University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2014
Schenectady, New York, United States of America
  •  343
    Becoming non-Jewish
    In Alejandro Arango & Adam Burgos (eds.), New Perspectives on the Ontology of Social Identities, Routledge. forthcoming.
    This paper is on the metaphysics and normativity of Jewish identity. It starts with a metaphysical question: “Can a Jewish person become non-Jewish?” This question and the related question “What is Jewishness?” are both ambiguous, because the word “Jewish” is ambiguous. The paper outlines five concepts of Jewishness: halachic, religious, ethnic, and cultural Jewishness, as well as being Jewish in the sense of belonging to the Jewish community. In some of these senses of “Jewish” a Jewish person …Read more
  •  185
    How to Change an Artwork
    In Sidney Hook (ed.), Art and philosophy, New York University Press. 1966.
    The question of how people change artworks is important for the metaphysics of art. It’s relatively easy for anyone to change a painting or sculpture, but who may change a literary or musical work is restricted and varies with context. Authors of novels and composers of symphonies often have a special power to change their artworks. Mary Shelley revised Frankenstein, and Tchaikovsky revised his Second Symphony. I cannot change these artworks. In other cases, such as those involving jazz standard…Read more
  •  586
    How Statues Speak
    The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 80 (4): 444-452. 2022.
    We apply a familiar distinction from philosophy of language to a class of material artifacts that are sometimes said to “speak”: statues. By distinguishing how statues speak at the locutionary level versus at the illocutionary level, or what they say versus what they do, we obtain the resource for addressing two topics. First, we can explain what makes statues distinct from street art. Second, we can explain why it is mistaken to criticize—or to defend—the continuing presence of statues based on…Read more
  •  212
    Creating abstract objects
    Philosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.
    Beach's Gaelic Symphony is plausibly an abstract object that Beach created. The view that people create some abstract objects is called abstract creationism. There are abstract creationists about many kinds of objects, including musical works, fictional characters, arguments, words, internet memes, installation artworks, bitcoins, and restaurants. Alternative theories include materialism and Platonism. This paper discusses some of the most serious objections against abstract creationism. Arguabl…Read more
  •  22
    Medicalization and linguistic agency
    Ratio 33 (4): 232-242. 2020.
    Medicalization is the process by which conditions, for example, intellectual disability, hyperactivity in children, and posttraumatic stress disorder, become understood as medical disorders. During this process, the medical community often collectively assigns a label to a condition and consequently to those who would be said to have the disorder. We argue that there are at least two previously overlooked ways in which this linguistic practice may be wrongful, and sometimes, unjust: first, when …Read more
  •  60
    Fiction and indeterminate identity
    Analysis 80 (2): 221-229. 2020.
    In ‘Against fictional realism’ Anthony Everett argues that fictional realism leads to indeterminate identity. He concludes that we should reject fictional realism. Everett’s paper and much of the ensuing literature does not discuss what exactly fictional characters are. This is a mistake. I argue that some versions of abstract creationism about fictional characters lead to indeterminate identity, and that some versions of Platonism about fictional characters lead only to indeterminate reference.…Read more
  •  205
    Abstracta Are Causal
    Philosophia 48 (1): 133-142. 2020.
    Many philosophers think all abstract objects are causally inert. Here, focusing on novels, I argue that some abstracta are causally efficacious. First, I defend a straightforward argument for this view. Second, I outline an account of object causation—an account of how objects cause effects. This account further supports the view that some abstracta are causally efficacious.
  •  940
    Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?
    Philosophical Studies 177 (3): 805-824. 2020.
    Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard “All the Things You Are” without its original verse. If we accept that musical works genuinely change in these ways, a puzzle arises: why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony? More generally, why are some individuals in a privileged position when it comes to changing musical works and other artifacts, such as novels, films, and games? I give a …Read more
  •  37
    A Problem for All of Creation
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 76 (1): 98-101. 2018.
  •  829
    Music and Vague Existence
    Res Philosophica 94 (4): 437-449. 2017.
    I explain a tension between musical creationism (the view that musical works are abstract artifacts) and the view that there is no vague existence. I then suggest ways to reconcile these views. My central conclusion is that, although some versions of musical creationism imply vague existence, others do not. I discuss versions of musical creationism held by Jerrold Levinson, Simon Evnine, and Kit Fine. I also present two new versions. I close by considering whether the tension is merely an instan…Read more
  •  16
    Abstract and Concrete Products: A Response to Cray
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (3): 292-296. 2017.
  •  421
    Abstract Creationism and Authorial Intention
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (2): 129-137. 2016.
    Abstract creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional characters are abstract objects that authors create. I defend this view against criticisms from Stuart Brock that hitherto have not been adequately countered. The discussion sheds light on how the number of fictional characters depends on authorial intention. I conclude also that we should change how we think intentions are connected to artifacts more generally, both abstract and concrete.
  •  130
    Salmon on Hob and Nob
    Philosophical Studies 165 (1): 213-220. 2013.
    Nathan Salmon appeals to his theory of mythical objects as part of an attempt to solve Geach’s Hob–Nob puzzle. In this paper I argue that, even if Salmon’s theory of mythical objects is correct, his attempt to solve the puzzle is unsuccessful. I also refute an original variant of his proposal. The discussion indicates that it is difficult (if not impossible) to devise a genuine solution to the puzzle that relies on mythical objects