack Prinz's theory, made explicit in (iii), by showing that there is strong …Read more
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147Robust, unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexiblePhilosophical Psychology 29 (5): 1-15. 2016.In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and ps…Read more
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39Reply to DoodyPhilosophical Psychology 30 (5): 677-681. 2017.In an earlier paper, we appealed to various empirical studies to make the case that the unconscious mind is capable of robust self-deception. Paul Doody has challenged our interpretations of that empirical evidence. In this reply we defend our interpretations, arguing that the unconscious is engaged in strategic and flexible goal pursuit.
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80How (Not) to Theorize About Multiple RealizationMetaphilosophy 49 (5): 674-690. 2018.Though multiple realization has been an important concept in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology for more than fifty years, it has not been until quite recently that anyone proposed an actual theory of what multiple realization is. This paper argues that the most dominant current theories of multiple realization are unacceptable. It does so by mainly arguing for a particular methodology for theorizing about multiple realization. Rather than being mostly constrained by intuitions,…Read more
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152Functional analysis and mechanistic explanationSynthese 191 (12): 2695-2714. 2014.Piccinini and Craver (Synthese 183:283–311, 2011) argue for the surprising view that psychological explanation, properly understood, is a species of mechanistic explanation. This contrasts with the ‘received view’ (due, primarily, to Cummins and Fodor) which maintains a sharp distinction between psychological explanation and mechanistic explanation. The former is typically construed as functional analysis, the analysis of some psychological capacity into an organized series of subcapacities with…Read more
Fayetteville, Arkansas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
General Philosophy of Science |