David Blitz

This dissertation considers the history and philosophy of emergent evolution, and in particular the attempt to answer the question of the role of qualitative novelty in the evolutionary process. Chapter one examines the background to the theory of emergent evolution in the work of Charles Darwin. It is argued that Darwin's theory is neither tautologous nor revolutionary, and the application of Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolution to the case of Darwinian evolution is criticized. Chapter two analyzes the work of the comparative psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan, and his views on qualitative novelty are compared with those of other major contemporaneous emergentist theorists: Samuel Alexander, C. D. Broad and Roy Wood Sellars. Chapter three discusses the history of emergent evolution as a philosophical trend, up to and including the emergent materialism of Mario Bunge. An alternative emergentist view of the level structure of reality based on the four levels of matter, life, society and mind is proposed in the conclusion.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76 Reviews PROPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS David Blitz Philosophy Dept. and Peace Studies / Central Connecticut State U. New Britain, ct 06050, usa [email protected] Graham Stevens. The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy: Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Proposition. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Pp. xii, 185. isbn: 978-0-415-36044-9 (hb). £80.00. us$155.95. Graham Stevens has written a short book on a diUcult subject: the unity of the proposition. While the title of the volume is The Russellian Origins of Analytic Philosophy, the underlying theme is the comparatively little discussed problem of how the elements of a proposition come together to form a unity, as indicated in the book’s subtitle: “Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Prop­ osition”. Stevens traces this concept, as a unifying thread or “central concern”, throughout Russell’s many philosophies which constitute for Stevens a “consis­ tent and constantly evolving philosophy” (p. 2) stretching from the earliest log­ ical writings to the later works of the 1930s and 1940s. This is an important and well written volume, which Russellians should have in their personal and uni­ versity libraries. That the “unity of the proposition” is a problem at all requires the reader to return to the neo-Hegelian idealism which Russell encountered as a student at Cambridge.1 Russell, inXuenced by Peano and Frege, broke with the doctrine of internal relations, defended by Bradley and others, according to which external relations are unreal and false appearance. However, an important element of idealism remains even during the Principia period, due to Russell’s continued belief that a proposition is a non-linguistic, non-mental, abstract entity; these elements are all of the same ontological kind, which can be identiWed through analysis and recombined so that their synthesis reconstitutes the original “unity of the proposition”. This turns out to be a very tall order which will occupy Russell for nearly half a century. Consider the standard example Russell gives: “Desdemona loves Cassio”. According to Russell, this proposition (independently of its truth or falsity) actually contains its “simple constituents”z—zwith “Desdemona” and “Cassio” being things and “loves” a concept. Russell, as a founder of analytic philosophy, has to defend the legitimacy of this analysis from the claim that it has reduced 1 Chapter 1: “Russell, Frege and the Analysis of Unities”. December 2, 2009 (5:28 pm) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd Reviews 77 the structured unity of the proposition into an unstructured set of parts (or heap) where the original order of combination has been lost. The problem of is that merely listing “Desdemona”, “Cassio” and “loves” does not indicate the way in which the terms were originally combined or re­ lated. For reasons to be made clear later, this is referred to in the literature as the “narrow order problem”. In particular, the question arises as to how analysis enables us to assert that it is Desdemona who loves Cassio (supposing this to be the case), rather than the other way around (since love may not be requited). Stevens deals with logical form in a later chapter devoted to the problem of belief statements, but the notion applies here as well: analysis seems to have skip­ ped the logical form, the way in which the constituents are combined. But if the logical form is included, then there seems to be an extra constituent in the prop­ osition not given by direct inspection, and analysis would appear to have added something above and beyond what was there before the analysis. Adding linking relations to indicate how the components were originally combined does not help either. If there is some relation Lz which relates “Desdemona” and “loves” and another relation Rz which relates “loves” and “Cassio”, then there are Wve constituents, not three. Moreover, there is now room for inWnite regress, with a relation L2 linking “Desdemona” and L, R2 linking “loves” and “Cassio”, and so on. But without adding these additional items, there is an apparent failure of an­ alysis to fully provide the order of the elements present in the original...

Russell and Einstein shared a commitment to a form of pacifism which Russell termed "non-absolute pacifism", or "relative political pacifism". Despite a 1947 disagreement on the roles of the United States, the Soviet Union and the immediate measures to be taken for world peace, Russell and Einstein were able to collaborate again in 1955 due to their shared philosophy. Newly discovered annotations by Einstein on a 1947 Russell article are used to analyze their disagreement, while their later statements are used to illustrate their shared commitment to a type of pacifism which allowed, exceptionally, for a justified war in the special circumstance of an enemy opposed to "life as such".

Russell's statements in the immediate post-World War II period about war with the Soviet Union have generated considerable controversy. Some commentators interpret his declarations as if he advocated a preventive war against the Soviet Union. To the contrary, Russell advanced a strategy of conditional threat of war with the aim not of provoking war, but of preventing it. However, Russell was unable to satisfy his critics. Despite initial accuracy in his restatements of what he had originally said, Russell erred in later affirmations, lending credence to the erroneous view that he had something to hide.