David DeMatteo

This article examines the viability of aspiring to a concept of objectivity that is defined by neutrality and apoliticism in psychological practice and research, with a focus on forensic psychology, and it argues that aspiring to this version of objectivity is both unrealistic and harmful. This article discusses attitudes toward social justice work in psychology, explores the extent to which the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct integrates social justice, and applies proposed expansions to the APA Ethics Code from Hailes and colleagues to forensic psychology. To conclude, it explores suggestions for integrating social justice considerations into the practice of forensic psychology while still adhering to the APA Ethics Code.

This paper makes an intervention into the debate between descriptivist and causal theories of reference-fixing by arguing that the two aren’t necessarily exclusive. One can formulate a theory of reference-fixing which closely mimics Kripke’s causal theory but which frames the relation between speakers in terms of descriptions rather than intentions. When a speaker utters the name, they associate the following description with the name: “the object/name that is referred to by the person I heard/read/learned the name from when they utter/write ‘nn’”. The reference itself will only be successful if 1) one object, and one object only, is determined by this reference, and 2) the descriptions stretch back to an individual who is the original ‘dubber’ of the name, whose descriptive content associated with the name does not incorporate the notion of reference. The majority of this paper is dedicated to showing both the tenability and the beneficial upshots of such a theory of reference, which, I will argue, both qualifies as descriptivist by Kripke’s own standards and does not fall victim to Kripke’s famous arguments against descriptivism. I conclude by responding to some criticisms of historical chain-descriptivism, and considering its implications for the descriptivism-causal theory dispute.

This paper makes a transcendental argument. It assumes the normative validity of the instrumental principle, and then investigates the conditions of its validity. Ultimately, it argues that there are three necessary conditions for its validity. Firstly, agents must be rationally capable of regarding themselves as having a single self that possesses the same reasons, ends, and means. Secondly, agents must be rationally capable of distinguishing themselves from other selves that possess ends. Thirdly, these two conditions must actually obtain, which means that we must have a self that has the same reasons, ends, and means, and that such selves must be distinct from one another. The paper fields two arguments in support of these three conditions and then offers an interpretation of the arguments to show that they vindicate all three conditions.

The purpose of this paper is to make a new distinction in metaethics. Specifically, I distinguish between externalism and internalism about normative principle validity (hereafter EINP). The basic distinction concerns whether the facts that make a given principle normatively valid for some subject are 1) particular facts about that subject (or agent-relative facts) or 2) facts about the world and the nature of agency in general (or agent-neutral facts). I call positions which emphasize 1) internalist positions, and positions which favor 2) externalist positions. I defend the conceptual originality of the distinction by arguing that it isn’t reducible to judgment internalism/externalism, reasons internalism/externalism, or realism/anti-realism about morality. Thereafter, I demonstrate the distinction’s philosophical merit by showing how it can resolve a dispute between Korsgaard and her detractors about whether normative principles need to be capable of “getting a grip” on an agent.