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1014Unconditional Forgiveness and Normative CondescensionIn David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7, Oxford University Press. 2021.This paper argues that the moral value of unconditional forgiveness is more complicated and constrained than it is often taken to be. When we unconditionally forgive, we engage with someone in a way that doesn’t take seriously their perspective about the meanings and values at stake in our relations with them. Other things being equal, this is problematic; it is normatively condescending, belittling the place of the other person’s moral agency in our relations with them. This doesn’t mean that u…Read more
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647Immortality, Boredom, and Standing for SomethingIn Michael Cholbi & Travis Timmerman (eds.), Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Routledge. 2021.Addresses a common criticism of Williams' so-called "Necessary Boredom Thesis," arguing that the criticism misconstrues the kind of boredom that Williams is worried about. Then offers an independent reason to worry about the Necessary Boredom Thesis, given the relevant construal of boredom. Finally, develops a weaker version of Williams' worries about choosing to live an immortal existence, arguing that immortality threatens to undermine our ability to stand for the things in our lives.
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591Two Strawsonian strategies for accounting for morally responsible agencyPhilosophical Studies 177 (8): 2341-2364. 2020.It is common for theorists, drawing on P. F. Strawson, to account for morally responsible agency in terms of the nature of the emotions and feelings that characterize our responsibility practices, in terms of the nature of the so-called “reactive attitudes.” Here, I argue against this attitude-based Strawsonian strategy, and I argue in favor of an alternative, which I call the “concern-based Strawsonian strategy.” On this alternative, rather than account for morally responsible agency in terms o…Read more
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33Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame, written by Audrey L. Anton (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (5): 618-621. 2018.
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573Responsibility, Libertarians, and the “Facts as We Know Them”: A Concern-Based Construal of Strawson’s ReversalEthics 128 (3): 612-625. 2018.Here, I put forth a construal of P. F. Strawson’s so-called reversal, his view that what it means to be morally responsible is determined by our practices of holding responsible. The “concern-based” construal that I defend holds that what it means to be morally responsible is determined by the basic social concerns of which our practices are an expression. This construal, I argue, avoids a dilemma that Patrick Todd has recently raised for the reversal.
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870Should I choose to never die? Williams, boredom, and the significance of mortalityPhilosophical Studies 174 (8): 2009-2028. 2017.Bernard Williams’ discussion of immortality in “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” has spawned an entire philosophical literature. This literature tends to focus on one of Williams’ central claims: if we were to relinquish our mortality, we would necessarily become alienated from our existence and environment—“bored,” in his terms. Many theorists have defended this claim; many others have challenged it. Even if this claim is false, though, it still isn’t obvious that …Read more
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265Fearing Death as Fearing the Loss of One's Life: Lessons from Alzheimer's DiseaseIn Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death, Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 101-114. 2015.
Berkeley, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Agency |
Moral Psychology |
Moral Responsibility |
Responsibility and Reactive Attitudes |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Biomedical Ethics |
Applied Ethics |