David Haugen

Parfit's reductionist theory of personal identity states that a person's persistence through time is just a matter of psychological continuity and connectedness. He uses this theory to argue against the requirement of equal concern: the view that a rational person should be equally concerned about all parts of her future. The argument is that since psychological connectedness is one of grounds of a person's concern for her future and since connectedness is weaker over longer periods, it follows that a person can rationally care less about her more distant future. I argue that Parfit's argument fails because the principles it employs generate counterexamples. I conclude by showing that if Parfit's view is modified so as to avoid these counterexamples, his argument against the requirement dissolves

In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment", Kant is concerned with the legitimacy of teleological judgments in the then emerging science of biology. Such judgments explain something by reference to its purpose, for example, the beating of the heart is explained in terms of its role in pumping blood to the rest of the body. McLaughlin's main objective is to provide an adequate interpretation of this part of the Critical philosophy, something he thinks that other Kant scholars have not done. McLaughlin's reconstruction of Kant's argument has three main steps, each of which constitutes a chapter of the book.