David Ellis

All atheists think that the central claims of religion are false, but not all atheists think that religion is useless. Some believe that, despite its falsehood, religious language and rituals are pragmatically valuable because they lead to goods worth getting. However, it is not easy for an atheist to engage in religion to obtain these goods because they can feel intellectually or morally insincere in saying and doing things they consider false or faulty. Religious fictionalism aims to address this by claiming that atheists can take part as they would in a fictional game of make-believe, and as they do so knowingly, they do so sincerely. We examine religious fictionalism from a Wittgensteinian perspective, which holds religious language as not in the business of asserting factual beliefs and religious rituals as not methods for achieving things. This leads to two challenges that indicate prima facie incompatibility between Wittgenstein and religious fictionalism: religious fictionalists are usually presented as atheists who think religious beliefs are false and are motivated to participate in religion because they believe it remains useful. We conclude with some responses to each challenge, showing that hermeneutic fictionalism is the most promising form of fictionalism from a Wittgensteinian view.

Pichler and Sunday Grève have recently argued that Wittgenstein took a dual approach of cognitivism and moderate non-cognitivism towards religious belief. I reply that this does not fully capture Wittgenstein’s view because it overlooks his understanding of the grammar of truth and belief in religion. Wittgenstein thinks the meaning of truth and belief is relative to the language game and form of life in which they are found, and he distinguishes claims that can be doubted (knowledge) from those that are immune to doubt (certainties). I argue that the grammar of truth and belief differ for knowledge and certainty and that Wittgenstein classed religious belief as the latter. However, a statement that expresses knowledge in one context can express certainty in another, and it is not always obvious which context the statement is in nor whether the two can be separated. For this reason, the same statement can be read following either grammar and appears to have cognitive and non-cognitive qualities. I conclude that identifying the duality in Wittgenstein’s view as grammatical captures many of Pichler and Sunday Grève’s views while offering a more nuanced account of Wittgenstein’s.

Some philosophers of religion are attracted to Wittgenstein’s claim of approaching religion in a descriptive and non-revisionary manner because they desire greater plurality and diversity of religions in their study. However, Wittgenstein’s account of religious beliefs as never based on evidence (i.e., non-evidentialism) and rituals as never performed as a means to an end (i.e., non-instrumentalism) results in a prescriptive conception of religion that impedes the plurality and diversity of religions apt for study. Moreover, since he thinks scientific beliefs are evidential and scientific practices are instrumental, he effectively dichotomizes religion from science. After demonstrating this, we counter that: (i) many religious beliefs are based on evidence; (ii) many religious practices are means to an end; (iii) not every society that has a religion separates it from science; (iv) Wittgenstein’s approach gaslights many religious believers.

Among the most popular arguments for God are those from design, which draw from science to argue that the universe is so finely tuned for life that it implies the existence of a designer. Wittgensteinians reply that although such arguments can convince a person that a creator exists, they do not necessarily lead to a religious belief. Wittgensteinians explain that a belief is religious because of what it is like, not what it is about, and what it is like is an aspect of a form of life. Convincing a person that a creator exists is not the same as changing their life religiously. Since arguments from design focus on the former over the latter, they often fail to develop religious beliefs. If this is convincing and such arguments aim to develop religious beliefs, supporters should reconsider the design of arguments from design. That said, Wittgensteinians are vocal in their complaints about the failures of arguments but quiet when asked to specify what a successful argument would look like. In this paper, I motivate the Wittgensteinian case against arguments from design and then outline what a successful argument needs to achieve and how it could be achieved. In doing so, this paper highlights the importance of changing lives alongside minds and encourages reflection on how arguments from design can be designed to do so.

