David DeGrazia

This chapter briefly defends each of the following theses, which together comprise an interest-based model of moral status: (1) Being human is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral status; (2) The capacity for consciousness is necessary but not sufficient; (3) Sentience is necessary and sufficient; (4) Social relations are not a basis for moral status but may ground special obligations to those with moral status; (5) The concept of personhood is unhelpful in modeling moral status, unless a non-vague conception is identified and its moral relevance clarified; (6) Sentient beings are entitled to equal consequentialist consideration; and (7) Sentient beings with substantial temporal self-awareness have special interests that justify the added protection of rights. This model will be engaged in illuminating the moral status of ordinary, self-aware human beings, non-paradigm humans, animals, robots and AI systems, brain organoids, and post-humans with superior self-awareness.

In the literature on persons and their identity, it is customary to distinguish the issue of the nature of personhood—“What is a person?”—from the issue of per- sonal identity—“What are the persistence conditions of a person over time?” In recent years, Eric Olson and Lynne Rudder Baker have brought to the forefront of discussion the related, but often neglected, issue of our essence: “What are we, most fundamentally (essentially)—human animals, persons, or something else?” Attacking what he calls the Standard View of personal identity, according to which personal identity consists in some type of psychological continuity, Olson contends that this thesis has highly implausible implications. Attributing the claim that we are essentially persons to the Standard View, Olson defends the alterna- tive thesis that we are essentially (living) human animals, members of the species Homo sapiens, and that our persistence conditions are biological, having nothing to do with psychology. At the heart of his critique is the contention that the Standard View lacks a plausible account of the relationship between a person and the human animal associated with her. Defending “person essentialism” and defining persons as beings with first-person perspectives, Lynne Rudder Baker responds to Olson’s challenge with the Constitution View: We (human) persons are constituted by, but not identical to, human animals. After reconstructing Olson’s critique of the Standard View, I argue that Baker goes a long way toward meeting his challenge to account plausibly for the relationship between persons and human animals. Then I contend that her person-based Constitution View nevertheless has major difficulties: a “newborn problem”; a dubious ontology; and a problematic account of personal identity. I conclude with general reflections about this dialectic.

The idea of a patient's best interests raises issues in prudential value theory–the study of what makes up an individual's ultimate (nonmoral) good or well‐being. While this connection may strike a philosopher as obvious, the literature on the best interests standard reveals almost no engagement of recent work in value theory. There seems to be a growing sentiment among bioethicists that their work is independent of philosophical theorizing. Is this sentiment wrong in the present case? Does value theory make a significant difference in interpreting best interests? In pursuing this question, I begin with a quick sketch of broad kinds of value theories, identifying representatives that are plausible enough to count as contenders. I then explore what each account suggests in (1) neonatal treatment decisions, and (2) decisions for patients in persistent vegetative states. I conclude that while these accounts converge somewhat in their interpretations of best interests, they also have importantly different implications.

Advance directives permit competent adult patients to provide guidance regarding their care in the event that they lose the capacity to make medical decisions. One concern about the use of advance directives is the possibility that, in certain cases in which a patient undergoes massive psychological change, the individual who exists after such change is literally a (numerically) distinct individual from the person who completed the directive. If this is true, there is good reason to question the authority of the directive ‐ which is supposed to apply to the individual who completed it, not to someone else. This is ‘the someone else problem’. After briefly introducing advance directives as a basis for medical decision‐making, this paper elaborates ‘the someone else problem’ in the context of severe dementia. The paper then reconstructs the reasoning that leads to this putative problem and exposes the important underlying assumption that we are essentially persons. An alternative view of what we are, one that regards personhood as inessential, is then considered, before several arguments are advanced in favor of that alternative view. The paper next explores implications for advance directives: ‘The someone else problem’ is effectively dissolved, while it is noted that a related problem (one beyond the paper's scope) may persist. A few implications beyond advance directives are also identified.

Do bioethicists have an obligation to speak out against such atrocities as Hamas' terrorism and Israel's war crimes? I will argue that they do have such an obligation, but not because they are bioethicists or even ethicists. Before driving home this conclusion, I will highlight some crucial facts in applying criteria for ethical engagement in warfare. Although I maintain that Hamas' terrorist attack of October 7 involved crimes against humanity that deserve condemnation, here I will focus on Israel's subsequent conduct, the ethical significance of which has been insufficiently appreciated among those who embrace a highly prevalent double standard.

In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions. In particular, they argue for replacing the first condition—expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)—with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP). In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced.

Rarely do everyday discussions of ethical issues invoke ethical theories. Even ethicists deploy ethical theories less frequently than one might expect. In my experience, the most powerful ethical arguments rarely appeal to an ethical theory. How is this possible? I contend that ethical argumentation can proceed successfully without invoking any ethical theory because the structure of good ethical argumentation involves leveraging a sturdy norm, where the norm is usually far more specific than a complete ethical theory. To illustrate this idea, I present the argumentative structure of five powerful articles in the ethics literature. I further argue that the present model of ethical argumentation is consistent with the coherence model of ethical justification, but the former need not--and usually should not--invoke the latter explicitly for various practical reasons.

