David Chelsom Vogt

To have moral standing to blame is to have a right to blame. But what kind of right is it, and what follows from having or lacking standing? I will argue that the function of standing norms is to protect the freedom and interests of persons who are or could be blamed. Moral standing to blame, I will claim, is a power according to Wesley Hohfeld’s classification of rights. It is a normative power to call for an uptake of blame from someone who is liable to blame, i.e., someone who is blameworthy. I make three further claims in distinction to recent scholarship on standing: I argue that the concept of standing does not apply at all to private blame, only to expressed blame; I claim that standing cannot be understood as only a privilege-right; and I argue that there is not a conceptual asymmetry between standing to blame and standing to forgive.

Artikkelen drøfter hvordan vi bør forstå kravet om likhet for loven i Grl. § 98. Vi spør hvorvidt en appell til likhet for loven har selvstendig normativ funksjon, og eventuelt hvorfor og hva som kreves for at likhetskravets skal realiseres. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i et behov for avklaring av disse spørsmålene, da verken forarbeidene til grunnlovsrevisjonen i 2014 eller etterfølgende rettsvitenskapelig litteratur, i særlig grad avklarer hva likhet for loven betyr. Vi utvikler en teori om at likhetsprinsippet i § 98 er et grunnprinsipp for retten som fastlegger begrunnelsesbyrden ved utformingen av lov og annen regulering, og ved rettsanvendelsen. Likhetsprinsippet innebærer at likebehandling krever i seg selv ingen begrunnelse, mens ulikebehandling må kunne begrunnes i henhold til kravene i andre ledd. De to leddene i paragrafen er derfor etter vårt syn uatskillelige: Første ledd stadfester hva som er utgangspunktet, mens andre ledd presiserer hva som ikke regnes som relevante begrunnelser for ulikhet. Likhetskravet er dermed ikke et krav om likt utfall, men et krav om likeverdighet, som vi hevder er en konstitutiv verdi for verdien av politisk rettferdighet. Den forståelsen av likhetskravet i § 98 som vi utvikler, knytter første og andre ledd i § 98 sammen, og åpner for at også første ledd kan bli mer aktivt brukt av domstolene.

I rettspraksis er det eksempler på at individualpreventive hensyn har begrunnet til dels betydelig straffereduksjon for lovbrytere i en ekstraordinært vanskelig livssituasjon. Artikkelen drøfter hvorvidt slik straffnedsettelse utfordrer skyldprinsippet og prinsippet om likhet for loven. I artikkelen utvikles et argument for at alvorlig sosial deprivasjon hos lovbryteren kan påvirke vår forståelse av lovbruddet, slik at lovbruddet kan fremstå mindre krenkende enn det ville gjort i et normaltilfelle. Dermed kan mindre enn normal mengde straff være riktig for å uttrykke en passende reaksjon på lovbruddet. Hvis så er tilfellet, vil ikke skyldprinsippet og likhetsprinsippet utfordres, fordi det vil dreie seg om et relevant ulikt lovbrudd.

Ideen om at lovbrytere fortjener straff, må legges til grunn dersom vi skal kunne forstå og begrunne strafferetten i Norge og i andre rettsstater. Av noen teoretikere har dette kravet til fortjent straff blitt forstått som et negativt krav, som setter en begrensning på oppnåelsen av straffens formål. Straffen må da være «ikke ufortjent». I denne artikkelen argumenterer jeg for at en slik forståelse av fortjenesteideen er utilstrekkelig. Straff som fortjent må ansees som et positivt, selvstendig formål for strafferetten. Artikkelen ser på norsk rettspraksis og lovforarbeider, og drøfter hvorfor det i norsk strafferett må legges til grunn at det er verdifullt å oppfylle lovbryterens fortjeneste.

The Moral Equality Account of Hypocrisy (ME) is a prominent theory of why hypocrites lack moral standing to blame. Hypocrites make exceptions for themselves and thereby implicitly deny moral equality, which is an essential premise of moral standing to blame. ME has recently faced challenges from philosophers who deny that it is the hypocrite’s rejection of moral equality that causes her to lose moral standing to blame. I have distinguished three main challenges which I discuss and rebut in this article: “The Internal Blame and Blame of Fictional Characters Challenge”, which I attribute to Todd ( 2019 ), and “The Hypercrite Challenge” and “The Inegalitarian Norm Challenge”, which are due to Lippert-Rasmussen ( 2021 ). The article begins by offering an account of ME. It fills in a few gaps in the theory, by explaining why it is necessary for a blamer to invoke a special right to blame and by determining the type of right that standing to blame is. It also distinguishes between the question of why hypocrisy is wrong or bad, and the question of why it undermines moral standing to blame. I hold that several theories provide plausible answers to the first question, but only ME has so far given a good answer to the second question. When distinguishing properly between these two questions, we see that ME can respond satisfactorily to the three challenges.

The article discusses retributive justice and punitive restraint in response to the worst types of crime. I take the Breivik Case as a starting point. Anders Behring Breivik was sentenced to 21 years of preventive detention for killing 69 people, mainly youths, at Utøya and 8 people in Oslo on July 22nd, 2011. Retributivist theories as well as commonly held retributive intuitions suggest that much harsher punishment is required for such crimes. According to some retributivist theories, most notably on the influential theories of Kant and Hegel, the death penalty is warranted for murderers like Breivik. This suggests that the rationale for punitive restraint in a case like the Breivik Case can only be found in forward- looking, consequentialist theories of punishment, or by adding to retributivist theories a side-constraint in the form of a principle of parsimony. However, I argue that if we look closer at the function of punishment in the retributivist theories of Kant and Hegel, they too imply a rationale for punitive restraint, even for such horrific crimes as here discussed. Against Kant and Hegel’s own views on the death penalty, I argue that their broader “freedom theories” of retributive justice do not imply the justice of the death penalty or life imprisonment. In the last part of the article, I explore differences in the concepts of freedom entailed by Kant and Hegel’s theories, and I relate these to some of the background factors relevant to the Breivik Case.