The newly elected Labour Government in the United Kingdom promised change. However, the first 10 months have been disappointing, characterized by misjudged announcements regarding the Winter Fuel Allowance and Employers' National Insurance contributions. Yet, there is still time to get back on track with welfare reform and create a new welfare state that other countries can replicate. To this end, this commentary argues for a shift from means-testing to universalism across welfare provision. It further contends that a basic income should be gradually introduced based on affordability and public support. Additionally, it proposes that these changes be funded through taxation on wealth, particularly targeting online billionaires profiting from automation. Welfare reform represents an opportunity for Labour to make a difference and regain public trust and support, as evidence indicates public backing for restoring our public services. With the election of a Labour Government in the United Kingdom, there is a once-in-a-generation chance to address welfare reform and establish a new welfare state that other countries can admire. So far, the Labour Government's rhetoric and actions have been aligned with dampening expectations. The new government has experienced a disappointing first 10 months, marked by controversy after controversy stemming from inexperience and incompetence. Moreover, they have begun using antiwelfare rhetoric, such as the threat to remove driving licenses from benefit fraudsters. Therefore, we argue that Labour needs to be reminded of its mission to restore public services.

In Between Knowledge and Certainty, I argued that Wittgenstein’s distinction between knowledge and certainty is not just epistemological but grammatical (Ellis 2025). This paper revisits that claim in light of two potential challenges: first, that a statement can express certainty only if it expresses a true knowledge claim; second, that belief-in God’s existence depends on belief-that God exists. I argue these are not genuine epistemological problems, but grammatical misunderstandings resulting from a failure to distinguish surface from depth grammar.

Whether in sci- fi films, Reddit posts, or Congressional Hearings, there is a common intuition that if space- travelling aliens can visit Earth, then they will be able to learn any human language. Or, at the very least, that we will have enough mathematics and science in common to communicate. This chapter challenges these intuitions by examining Wittgenstein’s views on language and meaning. We will trace how Wittgenstein’s views change from a picture theory to a language game account of language and apply each to the question: if an alien could talk, could we understand it? We will see reasons for optimism and pessimism and propose that the above intuition should be exchanged with the following principle: whereof human and alien forms of life differ, thereof we cannot understand one another. The answer to whether we could understand a talking alien is not accountable to whether we’re intelligent enough to decode their language, but whether we have enough in common to make sense of one another. We conclude that differences in forms of life lead to differences in meaning and that human and alien forms of life could be so different that complete mutual understanding is an unrealistic expectation.

Wittgenstein claims that religious belief does not stand on evidence, that only those with a religious point of view can see an event as a miracle, and that experiencing a miracle can influence a person towards religious belief. This has the unusual outcome that a miracle can lead a person to God, but a miracle cannot be evidence of God. This also faces two challenges. First, if miracles can only be seen from a religious point of view, then suggesting that a miracle can influence a person towards religion implies that a person can see a miracle before having a religious point of view. Second, if religious belief is not based on evidence, then those who report believing because of evidence are confused about their beliefs in a way we would not expect. I argue that these are not challenges to Wittgenstein’s account but symptoms of our misunderstanding of grammar and his distinction between relative and absolute miracles.

There are mainly two types of questions asked about religious language: those about identity (e.g., what is a religious language?) and those about meaning (e.g., what do its sentences say?). Most philosophers focus on the latter because while they disagree about meaning, they agree that some sentences are religious and that our understanding of them does not depend on us knowing what makes them religious. In this article, I provide two reasons why questions about identity should receive more attention. First, theories of identity and theories of meaning share a two-way relationship where the characteristics of one influence those of the other, and so overlooking identity overlooks important characteristics of meaning. Second, the study of religious language has been shaped by this relationship for some time and being aware of it improves our understanding of conventional trends and contemporary debates. If successful, this article will motivate philosophers to reconsider the role of identity in research and to dedicate more effort to its study.

Hume argues that Christianity would be a superstitious delusion if it were based on the testimonial evidence that Christ performed miracles. Wittgenstein argues that those who base religious belief on evidence are 'ridiculous' and that evidence turns religion into 'superstition'. Despite appearing to undermine Christianity, I argue that Hume and Wittgenstein defend Christianity from being undermined when contextualised in their philosophical project. Their philosophical project aims to show what Christianity is like, and they show that it would be a superstitious delusion if it were based on evidential reasoning. Therefore, if we think Christianity is not a superstitious delusion then we should think it is based on something else. Hume calls this something else 'faith' but doesn't tell us much about it nor what miracles do for it. Wittgenstein, however, does, and his views not only map Hume's but offer insight into Christian life. Read in this way, both philosophers remind us that Christ came to save souls through faith, not minds through reason.