David Bather Woods

ABSTRACT Few are persuaded by Schopenhauer’s argument that ours is the worst of all possible worlds. In this paper, I propose and defend an alternative reading of Schopenhauer’s argument. According to my reading, the argument has considerable polemical force against Leibnizian optimism independently of its positive success. Its force lies in its implicit proposal of worldly sustainability as a measure of worldly perfection. Worldly sustainability is the degree by which a possible world can tolerate alterations for the worse without ending. There is a natural connection between this measure of worldly perfection, on the one hand, and the inhabitants of the world, on the other, insofar as these inhabitants have an indirect interest in the global degree of worldly sustainability through their own will to exist. Measuring worldly perfection by the degree of existential sustainability is consistent with Schopenhauer’s general tendency to adopt the perspective of beings in the world when making evaluations of the world, always to the detriment of optimism. Regardless of whether Schopenhauer’s argument successfully inverts the thesis of Leibnizian optimism, therefore, it poses a serious and substantial challenge to the worldly values on which such optimism is based.

Few are persuaded by Schopenhauer’s argument that ours is the worst of all possible worlds. In this paper, I propose and defend an alternative reading of Schopenhauer’s argument. According to my reading, the argument has considerable polemical force against Leibnizian optimism independently of its positive success. Its force lies in its implicit proposal of worldly sustainability as a measure of worldly perfection. Worldly sustainability is the degree by which a possible world can tolerate alterations for the worse without ending. There is a natural connection between this measure of worldly perfection, on the one hand, and the inhabitants of the world, on the other, insofar as these inhabitants have an indirect interest in the global degree of worldly sustainability through their own will to exist. Measuring worldly perfection by the degree of existential sustainability is consistent with Schopenhauer’s general tendency to adopt the perspective of beings in the world when making evaluations of the world, always to the detriment of optimism. Regardless of whether Schopenhauer’s argument successfully inverts the thesis of Leibnizian optimism, therefore, it poses a serious and substantial challenge to the worldly values on which such optimism is based.

– An engaging biography of one of the most influential Western philosophers and a thought-provoking exploration of how to live with Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimism. – Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) almost wasn’t one of the greatest philosophers of the nineteenth century. Born in the Free City of Danzig to a family of shipping merchants, he was destined for a life of imports and exports until his father died in a suspected suicide. After much deliberation, the young Schopenhauer invested his inheritance in himself and his philosophical vocation. But the long road to recognition was a difficult one, with Schopenhauer spending all but the last decade of his life in total obscurity. Yet his ideas and style went on to influence great thinkers, including Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Sigmund Freud, as well as artists such as the composer Richard Wagner and writers Marcel Proust, Thomas Mann, Samuel Beckett, and many more. A singular and remarkably influential thinker, Schopenhauer is usually described as an extreme pessimist. He questioned the purpose of existence in a world where pain and suffering are inescapable and happiness is all too brief. In this engaging philosophical biography, David Bather Woods reevaluates Schopenhauer’s pessimism in the context of his life experiences, revealing the philosopher’s relentless fascination with the world and making a case for his contemporary relevance. Bather Woods weaves together Schopenhauer’s ideas with the story of how he came to be, including such topics as love, loneliness, morality, politics, gender, sexuality, death, suicide, fame, and madness. In doing so, this book answers some of life’s most challenging questions about how to deal with pain and loss, and how to live with ourselves and each other. Despite his pessimistic outlook on human existence, Schopenhauer didn’t give up on life. Rather, he recognized that the question of how to live becomes even more pressing, and he worked to provide an answer. Bather Woods shows how Schopenhauer’s life informed his ideas and how they still resonate today.