BackgroundThe use of great apes (GA) in invasive biomedical research is one of the most debated topics in animal ethics. GA are, thus far, the only animal group that has frequently been banned from invasive research; yet some believe that these bans could inaugurate a broader trend towards greater restrictions on the use of primates and other animals in research. Despite ongoing academic and policy debate on this issue, there is no comprehensive overview of the reasons advanced for or against restricting invasive research with GA. To address this gap, we conducted a systematic review of the reasons reported in the academic literature on this topic.MethodsSeven databases were searched for articles published in English. Two authors screened the titles, abstracts, and full texts of all articles. Two journals specialized in animal ethics, and the reference lists of included articles were subsequently also reviewed.ResultsWe included 60 articles, most of which were published between 2006 and 2016. Twenty-five articles argued for a total ban of GA research, 21 articles defended partial restrictions, and 14 articles argued against restrictions. Overall, we identified 110 reason types, 74 for, and 36 against, restricting GA research. Reasons were grouped into nine domains: moral standing, science, welfare, public and expert attitudes, retirement and conservation, respect and rights, financial costs, law and legal status, and longer-term consequences.ConclusionOur review generated five main findings. First, there is a trend in the academic debate in favor of restricting GA research that parallels worldwide policy changes in the same direction. Second, in several domains (e.g., moral standing, and respect and rights), the reasons were rather one-sided in favor of restrictions. Third, some prominent domains (e.g., science and welfare) featured considerable engagement between opposing positions. Fourth, there is low diversity and independence among authors, including frequent potential conflicts of interests in articles defending a strong position (i.e., favoring a total ban or arguing against restrictions). Fifth, scholarly discussion was not the norm, as reflected in a high proportion of non-peer-reviewed articles and authors affiliated to non-academic institutions.

The enhancement of human traits has received academic attention for decades, but only recently has moral enhancement using biomedical means – moral bioenhancement (MB) – entered the discussion. After explaining why we ought to take the possibility of MB seriously, the paper considers the shape and content of moral improvement, addressing at some length a challenge presented by reasonable moral pluralism. The discussion then proceeds to this question: Assuming MB were safe, effective, and universally available, would it be morally desirable? In particular, would it pose an unacceptable threat to human freedom? After defending a negative answer to the latter question – which requires an investigation into the nature and value of human freedom – and arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with MB, the paper closes with reflections on what we should value in moral behaviour.

This chapter opens with a conceptual investigation of suffering and distinguishes broad and narrow conceptions. The section that follows argues that if we bracket radical skepticism about animal consciousness (a position addressed later), there is ample empirical evidence that many animals, and not only mammals, are capable of suffering in this restricted sense. But insofar as the broader conception of suffering proves fundamental for moral purposes, the chapter takes up the question of what sorts of creatures can suffer in this sense. After a substantial empirical case is sketched for the thesis that animals from a wide array of species (at least mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and some fish) are capable of suffering in the relevant sense, a radical skeptical challenge is presented and rebutted. A brief coda considers implications for bioethics.

This volume offers a carefully argued, compelling theory of bioethics while eliciting practical implications for a wide array of issues including medical assistance-in-dying, the right to health care, abortion, animal research, and the definition of death. The authors' dual-value theory features mid-level principles, a distinctive model of moral status, a subjective account of well-being, and a cosmopolitan view of global justice. In addition to ethical theory, the book investigates the nature of harm and autonomous action, personal identity theory, and the 'non-identity problem' associated with many procreative decisions. Readers new to particular topics will benefit from helpful introductions, specialists will appreciate in-depth theoretical explorations and a novel take on various practical issues, and all readers will benefit from the book's original synoptic vision of bioethics. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The ethics of creating human beings has been addressed in several contexts: debates over abortion and embryo research; literature on ‘self-creation’ and discussions of procreative rights and responsibilities, genetic engineering and future generations. This book is a sustained, scholarly analysis of all of these issues—a discussion that attempts to combine breadth of topics with philosophical depth, imagination with current scientific understanding and argumentative rigour with accessibility. The overarching aim of Creation Ethics is to illuminate a broad array of issues connected with reproduction and genetics through the lens of moral philosophy.1 Chapter 1 introduces the concept of creation and the various ways in which human beings create, or someday will create, humans beings and particular types of human beings. It also clarifies how the book differs from existing literature and provides an overview of the other chapters. Chapter 2 addresses the moral status of the prenatal human being and the attendant ethical issues of abortion and embryo research. DeGrazia first defends a tripartite framework for understanding prenatal moral status: a biological view of our essence, a view of when we come into existence and a version of the time-relative interest account of the harm of death. The framework supports liberal views about abortion and embryo research. After rebutting the …

With an assortment of readings and perspectives from some of the most respected thinkers of our time, Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy provides a balanced, engaging introduction to today’s most pressing social and moral problems. This highly popular anthology illuminates the issues at the heart of each contemporary problem and encourages critical, fair-minded examination of varying viewpoints―all presented in the words of those who embrace them. Helpful editorial features include substantial chapter introductions, a summary preceding each selection, discussion questions, and bibliographies for further reading.

This volume presents a framework of general principles for animal research ethics together with an analysis of the principles' meaning and moral requirements. Tom L. Beauchamp and David DeGrazia's comprehensive framework addresses ethical requirements pertaining to societal benefit and features a thorough, ethically defensible program of animal welfare. The book also features commentaries on the framework of principles by eminent figures in animal research ethics from an array of relevant disciplines: veterinary medicine, biomedical research, biology, zoology, comparative psychology, primatology, law, and bioethics.