David Golemboski

Fair compromise is often taken to involve reciprocity and proportionality in concession-making. This paper examines challenges posed to this ideal by value pluralism: the proposition that there are multiple, irreducible basic goods. Value pluralism entails that parties to a potential compromise will sometimes act on the basis of non-shared interests not fully amenable to reciprocal determinations of proportionality. Specifically, certain judgments of value pose problems of epistemic inaccessibility and/or value incommensurability. I show that these problems arise with special visibility in conflicts involving law and religion, and suggest that in such cases the best that can be hoped for is a “blind compromise” in which the magnitude of the other party’s concessions remain uncertain. However, I suggest an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s Religion Clauses as framing a meta-compromise that brackets these problems and enshrines reciprocal concessions between law and religion as dual sources of authority.

Legal and philosophical theories of religious exemptions have primarily understood them as a means toward one or more moral ends: protecting rights and securing equality, primarily. But exemptions also serve an under-theorized stabilizing function in resolving conflicts between law and belief. In this paper, I argue that these conflicts pose a challenge to public justification, and ipso facto to political stability. I then show how religious exemptions can support stability by ameliorating these conflicts, and elaborate parameters for identifying those exemptions most likely to achieve this stability-enhancing effect.

Legal and philosophical theories of religious exemptions have primarily understood them as a means toward one or more moral ends: protecting rights and securing equality, primarily. But exemptions also serve an under-theorized stabilizing function in resolving conflicts between law and belief. In this paper, I argue that these conflicts pose a challenge to public justification, and ipso facto to political stability. I then show how religious exemptions can support stability by ameliorating these conflicts, and elaborate parameters for identifying those exemptions most likely to achieve this stability-enhancing effect.

Amartya Sen has argued that contractarian theories of justice inevitably fall victim to the problem of parochialism, for the reason that they rely on a problematically narrow conception of impartiality. Sen finds a corrective model of impartiality in Adam Smith’s figure of the impartial spectator. In this essay, I argue that Sen’s invocation of the spectator to resolve the problem of parochialism is unfounded, as the impartial spectator is fundamentally a product of socialization that serves to propagate conventional moral norms. I consider various interpretive avenues for “rescuing” the spectator from parochialism, and ultimately conclude that a minor amendment to Smith’s account, resting on the possibility of a conscience informed by moral pluralism, is required.

Many theories of liberal public reason exclude claims derived from religion on grounds that religious beliefs are not publicly ‘accessible’, because they are not amenable to meaningful evaluation by outsiders to the faith. Some authors, though, have argued that at least some religious beliefs are, in fact, publicly accessible. This paper examines the consequences of these arguments by exploring the accessibility requirement in relation to U.S. judicial precedent concerning religious accommodation. I first show that precedent accords de facto with the accessibility requirement by precluding judicial evaluation of the content of religious beliefs. I then show that this norm is independent of the status of religious claims vis-à-vis accessibility: even granting the accessibility of religious beliefs, other important political ends weigh against judicial evaluation of the content of those beliefs. I then generalize this conclusion to the broader enterprise of public reason, suggesting the general inadequacy of the accessibility requirement.