Schopenhauer has a longstanding reputation for misanthropy. The reputation is warranted, but it is also potentially misleading. Privately, Schopenhauer resisted being called misanthropic, possibly because of the false implication that he hated humanity. Recent philosophical studies of misanthropy have helped to forestall this implication by detaching the definition of misanthropy from hatred and associating it instead with a negative critical verdict of humankind that can be expressed in a wider range of responses. On this definition, whether Schopenhauer endorses the misanthropic verdict, on the one hand, and how he proposes to respond to it, on the other, are separate questions. In this paper, I answer the second question by presenting two of Schopenhauer’s proposals for preventing a hateful response. Both proposals confirm that Schopenhauer not only resisted hatred of humanity but also had recommendations for achieving such resistance. However, the two proposals are also markedly different in important respects. The first proposal is still based on a misanthropic evaluation of humankind but recommends a different negative response from hatred, namely contempt. The second proposal, by contrast, is based on an alternative evaluation of humankind and recommends a positive response that supplants both hatred and contempt, namely compassion. In the course of presenting these proposals, I shall give reasons to disfavour the contemptuous proposal and thereby favour the compassionate one.

© British Society of Aesthetics 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] even opening the pages of Bart Vandenabeele’s The Sublime in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, it is an encouraging sight to behold. For, there are surprisingly few single-author monographs focused solely on Schopenhauer’s aesthetic philosophy, at least in the Anglophone literature—much less on Schopenhauer’s theory of the sublime in particular, as is rightfully boasted in the blurb to Vandenabeele’s book. The paucity of such books is all the more surprising given, first, that Schopenhauer is often noted as having continuously exerted an influence upon artists and writers from the time of his own life up to the present day; and second, and more relevantly to Vandenabeele’s book, that few philosophers have held aesthetic experience, of nature as well as art, in any higher regard...

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I identify the mentions of Schopenhauer in À la recherche du temps perdu. I use an implicit reference to Schopenhauer by Swann to open a discussion of Schopenhauer’s theory of music. I attempt to downplay its identification, suggested by some commentators, with both the views about music expressed in the novel and the form of the novel itself. In the second section, I discuss Proust’s references to Schopenhauer in his essay on reading. I confirm that Proust well understood Schopenhauer’s relationship with his own erudition and suggest that Schopenhauer’s influence on Proust may take the form of an incitement to think for oneself. In the third and final section, I consider several potential points of convergence between Proust and Schopenhauer concerning states of the will. However, in all cases I find, as I do throughout the chapter, that below the surface Proust and Schopenhauer often part ways.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is now recognised as a figure of canonical importance to the history of philosophy. Schopenhauer founded his system on a highly original interpretation of Kant's philosophy, developing an entirely novel and controversial worldview guided centrally by his striking conception of the human will and of art and beauty. His influence extends to figures as diverse as Fredrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Iris Murdoch within philosophy, and Richard Wagner, Thomas Hardy, Sigmund Freud, Thomas Mann, Samuel Beckett and Jorge Luis Borges outside it. The Schopenhauerian Mind is an outstanding, wide-ranging collection that explores the rich nature of Schopenhauer's ideas, texts, influences, and legacy. Comprising 38 original chapters by an international team of contributors, the volume is organised into five clear parts: Knowledge and Reality Aesthetics and the Arts Ethics, Politics, and Salvation Before Schopenhauer After Schopenhauer. The Schopenhauerian Mind covers all the key areas and concepts of Schopenhauer's philosophy, including fields omitted in previous studies. It is essential reading for students of nineteenth-century philosophy, Continental philosophy and philosophy of art and aesthetics, and also of interest to those in related disciplines such as literature and religion.

A evidência textual primária confirma que Schopenhauer estava ciente da adoção generalizada do confinamento solitário no sistema penitenciário americano e alguns de seus efeitos prejudiciais. Ele entende sua perniciosidade no que diz respeito ao tédio, fenômeno pelo qual é conhecido por ter nele pensado e analisado extensivamente. Neste artigo, eu interpreto o relato de Schopenhauer sobre o tédio e sua relação com o confinamento solitário. Defendo Schopenhauer contra a objeção de que os casos de confinamento servem apenas para ilustrar a inadequação geral de sua explicação do tédio como a falta de coisas para se querer. Esta defesa chega à conclusão de que, ao contrário, alguém pode muito bem sofrer da falta de coisas para querer como resultado direto de estar confinado; e que o tédio, entendido como a privação de vontade — fenômeno que sugiro poder ser chamado de privação conativa — faz uma contribuição esclarecedora para a nossa compreensão teórica da nocividade do confinamento solitário.