English title: The Right to be Punished: On Kant and Hegel's theories of punishment as respect for the criminal The article discusses Kant and Hegel's theories of punishment in light of their broader legal philosophies. The purpose of punishment, and law in general, is to secure mutual freedom and mutual recognition. Punishment is a way of expressing respect for the freedom of the criminal, as well as the freedom of victims and all members of society. Though it might seem odd that imprisoning somebody means respecting their freedom, Hegel famously insists that punishment is a right for the criminal. The article explains how punishment may respect mutual freedom, and defends the claim that this is a necessary condition for just punishment. However, the purpose of re-establishing mutual freedom may possibly be achieved by other methods than punishment. The article discusses the potential of restorative justice processes for expressing the kind of mutual recognition that Hegel ascribes to punishment. Punishment is therefore not necessary for achieving the just purpose that Kant and Hegel ascribe to it. We may thus accept the Kantian-Hegelian framework for the just sanctioning of crime while challenging their more controversial claim that punishment is a categorical imperative.

English title: Kant and the Right to Vote The article is a contribution to the ongoing debate in NFT about the moral responsibility of voters. Kristian Skagen Ekeli has argued that politically ignorant citizens have a duty to abstain from voting. He argues that such a duty fol- lows from Kant’s duty to respect other persons. I analyze Ekeli’s proposed duties by considering how they might fit into Kant’s system of duties. I conclude, contra Ekeli, that the Kantian duty to respect persons does not give rise to a duty for politically ignorant voters to abstain from voting. Denne artikkelen er et bidrag til debatten om velgeres moralske ansvar. Kristian Skagen Ekeli har i to artikler argu- mentert for at uvitende borgere har en plikt til ikke å stemme, noe han begrunner ut fra en kantiansk pliktetikk. Det er imidlertid uklart hvordan en uvitende borgers plikt til å avstå fra å stemme skulle følge av Kants plikt til å respek- tere personer, noe Cornelius og Herman Cappelen kort antyder i sin kommentar til Ekeli. I denne artikkelen foretar jeg en analyse av de pliktene som Ekeli tar til orde for, og undersøker hvordan disse eventuelt kunne passe inn i Kants system av plikttyper. Jeg konkluderer motsatt av Ekeli, med at den kantianske plikten til å respektere personer ikke gir grunnlag for en plikt for uvitende borgere til å avstå fra å stemme i valg.

The article discusses the link between freedom, crime and punishment. According to some theorists, crime does not only cause a person to have less freedom; it constitutes, _in and of itself_, a breach of the freedom of others. Punishment does not only cause people to have more freedom, for instance by preventing crimes; it constitutes, _in and of itself_, respect for mutual freedom. If the latter claims are true, crime and punishment must have certain _meanings_ that make them denials/affirmations of freedom irrespective of their consequences. My aim is to show that such an immanent connection between crime/punishment and freedom exists. I do so by explicating the “natural meaning” of crime and punishment. This way of addressing the topic is inspired by Jean Hampton’s use of H. P. Grice’s concept of natural meaning. Expanding on Hampton’s theory, drawing on both H. L. A. Hart and Kant, I argue that crime has the natural meaning of denying freedom, and punishment has the natural meaning of affirming freedom. The paper presents an ideal theory, not a justification for actual criminal justice practices, which in most countries unfortunately fail to instantiate the value of mutual freedom.

The thesis discusses the justice of state punishment in response to criminal wrongs. The introductory chapter explores the logic of the concept of justice itself, proposing that we understand justice as the function of remedying injustice. This negative approach – studying justice through injustice – allows us to critically evaluate theories of retributive justice via the conceptions of the wrong in crime that they entail, and for which punishment is perceived as a remedy. Examples of the conceptions of the wrong in crime considered in the first part of the thesis are: ‘infringement of mutual freedom’, ‘freeloading’, ‘undermining the mutual benefits of law’, ‘undeserved profit’, ‘harm to the victim’ and ‘material imbalance’. Punishment, upon each of these conceptions, is just to the extent that it remedies the particular wrong of the crime, for instance by cancelling its undeserved profits or by alleviating the harm of the victim. The first part of the thesis culminates in a prolonged discussion of what is deemed the most suitable theory of punishment in a modern democratic state, the ‘Freedom Perspective’ based on a Kantian-Hegelian framework, whereupon crime is wrong because it infringes upon mutual freedom. The second part discusses the possible injustice of punishing severely socially deprived offenders. Specifically, it considers four reasons for the justice of lowering or abstaining from punishment of this group of offenders. These reasons relate to the material, cultural and psychological factors which increase this group’s likelihood of committing crimes and of being punished. These factors are to some extent the result of unjust social structures in society. Hence, this part discusses the links between social justice and criminal justice. Finally, the thesis examines the justice of an alternative way of remedying the wrong in crime: restorative justice processes between victim, offender and other parties to the crime. The concluding remarks are devoted to the meta-issue of how to conceive of justice when facing competing, yet plausible claims of justice.