The via negativa conception of physicalism defines the thesis in terms of the exclusion of fundamental mentality: no property is both fundamental and mental. I argue that its appeal is best understood as resting on a deeper metaphysical ideal inherited from classical materialism—the ideal of natural continuity. Rather than proposing a rival formulation, I reconstruct this continuity ideal as the animating commitment behind many physicalist views. This reconstruction helps to systematize characte…
Read moreThe via negativa conception of physicalism defines the thesis in terms of the exclusion of fundamental mentality: no property is both fundamental and mental. I argue that its appeal is best understood as resting on a deeper metaphysical ideal inherited from classical materialism—the ideal of natural continuity. Rather than proposing a rival formulation, I reconstruct this continuity ideal as the animating commitment behind many physicalist views. This reconstruction helps to systematize characteristic modal judgments in the literature and to explain the appeal of via negativa. However, if physicalism’s metaphysical motivation is tied to this ideal, then developments in contemporary physics, especially non-locality and indeterminism, may place it under pressure. Physicalism’s future thus depends on whether our evolving scientific worldview continues to sustain the continuity ideal that historically gave the view its force.