According to Schopenhauer’s compensation argument for pessimism, the non-existence of the world is preferable to its existence because no goods can ever compensate for the mere existence of evil. Standard interpretations take this argument to be based on Schopenhauer’s thesis that all goods are merely the negation of evils, from which they assume it follows that the apparent goods in life are in fact empty and without value. This article develops a non-standard variant of the standard interpretation, which accepts the relevance of the negativity thesis but rejects that the argument assumes that life’s goods are all empty and valueless. Instead, it argues that whatever value negative goods might possess, they do not have the kind of value to compensate for positive evils. This involves additional development of the negativity thesis and a defence of it against objections from Byron Simmons (2021)

This chapter examines the ethical matters that arise from Schopenhauer’s discussions of sexual love and sexual practices. It presents Schopenhauer's remarks on “pederasty”, among other “unnatural lusts”, and attempts to disentangle Schopenhauer’s judgements on these practices from the principles that guide them. It considers these practices in the light of Schopenhauer's ethics of asceticism and his ethics of compassion and concludes that Schopenhauer’s objections to them are not always moral in nature, strictly speaking, and where they are moral, they are not always based on the “unnaturalness” of the practices, but rather the harm that he supposes they may cause.

Primary textual evidence confirms that Schopenhauer was aware of the widespread adoption of solitary confinement in the American penitentiary system, and some of its harmful effects. He understands its harmfulness in terms of boredom, a phenomenon which he is known to have given extensive thought and analysis. In this paper I interpret Schopenhauer’s account of boredom and its relation to solitary confinement. I defend Schopenhauer against the objection that cases of confinement only serve to illustrate the general inadequacy of his explanation of boredom in terms of a lack of things to will. This defence arrives at the conclusion that, on the contrary, someone might well suffer from a lack of things to will as a direct result of being confined; and that boredom understood as the deprivation of willing, a phenomenon I suggest may be called conative deprivation, makes an illuminating contribution to our theoretical understanding of the harmfulness of solitary confinement.

In this thesis I offer an interpretation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimism. I argue against interpreting Schopenhauer’s pessimism as if it were merely a matter of temperament, and I resist the urge to find a single standard argument for pessimism in Schopenhauer’s work. Instead, I treat Schopenhauer’s pessimism as inherently variegated, composed of several distinct but interrelated pessimistic positions, each of which is supported by its own argument. I begin by examining Schopenhauer’s famous argument that willing necessitates suffering, which I defend against the misrepresentative interpretation advocated by Ivan Soll. I also offer a metaphysical reading of Schopenhauer’s claim that no amount happiness can compensate for the mere fact of suffering, based upon his negative conception of happiness. I proceed by analysing Schopenhauer’s criticisms of two prominent optimists, Leibniz and Rousseau. I attempt to salvage something of Schopenhauer’s counterargument against Leibniz that this is the worse of all possible worlds, and I also examine Schopenhauer’s claim that the optimistic metaphysics of a priori rationalistic philosophy cannot cope with the evidence of meaningless suffering. In the case of Rousseau, I interpret Schopenhauer’s brief objection to Rousseau’s assumption of original goodness, by means of an examination of Schopenhauer’s conception of the contrary doctrine, original sin. Next I consider the metaphysics of Schopenhauer’s account of eternal justice. After defending it against a number of objections, I argue that the nature of his version of eternal justice, which he admits constitutes a justification for suffering, does not conflict with the fact that he so strongly condemns Leibniz’s and Rousseau’s optimistic justifications for suffering. Finally I assess whether and to what extent Schopenhauer’s ethics of salvation are either pessimistic or optimistic. I conclude that the mere fact that salvation is possible is not necessarily a cause for optimism, but that Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation is made partly optimistic by the higher form of cognition that he describes as part of it. I also argue that Schopenhauer’s views on the essentially mystical nature of the state of salvation ultimately commit him to being neither positively optimistic nor positively pessimistic about salvation. I conclude overall with some brief remarks about the meaning of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, and how in spite of its diverse nature, it is able to lay down a singular challenge to all future philosophers concerned with the question of suffering